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AN INQUIRY 

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iTE OF THE NATION, 



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STATE OF THE NATION, 



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PRESENT ADMINISTRATION, 



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INTRODUCTION. 

SlNCE the constitution of this country 
acquired its present form, and public bu- 
siness came to be transacted regularly in 
the great council of the nation, it has 
been customary in all important junc- 
tures, for our representatives to undertake 
a general investigation of the state of our 
affairs. The method of conducting this 
examination has varied at different periods. 
Sometimes a motion for inquiry has been 

B 



AN INQUIRY INTO THE 



agreed to by the ministry, and their adver- 
saries have been permitted to bring for- 
ward their propositions upon the situation 
of the commonwealth. Sometimes the 
motion for inquiry has been opposed, 
while a view of the public misfortunes 
was given as the ground of claiming a 
solemn investigation. But in every case 
the inquiry has substantially been entered 
into, and has consisted always in the free 
and comprehensive discussion to which 
such motions gave rise. 

Those who have attended to the tactics 
of parliamentary debate, and remarked 
how greatly the separation of different 
articles of charge assists the party accused 
in shifting off the attack from any one 
point, will easily admit the superior ad- 
vantages of such a comprehensive view 
of the actual posture of affairs, as we 
commonly denominate " a state of the 
nation" It happens, however, that se- 
veral years have now elapsed, preg- 
nant beyond all former experience in dis- 
strous changes, without any diseussion of 



-STATE OF THE NATION. £ 

this wholesome and constitutional nature. 
In consequence, too, of certain recent oc- 
currences, it has been found impossible to 
investigate at all, even in their distinct cha- 
racter, those measures which occupied the 
government during the last vacation. And 
thus a new ministry is formed, and a 
new system about to commence, before 
the account has been settled with the old ; 
before the causes of our present calami- 
ties have been ascertained ; before the na- 
tion has been able to determine, either 
the extent or the origin of its dangers. 
Greatly as this change of men and of mea- 
sures is to be rejoiced at, we may ven- 
ture to question, whether it would not 
have secured more solid benefit to the 
country, had it been delayed until the wis- 
dom of parliament had been applied, to 
such a full discussion of the late calami- 
tous interference with continental affairs ; 
and such a comprehensive review of our 
present situation in every particular, as 
can alone furnish the ground-work of that 
radical change of system, in which our 
B 2 



4 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

only remaining chance of salvation must 
be sought. 

It is to be feared, however, that the 
change of ministry has deprived us alto- 
gether of the benefits which would have 
resulted from a parliamentary investigation 
of these grave and difficult subjects : and 
it becomes the more necessary to attempt 
such a compilation of particulars, as may 
assist the public in examining the question 
out of doors. — -With this view the follow- 
ing statement is drawn up. It is a very 
humble attempt at providing a substitute 
for the information respecting the state of 
their affairs, which the people would have 
received from the deliberations of their 
representatives, had the formation of the 
new ministry been so long delayed as to 
have given time for an inquiry into the 
state of the nation. 

This disquisition may conveniently be 
arranged under three heads — as it relates 
to the state of our foreign relations, our 
domestic ceconomy and our colonial 
affairs. It is of the last importance that 



STATE OF THE NATION. 



the country should be able to estimate the 
nature and extent of its resources in each 
of these departments ; and to appreciate 
the system of management in all of them, 
which has given rise to the unparalleled 
dangers that at present surround us on 
every side. After examining under each 
head the causes of our calamities, and fairly 
stating their real extent, we shall shortly 
inquire if there are any changes of system 
by which the fate of the empire may yet 
be stayed. 



AN INQUIRY INTO TIIX 



FOREIGN RELATIONS. 

In discussing this primary and import- 
ant branch of the subject, it is necessary 
to dwell at greater length on points which 
have never been brought before the Houses 
of Parliament. Of these the most material, 
is the late continental policy of the British 
government. We shall accordingly begin 
with an examination of the various particu- 
lars presented by the history of the " Third 
grand Coalition." We shall then take a 
view of the situation in w T hich it has left 
our external relations. Our attention will be 
directed in the next place toward the re- 
maining objects of foreign policy in the 
present crisis ; more particularly the state 
of the neutral questions; and we shall con- 
clude with suggesting the change of sys- 
tem which the previous deductions appear^ 
to prescribe. 

I. THE LATE CONTINENTAL ALLIANCE. 

] . The first circumstance which strikes 
us in contemplating the system of nego- 



STATE OF THE NATION. 7 

tiation lately pursued by the British cabi- 
net is, that the documents laid before par- 
liament furnish no evidence of any at- 
tempts having been made to procure the 
mediation of our allies for an amicable ad- 
justment of our differences with France. 
As far back as May 1803, a direct assure - 
ance was given by ministers, that they 
would solicit the mediation of Russia, and 
in recommending this salutary measure, 
all parties cordially united. A communi- 
cation of a pacific nature was received 
from the French government at the begin- 
ning of 1 805. His Majesty declined en- 
tering into any negotiations until he should 
consult his allies, and especially the Em- 
peror of Russia; but he expressed himself, 
at the same time, desirous of seeing such 
a peace established as might be consistent 
with security and honour. 

It is well known that the dispositionsof 
Russia towards this country were never 
more favourable, nor her sense of duty 
towards the rest of Europe more strong, 
than at the time when the king returned 
this answer. — Our cabinet then, with the 



AN INQUIRY INTO THE 



concurrence of all parties, stood pledged 
to procure, if possible, the mediation of 
Russia : The dispositions of France were 
officially announced, at least, to be pacific. 
Russia was engaged in the most confiden- 
tial intercourse with us : His Majesty was 
advised only to delay entering upon an 
amicable discussion with France, in con- 
sequenceof that intercourse with Russia. — 
Might it not have been expected that our 
cabinet would seize this happy juncture, 
to press for the mediation of our august 
ally, and thus to redeem its pledge, at 
least, if not secure an honourable termina- 
tion of the dispute ? Yet it is not a little 
remarkable, that in the whole mass of 
papers laid before parliament with a view 
of detailing the history of the late negoti- 
ation, no traces whatever are to be found 
of any steps towards obtaining the medi- 
atory interference of Russia, 

On the contrary, our communica- 
tions with that power have been from 
the beginning of a war-like nature. — 
The treaty of Concert, llth April, 
1805, the Urst result of our negotiations, 



STATE OF THE NATION.' Q 

is framed for the purpose of marching half 
a million of men against France, in the pay 
of England, (Art. m*.) That a mediator of 
differences should be in a respectable state of 
strength, in order to interpose with effect, 
is not denied ; but no power can assume 
the functions of an umpire after forming 
such a concert with one of the con- 
tending parties. It deserves further to 
be remarked, that the pacific inclina- 
tions expressed in his Majesty's answer 
to the French message, appear never to 
have produced any effect on our negotia- 
tions. The Cabinets of Vienna and St. 
Peters burgh were engaged in the cor- 
respondence which gave rise to the war, 
as far back as November, 1804. The 
British government was a party to this 
intercourse at the same time. The French 
message was communicated during these 
negotiations, and no circumstance appears 
either in the official documents, or in the 
conduct of the parties, tending to shew that 
'this pacific proposal produced any effect 

* Treaties, p. 9. f Supplerr^ntary Papers, p. 4. 



] AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

upon the progress of an intercourse avow- 
edly hostile to France. 

But it may he said that the seizure of 
Genoa rendered it impossible for Russia to 
mediate, or hold any amicable corre- 
spondence with France. To this various 
answers are obvious. The Russian medi- 
ation was first thought of long after the 
invasion of Switzerland — a violation of the 
treaty of Luneville infinitely more im- 
portant to the interest of all parties, than 
the annexation of Genoa. The incorpora- 
tion of Piedmont, without any indemnity 
to the king of Sardinia, was made in ex- 
press violation of the same treaty, and in 
contempt of specific engagements with 
Russia herself: yet this neither prevented 
Russia from offering her mediation, nor 
our government from pledging themselves 
to accept it. But, in truth, it is absurd to 
lay any stress upon the seizure of Genoa, 
when the first article of the treaty of 
Concert, concluded two months before that 
event, bound Russia and England to league 
against France in measures of hostility, 
" without waiting for further encroach- 



STATE OF THE NATION. 1 i 

ments on the part of the French govern- 
ment*." 

Long before the seizure of Genoa, then. 
Ave had given up every chance of Russian 
mediation, by our hostile league with the 
court of St. Petersburgh ; and that event 
was viewed with exultation by the friends 
of the new war, as an additional means of 
rousing Austria and Russia to join us — not 
with regret as an obstacle to the work of 
pacification, which we had pledged our- 
selves to undertake.- Even after our allies 
had placed themselves in a commanding 
posture of military preparation, and were 
fully disposed to embrace whatever plan 
might be most effectual for restraining the 
encroachments of France, no attempt was 
made to avail ourselves of so favourable a 
juncture, for effecting that object in the 
manner pointed out in 1803, by the united 
voice of parliament. Our government 
seems only to have been anxious that there 
should be a battle, and impatient but to 
&e the fighting begin. This leads us to 

Treaties, p. 8. 



1 2 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

the next remark suggested by the history 
of the late coalition. 

2, The league appears to have had no 
precise or definite object in view. To at- 
tack France, and try the issue, is the only 
fixed point of concert. How far the allies 
were prepared, in the event of their suc- 
cess, to propose such an arrangement as 
might secure the future independence of 
Europe, may be determined by a conside- 
ration of the purposes for which they avow 
that the league was formed. These are 
stated in Art. n. of the treaty of Concert*. 
We shall begin with the independence of 
Holland. 

By the treaty of Luneville, the inde- 
pendence of Holland was guaranteed, and 
at the peace of Amiens France pledged 
herself to withdraw all her troops from 
the Dutch territories. It is of little mo- 
ment to inquire by what circumstances, 
the fulfilment of these stipulations was 
retarded. The war between France and 
England finally prevented them from 
taking effect ; but France has repeatedly 
* Treaties, p. 9. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 1 3 

declared her readiness to evacuate Holland 
as soon as the other points in dispute 
should be settled. Suppose the new con- 
federates were successful in the war, and 
demanded a renewal of the stipulations 
respecting Holland. France withdraw s 
her troops from that country during the 
peace which ensues — during the period 
when it is not her interest to keep troops 
there. But as soon as a new war b ea';s 
out — as soon as the occupation of Holland 
is of tlte smallest importance to France, or 
detriment to us, has she not the means of 
again overrunning the Dutch territories in 
a week ? The whole of Flanders, from 
Ostend to Antwerp, from Antwerp to 
Wesel, is her's. No barrier remains be- 
tween the enormous mass of the French 
dominions, and the little, insulated, de- 
fenceless province of Holland. The 
strongest part of her frontier, the triple line 
of fortresses which surround France on the 
north, is opposed to the weakest side of 
the Dutch territories. Long before the 
guaranties of Batavian independence could 
possibly send a man to the Rhine, the 



14 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

French would take Amsterdam, and keep 
the country as easily as they can defend 
the rest of their provinces. The Hollanders 
of this age are no longer the men who in- 
undated their fields to defend their liberty. 
France has a party in the councils, and in 
the nation of the republic, and nothing 
could be more chimerical than to hope 
that she would meet with any resistance 
from the unaided patriotism and resources 
of this state. 

When, therefore, the new alliance 
professes to have in view the establish- 
ment of the Dutch independence, one 
of two things must be meant : either that 
nominal independence which consists in 
the removal of French troops, and which 
was guaranteed in the treaty of Luneville — 
or that real independence which consists 
in security from French influence during 
peace, and invasion during war; which was 
obtained for the Dutch by their own spirit, 
and the assistance of their allies at the be- 
ginning of the eighteenth century ; which 
they only lost by the conquest of Bel- 
gium. To make war for the first of these 



STATE OF THE NATION. 15 

objects was evidently most unwise : it was 
attained by the treaties of Luneville and 
Amiens, and, when attained, was perfectly 
useless. To make war for the second 
object was quite absurd, unless those other 
measures were in contemplation, which 
alone could secure it ; and the treaty of 
Concert gives us no hint whatever of any 
such measures. We are, therefore, left to 
conclude that the allied powers wished to 
see Holland once more independent, but 
did not know how to gratify this desire; 
that they had a general design of freeing 
the Dutch from French influence, but 
could discover no means of doing so ; 
that, therefore, they resolved to attack 
France, but, if successful, they were not 
prepared with any specific demands in fa- 
vour of Holland. In so far then as the 
interests of Holland were concerned, the 
purpose of the allies was perfectly vague 
and indefinite ; it was merely the pur- 
pose of beginning to fight, trying their 
fortune, and afterwards finding out what 
they wanted. 

Nearly the same observations apply to 



I 6 AN INQUIRY INTO TILE 

the independence of Switzerland, which is 
stated as another object of the coalition. 
At the peace of Luneville, France was left 
in possession of the bishopric of Bale, the 
Frickthal, Savoy, and the territory of 
Geneva. The two first of these possessions 
give her a complete command of the passes 
of Havenstein, and consequently of the 
entrance into the plain of Switzerland from 
the north ; while the acquisition of Savoy 
and Geneva throws open a passage on the 
south. With such advantages, it might 
be difficult for the Swiss themselves to 
prevent the return of the French troops 
at any time. But all plans for the inde- 
pendence of that country must evidently 
be futile, which do not originate in a firm 
union with the inhabitants, and no such 
union could well be hoped for under 
the constitution established by the, inter- 
ference of France. The league for making 
Switzerland independent, however, spe- 
cifies no plan by which such an object is 
to be accomplished. The allies seem to 
have thought, that after France should be 
conquered, they would have time to dis- 



STATE OF THE NATION. 1 7 

cover how Switzerland might be made free, 
and to settle whether Savoy was to be se- 
parated from France, or the Frickthal 
given back to Austria, or Geneva restored 
to independence. 

The re-establishment of the King of 
Sardinia, in Piedmont, is another object 
of the coalition. This must strike every 
one as a strange proposition to come from 
the, court of St. Petersburgh ; the court, 
which after pledging itself to obtain an 
indemnity for his Sardinian Majesty, 
carried through the whole business of 
the German indemnities in active con- 
cert with France, and suffered the scene 
to be closed without any mention of that 
Prince's name ; the court which began in 
league with France, to parcel out Germany 
among its dependants, immediately after 
Piedmont had been seized by France, in 
violation of her pledge to Russia. No less 
singular is it to observe, that the prime 
mover of this claim in the Ring of Sardi- 
nia's favour is England, which gave him up 
without a struggle at the peace of Amiens ; 
c 



15 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

and then witnessed unmoved, the parti- 
tion of Germany. But the singularity of 
the interest displayed for Piedmont is com- 
plete, when we find that the third party 
in the league is Austria, who now comes 
forward in concert with the cabinets of 
St. Petersburgh and London, to avenge 
the King of Sardinia's cause against France, 
when a few months before she had been 
dragooned into the spoliation of Germany, 
by that very France, with the assistance 
of one of those cabinets and the connivance 
of the other. It is easy to perceive how 
little credit all those parties are likely to 
get with the rest of the world, either for 
their honesty or their wisdom — for their 
disinterested zeal in behalf of Piedmont, 
or their systematic views of the general 
policy of Europe. 

Moreover, it would be difficult to ima- 
gine any less determinate or specific 
scheme than that of a war, for the re- 
establishment of the Sardinian family on 
the continent, " with as large an augmen- 
" tation of territory as circumstances will 



STATE OF THE NATION. 1Q 

permit *." While Savoy belongs to Trance, 
while the Italian republic is subject to her 
sovereign, and the Ligurian territory is at 
least controuled by her influence ; the 
mere restoration of dominion provides no 
security against the sudden resumption of 
that province as soon as France may find 
it convenient. This object, therefore, is 
as vague and indefinite as the general plan 
of rendering Holland independent, while 
Belgium and the left Bank of the Rhine 
belong to France. 

The bare statement of the next proposed 
object is sufficient to shewthat it belongs to 
the same class — "the future security of the 
kingdom of Naples," There is apparently 
something less vague in " the evacuation of 
Italy by the French forces." But if by 
Italy is meant Naples and the states of the 
church, the treaty of Amiens bound France 
to withdraw her troops from thence ; she 
had entered into the same engagement 
with his Sicilian Majesty, and had stipu- 
lated with Russia, in general, to respect 

* Treat, p. 9. Art. II. Letter C. 
C 2 



20 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

the independence of Naples. These obli- 
gations were fulfilled by France immedi- 
ately after the peace of Amiens, and until 
the commencement of the present war she 
had no troops in the Sicilian territory., 
When, however, she found it convenient 
to occupy it again, no obstacle was thrown 
in her way : So slender is the " security" 
which Naples can derive, from France 
complying with such demands as the allies 
had proposed to make after a successful 
war ! But, if by the evacuation of Italy, 
the allies meant the recal of French troops 
from the Italian republic, we may observe, 
that this was a most futile object of war. 
The whole Cisalpine territory is substan- 
tially a province of France; whether she 
rules it by French or by Italian troops. Sub- 
ject to her sovereign; governed by the 
constitution which she has imposed ; ad- 
ministered either by her emissaries or her 
creatures — that province, even if entirely 
freed from French armies, would continue 
under the influence of France, acknow- 
ledge her alliance, and receive her troops 
as soon as hostilities were renewed. So 



STATE OF THE NATION. 21 

nugatory is it to propose, as the object of 
an offensive league, the single, unsupported, 
ineffectual measure of recalling the French 
army from the Cisalpine. 

The last object of the allies, is only in 
appearance, more vague than those already 
considered. u The establishment of an 
i( order of things in Europe which may 
" effectually guarantee its security and 
u independence." Here, as in the former 
cases, we are left to guess at the particu- 
lars, and have no means of discovering 
how the general end in view is to be at- 
tained by the concerted plan of hostilities» 
This is the character of all the branches of 
the scheme, except only one, " the eva- 
cuation of Hanover," — an object in itself 
so trifling, as not to merit consideration, 
among projects for the liberation of the 
v/orld ; and placed, it should seem, at the 
head of these plans, rather in compliment 
to one of the contracting parties, than 
from its value in the eyes of the rest. 

A league, then, of unparalleled expense 
and vast risk is concerted, without any 
precise object but that of beginning a war , 



22 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

without any view more specific than a 
vague desire of curbing the power of 
France ; without a plan more comprehen- 
sive than that of freeing from momentary 
oppression, a few detached parts of the 
French dependencies ; with no preconcerted 
scheme for securing their independence, or 
for carrying into effect the general wish 
that has been formed to check French 
usurpation. — But, it may be asked, is the 
situation of Europe so hopeless that no 
means can be devised for accomplishing 
the grand objects which we have been 
rapidly surveying ? Must Holland be \\m- 
ted in fate with Belgium, and the Cisal- 
pine decide the destinies of the south ? — ? 
The consideration of these matters belongs, 
to a future stage of this inquiry. At pre- 
sent, iU is enough to have shewn that 
those objects bear no relation to the mere 
act of commencing a hostile coalition ; that 
the fortune of war might drive the French 
troops out of Holland and Naples, without 
rendering those states less dependent on 
France ; that the emancipation of Europe 
could only be obtained from a war of this 



STATE OF THE NATION. 23 

description, in the most improbable event 
of its leading to the entire conquest of 
France ; and that the choice of instant hos- 
tilities, without giving any reasonable pros- 
pect of success, in prosecuting the general 
scheme, precluded all chance of paving the 
way to better times, by a gradual and peace- 
able arrangement. The only specific ob- 
ject of the coalition, then, was to make 
war upon France, and try the event. Let 
us next inquire, whether this object was 
prosecuted with such a degree of wisdom, 
as bestowed any title to expect that the 
event would be prosperous. 

3. In order to attack France with a fair 
prospect of success, it was indispensably 
necessary, that the different states of the 
continent should feel how much their real 
interests depended upon a diminution of 
the French power. By our inteferrence, 
indeed, it was possible that the moment 
of their recal to a true sense of policy and 
duty, might be somewhat accelerated. 
But no salutary or lasting conversion could 
reasonably be expected from such a sudden 
ehange as our intreati.es or subsidies might 



24 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

work, before the natural course of events 
had prepared them for adopting a new line 
of conduct. During the wdiole of 1 802, 
Russia was not only blind to the encroach- 
ments of France, she w r as actively assisting 
them ; she was leagued with that power 
in the new partition of Germany, which 
has been called the "Settlement of Indem- 
" nities" — in other words : France having 
despoiled several powerful princes of 
their dominions, was now pacifying them 
with the territories of several w T eaker states • 
and Russia, by a cordial support, enabled 
her to accomplish what the Germanic body 
in general viewed as an unparalleled vio- 
lation of justice. In the same operation, 
Prussia, w T ho had lost nothing, was an 
active coadjutor ; and these three great 
powers were thus, so late as the middle of 
1803, leagued together, for the purpose of 
aggrandizing themselves or their dependants 
at the expense, partly of Austria and her 
allies — partly of other powers, who had 
been spectators of a contest, in which their 
weakness prevented them from engaging. 
This most unpromising state of things conti- 



STATE OF THE NATION. 25 

nued during almost the whole of 1803, and 
until a coolness began to arise between Rus- 
sia and France ; not on any solid grounds ; 
not because France had made new en- 
croachments — but rather from certain tri- 
fling and personal motives. Our clear 
policy was to have improved this change ; 
confirmed the alienation of Russia ; and 
attempted slowly to heal the wounds 
which her late conduct had an evi- 
dent tendency to inflict on Austria. 
But to push hastily at any active measures 
— to hurry on an intimate union of two 
powers, lately in a state almost hostile; 
or even to engage Russia suddenly to ex- 
change her alliance with France, for an 
open rupture, was in every view the height 
of rashness and impolicy. Far from pres- 
sing Russia towards so premature a con- 
duct, it was our interest to have restrained 
her until both her own time and the time 
of Austria- was come ; and, instead of re- 
joicing, that the seizure of Genoa gave 
both those powers a new desire to resist 
the French encroachments, it was our bu- 
siness to curb .their sudden resentment, 



20 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

until it could be displayed with effect ; 
and to retard the moment of their attack 
upon France, until their mutual relations 
were cemented and their resources were 
ripe for so dreadful a contest. 

Let us consider whether this has been 
our policy. Hie documents laid before 
parliament, defective as they are in vari- 
ous particulars, furnish a most imper- 
fect history of the late alliance ; but they 
contain evidence quite sufficient to convict 
us of having adopted and persisted in a 
line of conduct, the very reverse of that 
which has just now been sketched. 

In November 1804 * the negotiations 
between Austria and Russia were going 
on with a view to an offensive alliance. 
England must therefore have begun her 
operations at St. Petersburg!! long before 
that period, probably before the end of 
1803, or immediately after the union be- 
tween France and Russia was relaxed. At 
any rate, it is certain that an alliance be- 
tween this country and Russia existed as 

p Sir Arthur Paget's Dispatch, Sup. Pap. p, 4. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 27 

early as July 1804, and was the subject of 
common conversation during the course of 
that month. The British cabinet, there- 
fore, took advantage of the very first cool- 
ness that appeared between France and 
Russia, (chiefly on account of the Due 
d'Enghien's death) to offer subsidies and 
precipitate R ussia towards a war. A sub- 
sidiary treaty was concluded with Sweden 
also, at the beginning of December 1804. 
But, without the assistance of either 
Prussia or Austria, it was obviously in 
vain to think of a continental war. Per- 
haps it was foolish to think of succeeding 
in such a scheme, without the co-opera- 
tion of both those great powers. Was 
it wise, then, to begin by engaging Russia 
and Sweden as principals, and trusting to 
chance for obtaining as accessories, those 
who ought to have been the principals ? 
It was for Austria that the struggle was 
to be made, and by her exertions alone 
that it could succeed. Her resources were 
to bear the shock of the war, or her exist- 
ence was staked upon its issue ; yet we do 
not apply to Austria, but to Russia, or rather 



2S AN INQUIRY INTO THX 

we first apply to Austria — we find she is not 
ready, or not willing to begin the war for 
her own interests ; and therefore we go to 
Sweden and Russia, who happen at the 
time to be in ill-humour with France. 
This was surely not the best way of secur- 
ing the cordial union of Austria. 

We have already noticed the terms upon 
which Austria and Russia were at the 
beginning of the Year 1803; but the jea- 
lousy which had subsisted from the affairs 
of Switzerland in the last war, and which 
the business of the indemnities inflamed, 
received its last aggravation in May, 1 804, 
from the promulgation of the secret con- 
vention, Oct. 1801, between France and 
Russia. Austria now saw a neighbour 
whose ambition she suspected, and whose 
power she dreaded, acting in conjunct 
tion with her natural enemy, as the sole 
arbiter of the south of Europe; taking 
upon herself the guarantee of Naples, Sar- 
dinia, and Rome ; and stipulating for the 
general arrangement of the balance of 
Italy. Excluded by the successes of her 
enemy from all territorial power beyond 



STATE OF THE NATION. 2 9 

the Adige, she now saw herself cut out 
from all concern in Italian affairs, by the 
interference of her former ally. In the 
temper of mind which such a discovery 
was calculated to produce, she found that 
Russia and France were involved in a sud- 
den quarrel. She plainly evinced her good 
dispositions towards the latter, by immedi- 
ately acknowledging the Chief Consul's 
new title, which Russia and Sweden pe- 
remptorily refused ; and she took this oc- 
casion of assuming a similar dignity to her- 
self, against which Russia and Sweden pro- 
tested* — And this was the moment chosen 
by the British cabinet for applying to Rus- 
sia as the arbiter, the saviour of Europe ; 
and to Sweden as the other great cham- 
pion of -the same cause ! Surely, if any 
principle in practical policy ever deserved 
the name of self-evident, it is this, that 
our interest was by all means to avoid 

* See Talleyrand's and D'Oubril's notes of May 
16, July 21, and August 28, 1 8O4.— Imperial and 
Swedish notes to the Diet, August 24 — 26, 1304.. 



SO AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

whatever might give umbrage to Austria » 
to court her most, who must always be 
our best ally ; and if we could not effect 
a cordial reconciliation between her and 
Russia, at least to beware of taking such 
a part with the latter, as must involve us in 
the consequences of the disunion*. 

Having, however, made common cause 
with Russia, our next object was to ob- 
tain, at any rate, the accession of Austria. 
Nor can there be a doubt, that we availed 
ourselves partly of the formidable influ- 
ence of Russia — partly of our subsidies — • 
partly of fallacious representations of our 
own strength, and the dispositions of 
Russia ; to force the cabinet of Vienna 
prematurely into a rupture with France. 
In order to demonstrate this, we have only 
to consult the Treaties and Supplementary 
Papers. By the first separate article of 



* In the foregoing argument, it is not intended so 
much to state absolutely the sentiments of England, 
with regard to Russia, whose late conduct has been so 
pure and magnanimous, as to describe the feelings of 
Austria, and the deference which those feelings might 
have been expected to meet with from England. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 3 1 

the Treaty of Concert, England agrees with 
Russia to subsidize Austria, provided 
she shall take the field against France in 
four months *. This is a public article, 
and intended for the inspection of Au- 
stria. But there is a secret article f 
added, by which England engages not to 
refuse the benefits of the treaty to Austria, 
if she shall take the field during any part 
of 1805. This article was intended only 
to be used, if the threat contained in the 
former one should fail in bringing Austria 
forward. The two articles are of the 
same date. — Further, Lord G. L. Gower, in 
a dispatch dated Sept. 3, expresses his 
hopes that the Austrian cabinet " may be 
induced not to wait the issue of the pro- 
posed negotiations with France J," but to 
commence hostilities immediately. His 
hopes are founded on " the last dispatch 
from the Russian minister at Vienna;" 
where it appears, therefore, that war had 
not been resolved upon in the last week of 



* Treaties, p. 1 1 . f Treaties, p, -0. 

I Supp. Pap. p. 10. 



32 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

August. Yet, at the very same time, the 
march of the Russian armies towards the 
frontiers of Austria and Prussia, was for- 
mally announced to the Austrian cabi- 
net*; and as far back as July 16th, offi- 
cial notice was given that Russia intended 
to put her forces in motion by the middle 
of August f . It is clear, therefore, that 
Russia was determined to act offensively, 
whatever Austria might resolve upon ; 
and that this determination was used to 
quicken the cabinet of Vienna. According- 
ly we find, in the very able Paper of Aus- 
tria, entitled, " Plan of Operations J,'' 
the most decisive proofs of her unwilling- 
ness to come forward. A general view 
is taken of the relative situations of France 
and Austria, and the inference is drawn, 
" that the maintenance of peace till a 
more favourable juncture shall arise, 
seems to be infinitely desirable" The 
answer of Russia, which is indeed a paper 

* Supp. Pap. p. 6, 16. f Supp. Pap. p. 40. 

% Supp. Pap. p, 21. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 3 3 

of very inferior abilitv, combats those 
positions ; affects to view the situation of 
Austria as much more prosperous ; denies 
that any more favourable juncture can 
arise ; and concludes that Austria, " as- 
sured of the assistance of Russia and Eng- 
land, should not hesitate to renew the 
war as speedily as possible *." In enume- 
rating the inducements held out to Au- 
stria, the cabinet of St. Petersburgh does not 
fail to notice " the immense sums of mo- 
ney which England is ready to sacrifice,' 1 
and the " powerful diversions which she 
will operate in Holland, Flanders, and 
Germany, perhaps even the regular inva- 
sion of France by her troops f ." And that 
Austria did listen to such hopes, we learn 
from her own minister at London, who 
mentions the delay of England to attack 
France in the North, as the first cause of 
the subsequent disasters J. 

Such then was the unwillingness of Au- 



* Supp. Pap. p. CO. 1 Ibid. p. 29 & 30. 

t Ibid. p. 51 8r 52. 



34 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

stria, and such the means employed to 
bring her into the late ruinous contest. 
— And truly when we reflect on the ex- 
hausted state in which the last war had 
left her ; when we consider the loss of her 
ancient provinces, best situated for offen- 
sive operations, and the various difficulties 
which opposed themselves to any attempt 
at calling forth the resources of her new 
acquisitions ; when we survey her finances, 
involved, in unexampled embarrassment, 
and her cumbrous administration, check- 
ing in every quarter the development of 
her natural strength; when, above all, 
we think of the universal dread of a new 
war, which prevailed through every rank 
of her people, dispirited by a recollec- 
tion of the last, and impressed with a 
firm belief in the ascendant of France; 
when, to all this, we oppose the signal 
advantages of her enemy in every particu- 
lar ; — a compact and powerful territory, 
impregnable to attack, and commanding 
its neighbours from the excellence of its 
offensive positions ; an army inured to 



STATE OF THE NATION. 3 5 

war, and to constant victory ; an armed 
people intoxicated with natural vanity, 
and the recollection of unparalleled tri- 
umphs ; a government, uniting the vigour 
of military despotism with the energies of 
a new dynasty ; an administration, com- 
manding in its service all the talents of 
the state ; finances, unburthened by the 
debts of old monarchies, and unfettered 
by the good faith of wiser rulers ; finally, 
a military expedition of vast magnitude, 
at the very moment prepared, and appli- 
cable to any destination which the change 
of circumstances might require — when 
we contrast these mighty resources with 
the remnant of her strength which Austria 
had to meet them, we shall marvel but 
little at her backwardness to seize the pre- 
sent juncture for beginning a war, which, 
if unprospcrous, must be her last. In a 
prudent delay she saw that every advan- 
tage might be expected; — an improvement 
of her domestic oeconomy ; a gradual ame- 
lioration of her political constitution ; the 
correction of those evils in her military 

D 2 



3 5 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

system, which had formerly proved fatal ; 
the change of conduct towards her fron- 
tier provinces, which the experience of 
last war prescribed ; the progress of her 
rich dominions, and numerous and vari- 
ous population in civility and wealth ; the 
confirmation and extension of her foreign 
alliances. On the other hand, most of the 
enemy's advantages were likely to be im- 
paired by delay ; many of them were pe- 
culiar to the present crisis ; almost all of 
them were of a temporary nature. The 
pursuits of commerce might temper his 
warlike and turbulent spirit ; the formid- 
able energy of a new government might 
yield to the corruption which time never 
fails to engender; and though kept quite 
pure, could not but relax during the in- 
terval of quiet ; the constitution was likely 
to become either m6re despotic and weaker 
for offensive measures, -or more popular 
and less inclined to adopt them ; for a na- 
tion always becomes a wiser and better 
neighbour in proportion as its affairs are 
influenced by the voice of the coramu- 



STATE OF THE NAIION. 37 

nity : The arts of peace must modify that 
system of military conscription which 
made every Frenchman a warrior : The 
remembrance of recent victories would 
gradually wear away, both in the army 
and the nation : Allies might desert from 
better views of their interest ; dependant 
states might throw off the yoke, when 
the}- recovered from the panic that made 
them bend to it ; neutral powers might 
be roused to a just sense of their duty, 
when a successful resistance seemed prac- 
ticable, and the re-establishment of the 
Austrian affairs furnished a center round 
which to rally : The army destined to in- 
vade England w r ould probably fail in the 
attempt, or at any rate might be occupied 
in making it : Factions were more likely 
to disturb the vigour of the government 
when the continent was at peace ; nay, 
the chance was worth considering, which 
every delay gave, of some sinister accident 
befalling the chief, whose destinies in- 
volved those of France herself, and whose 
power had not yet received its last conso- 
2 



38 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

lidation. — Every thing then rendered a 
delay as hurtful to the enemy as it was 
desirable to Austria, and her allies. If 
France had been called upon to chuse the 
juncture of her affairs* at which a new 
continental league should be formed against 
her, not only with safety, but with emi- 
nent advantage to her interests, she would 
have chosen the year 180 4 ; that the ope- 
rations of this league, after it had once 
been formed, should be delayed till the 
latter part of the year, she could scarcely 
have dared to hope. If Austria had been 
desired to name the crisis at which her 
present necessities, as well as the prospects 
of bettering her condition, most clearly 
enjoined an adherence to peace, she must 
have been blind, indeed, not to fix upon 
the same period ; and, if she had shut her 
eyes to her most obvious interests, it 
would have been the best policy of her 
allies to undeceive her, and chiefly of Eng- 
land, who had no stay on the continent 
but Austria. But the blindness was ours ; 
Austria was alive to her true interests, as 



STATE OF THE NATION. 3 9 

she knew her real situation ; and we un- 
happily prevailed upon her to seek certain 
ruin, by partaking of our infatuation. 

4. We now come to examine with what 
prospects of assistance from . Prussia the 
late attempt to deliver the continent was 
undertaken. Upon this part of the sub- 
ject several principles are self-evident It 
is manifest that every effort should have 
been made, and even any reasonable sa- 
crifice offered, for the prospect of so in- 
estimable an advantage, as the accession 
of Prussia to the league. Without her 
co-operation, every chance of ultimate 
success was against the allies; with her 
aid it was scarcely possible their scheme 
could altogether fail. If she persisted in 
adhering to her neutrality, this was at 
least an additional reason for the delay 
which so many other circumstances con- 
curred to recommend. But, at any rate, 
it was the consummation of headlong im- 
patience to hurry on the execution of the 
enterprize, before time was given to obtain 
a definitive answer from Prussia, whe- 



•40 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

ther favourable or adverse to the views of 
the league. What shall we say, then, if it 
appears, that, far from waiting until Prussia 
had become favourably disposed, the allies 
did not even suspend their measures until 
she had given a positive answer ; that far 
from waiting to ascertain whether Prussia 
meant to join them, or remain neutral, they 
rushed into the war before they knew 
whether she was to remain neutral, or to 
take part with France ! — The documents 
laid before parliament, defective in every 
branch of the details, are peculiarly so 
upon this important subject ; but they 
contain, nevertheless, sufficient evidence 
of the foregoing propositions, especially 
when coupled with the official communi- 
cations of the continental powers. 

In September, 1804, Prussia declared to 
Sweden her resolution to remain neutral, 
and in December she heard of the subsi- 
diary treaty between Sweden and England, 
A notice was immediately given by the 
court of Berlin, that the king of Prussia 
was determined to protect the neutrality 



STATE OF THE NATION. A 1 

of the north, and his Swedish majesty was 
warned against adopting offensive opera- 
tions against France*. At the beginning 
of 1805, therefore, the allies had no reason 
to expect much from the side of Prussia ; 
but this transaction neither prevented 
England from indulging in hopes of suc- 
cess at Berlin, nor from hurrying on mea- 
sures at St. Petersburgh and Vienna, as if 
there was no chance of failure. 

In the " Plan of Operations" proposed 
by Austria, we find mention made of " a 
great and important step which the Em- 
peror of Russia has taken at the court of 
Berlin,' from the result of which " the 
allies are to learn how far they may reckon 
upon the co-operation or neutrality of 
Prussia^." Neither the nature nor the 
success of this step is disclosed ; but that 
the allies, while combining their military 
plans, were ignorant of Russia's determi- 
nation, is proved both by the foregoing 
passage, and by the following particulars — 

* See Count Hardenberg's note, Dec. 24, 1804. 
| Sup. Papers, p. 25. 



42 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

In the Russian answer to the paper just 
now cited, it is stated that Austria, being 
assured of Russia, " will not be under any 
great necessity of maintaining a force to 
observe Prussia* " Here then is a con- 
siderable doubt expressed as to the inten- 
tions of Prussia, and all hopes of her 
co-operation seem to have vanished. But 
soon after, the uncertainty increases, and 
a hope of assistance is changed, first into 
fear, least she should oppose — and next 
into an expectation of her hostility. 

In the protocol of the conferences held 
between the Austrian and Russian generals, 
July 16, 1 805, for the purpose of arrang- 
ing the military operations of the allies, 
we find an express agreement, that the 
second and third Russian armies shall be 
" employed on the frontiers of Prussia, for 
the purpose of making demonstrations 
against her ]." And in the treaty of 
Concert between Russia and England, 
there is an article (viii. Separate Art. J) 

* Sup. Papers, p. 30. f Sup. Papers, p. 42. 
1 Tieaties, p. 17. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 43 

binding the parties to make common cause 
against any state (meaning Prussia) " which 
may, either by employing its forces, or by 
too intimate a union with France, pretend 
to raise obstacles to the measures of the 
league." 

Thus we find that the scheme was en- 
tered upon with the prospect of resistance 
from Prussia ; that this was, however, not 
ascertained, but that the measures were 
nevertheless pushed forward ; and that, 
when the details of the plan came to be 
settled before taking the field, the first 
service required of the allied powers was 
found to be " making demonstrations 
against Prussia ;" either to induce her to 
join the league, or to prevent her from 
opposing it. Nor were these calculations, 
however indefinite, altogether unfounded; 
for it appears that, when the combined 
armies took the field, they were kept in 
check by Prussia a whole month. 

Count Stahremberg, the Austrian mi- 
nister, in a note upon the causes of the de- 
feats in Swabia, and the capture of Vienna, 



AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

ascribes these melancholy events in a great 
measure to " the advance of the second 
Russian army being retarded more than a 
month, by the first armaments which the 
cabinet of Berlin threatened to oppose 
to those of the court of St. Petersburgh*." 
It was not then till the second week in 
October, and after the disasters of the 
allies had begun, that they knew any thing 
certain respecting the dispositions of 
Prussia. 

The accidental circumstance of the vio- 
lation of Anspach, which no one could 
have foreseen, first determined Prussia not 
to attack the members of the league. 
Before that moment, they had reason to 
fear that she would not even be neutral, 
and they planned their defensive measures 
accordingly. But through the whole of 
their negotiations and arrangements they 
pressed forward in the dark. Far fromde- 
laying their attack till they had disposed 
Prussia to join them, they began it with 

* Sup. Papers, p. 52, 



STATE OF THE NATION*. 



the prospect of her hostility, though, even 
of that prospect, they did not take time to 
be fully ascertained. 

The conduct of Prussia suggests two 
important observations upon the proceed- 
ings of the allies. In the first place it 
appears that her Avarlike preparations kept 
the Russian armies in check for more than 
a month. Before the beginning of Sep- 
tember, therefore, the allies were convinced 
that, instead of her assistance, they had 
rather to reckon upon her hostility. Ad- 
mitting that this important point was not 
ascertained before the Russian army began 
their march, it was at least established before 
the first movements of Austria, and before 
her rupture with France was irrevocably de- 
clared ; for the court of Vienna continued 
to hold a pacific language to the French 
government in its declaration of the third 
of September, and its armies did not cross 
the Inn till the seventh*. It is manifest, 



* See Second declaration of the court of Vienna — 
" The court of Vienna has no other motive than that 



4Q AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

therefore, that war was not inevitable for 
some time after the hostile views of the 
cabinet of Berlin were apparent, and that 
even the hasty steps which had been taken 
by the allies might still have led to no fatal 
consequences, if they had paused as soon 
as the unfavourable dispositions of Prussia 
were displayed. To all the measures 
of rashness and imprudence, however, 
which marked this unhappy confederacy 
from the beginning, the fatal error was 
now added, of throwing away the last 
chance of accommodation, when new 
obstacles to the success of the war 
daily arose ; of finally breaking the 
peace, at the very crisis when the hos- 
tility of Prussia rendered the war utterly 
hopeless. 

But, in the next place, when the senti- 
ments of the court of Berlin received- a 
sudden change, from the violation of 



of maintaining peace and friendship with France, and 
securing the general tranquillity of the Continent."— 
Also Proclamation, Sept. 21, 1805, of the Archduke 
Charles to the army in Italy. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 47 

Anspach, and when the}' became, upon 
the whole, unfavourable to France, if not 
favourable to the coalition, it seems won- 
derful that no attempt should have been 
made by England to avail herself of this 
happy revolution ; — not indeed for the vain 
purpose of inducing Prussia to join the 
league, which the very day before she had 
been prepared to oppose — but in order to 
use her new enmity towards France as a 
means of regaining the ground which the 
allies had lost by their rashness, and of 
submitting the whole dispute to Prussian 
mediation, before it went further, at a time 
when France would have listened to what- 
ever came from Berlin ; while the forces 
of Austria were not irreparably injured, 
and the armies of Russia were still unim- 
paired. It never could be expected that 
Prussia would at once take the field, how 
much soever her dispositions might have 
been suddenly improved. Before she could 
prepare either her resolution or her forces, 
the French were sure to push their suc- 
cesses against the Austrians the more 



48 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

strenuously that they had a prospect of 
opposition from a new quarter. Nothing, 
therefore, was more obvious than the 
policy of obtaining some delay at least, if 
not a safe retreat from our dangerous po- 
sition, through the sudden good wishes of 
Prussia. But the same blind zeal for mere 
fighting prevailed, which had led to the 
occupation of Bavaria. The allies con- 
tinued in the field without any attempt 
to attain what alone could save them; 
and England intoxicated with the chime- 
rical hope, that the events of one day 
would root out the policy which had been 
growing up at Berlin for twelve long years 
of various fortune, anxiously urged on the 
work she had begun, and counted upon 
Prussia as a sure resource. 

It is indeed highly probable that the an- 
cient jealousies of Austria and Prussia, awa- 
kenedby the late transaction of the indemni- 
ties, opposed obstacles to any cordial union, 
even at this crisis of affairs, and might have 
prevented the measure of attempting an ac- 
commodation with France through Prussia, 



STATE OF THE NATION. 4Q 

which circumstances now suggested. But 
this rivalry formed no part of our estimate 
when we entered upon the war. No steps 
had been taken, indeed no time had been 
allowed, for any attempt to overcome it ; 
and we have ourselves only to blame, if 
untoward circumstances, overlooked by 
our blind impatience to see the continent 
in arms, have eventually frustrated the cal- 
culations into which they did notenter : We 
have ourselves only to blame, if we formed 
a league which could not succeed without 
the cordial union of power* divided by 
long hatred and recent quarrels ; hur- 
ried the allies into critical situations, where 
perfect unanimity alone could save them ; 
and gave no time for those measures of 
conciliation, without which it was vain to 
expect even the semblance of cordiality*. 

* It is inconsistent with the plan of this inquiry to 
cite any authorities which are not official ; but a very ex- 
traordinary tract has lately been published by Mr. Gentz, 
which, from particular circumstances, deserves to be 
noticed. Its inferiority to all this gentleman's otherr 
writings is ?o striking, that nothing but the uncontra- 
dicted avowal of his name on the title page.could have 
induced any one to think it the production of his pen. 
£ 



50 AN INQUIRY INTO TUB 

5. Having now traced the fatal impolicy 
which gave rise to the late alliance, and 
precipitated the confederates into the war^ 
we shall direct our attention to the parti- 
cular errors that accompanied the opera- 
tions of the league. Of these the most 
remarkable, and the most extensive in its 
effects, is a strange want of concert which 
appears from the commencement between 
the two principal parties — England and 
Austria: England the prime mover and soul 
of the union, and Austria its main support; 

Among other lingular assertions, it contains one 
which requires either a contradiction or acknow- 
ledgment by the members of the ]ate cabinet — that 
a treaty was concluded between Russia and Prussia 
before last December. No such treaty has been men- 
tioned in the papers laid before parliament ; yet 
surely a full statement of its contents would have been 
much more decorous, than such an allusion to it as Mr. 
Gentz here makes. He adds, that he is placed in situa- 
tions which cnab e him to " fee into the secret move*- 
meats of the different political springs, of which the 
events we now witness are the visible results'' — p. 28. 
Now as hi^ place of counsellor at war is merely nominal, 
(however creditable the title may be,) and as he is not in 
the confidence of the Austrian court, it is difficult to 
imagii e what situation he can fill, except he may have 
enjoyed the confidence of the English cabinet. If he 
did — if a foreigner was admitted to this confidence,, there 
is room for inquiry ; and if a confidential agent has told 
the secret of a Prussian treaty, why is that still withheld 
Ettim parliament ? 



STATE OF THE NATION. 3 1 

It cannot fail to strike any one who 
peruses the documents laid before parlia- 
ment, that throughout the whole of the 
late negotiations, Austria has kept herself 
studiously aloof from any direct intercourse 
with this countiy ; until the moment that 
a subsidy is to be given, no communica- 
tion exists between the two powers. We 
have treaties with Russia and with Sweden, 
but not one with Austria. Whatever 
comes from Vienna, comes through St. 
Petersburgh. Our correspondence with 
Austria is carried on by means of our 
Russian alliance ; our relations with the 
emperor, the ancient ally of England, and 
the main-stay of her continental influence* 
shrunk into a sort of appendage to our 
concert with the Northern Powers — the 
inventors of the armed neutrality, the 
executors of the German indemnities, and 
the recent confederates of France. In 
order to be satisfied of the extent to which 
our alienation from Austria has proceeded, 
it is necessary to examine the whole of 
the treaties and dispatches that have been 
E 2 



52 AN IN&UIftY INTO THB 

made public. But we shall mention a 
few of the most remarkable proofs, as a 
clue to the more ample investigation of 
this alarming topic. 

The uniform anxiety of Austria to ap- 
pear wholly unconnected with England, 
is one of the most singular features in 
the conduct of the late continental alli- 
ance. By an article * added to the Treaty 
of Concert it is stipulated by Russia on 
the part of Austria, that in case those 
two powers should, at the opening of the 
campaign, disavow their connexion with 
England, yet as soon as the war is fairly 
begun, they shall acknowledge the con- 
nexion. Thus the appearance of a con- 
cert with England, was so odious on the 
Continent at the time which we chose 
for stirring up the new coalition, that our 
confederates stipulate for permission to 
begin their operations by Asserting a di- 
rect falsehood in order to conceal it. Fur- 
ther, when England agrees to subsidize 

* July 24, 1805, Treat, p. 24, 



STATE OF THE NATION. 5$ 

Austria, in case she shall come forward 
within a certain time, the stipulation is 
made, not with the court of Vienna — not 
in consequence of the relations subsist- 
ing between that court and the cabinet 
of St. James' 9-_but with the court of 
St. Petersburgh, and " in consequence of 
engagements subsisting between Austria 
and Russia*." In the same spirit is the 
settlement of the plan of operations be- 
tween Austria and Russia, by diplomatic 
correspondence, and conferences of mi- 
litary counsellors ; from all which Eng- 
land is carefully excluded ; nor, indeed, is 
she once mentioned in the course of them, 
except at the moment when subsidies are 
to be considered, and then some notice is 
taken of her f. This anxiety to appear 
unconnected with England, is so remark- 
able in the whole conduct of Austria, 
that even in the proclamation after the 
capture of Vienna, when the emperor is 

* Treaty of Concert. Sep. Art. Treat, p. 11, 
f Treat, p. 32. Sup. Pup. p. 39, et «eq. 



54 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

encouraging his people with a view of the 
hopes which still remain, he enumerates 
<( the great and unexhausted resources 
which he finds in the forces of his high 
allies and friends, the emperor of Russia^ 
and the king of Prussia," and makes no 
allusion whatever to England, the main 
spring of the war*. 

But the anxiety to avoid the reality 
of such a concert as well as the appear- 
ance of it, until the moment that sub- 
sidies were required, is strikingly illus- 
trated by the total exclusion of the 
English minister at Vienna, from all share 
in the negotiations carried on with the 
Russian minister at the same court : and so. 
wonderfully well were the cabinet of Lon-. 
don gained over to second this plan, that 
they seem to have kept their envoy in 
utter ignorance of what was going on 
both at St. Petersburgh and Vienna, un- 
til every Gazette writer in Europe was 
acquainted with the whole business. 
This forms so singular and so instructive 

* Declaration of Brunn, Nov. 13, 1805. 



STATE OF THE NATION. £5 

a feature in the late negotiations, that 
we must refer more particularly to the 
parts of the papers which illustrate it. 
It appears from the dispatches of Sir 
A. Paget, (June 5, June 22, July 6, and 
August 3, 1805*) that he was endea- 
vouring all along to discover the views 
of the Austrian cabinet, as well as he 
could by his own observation, and his 
conferences with Count Cobcnzel. In 
his dispatch of August 29 f, he informs 
our government that he has at length 
been put in possession by Count Cohen- 
zel, of the negotiations carried on be- 
tween Russia and Austria during the last 
ten months ; and that about the same 
time, the same secret was communicated 
to him by Lord G. L. Gower. The rea- 
son of his being at length intrusted with 
the transaction speedily appears : the 
court of Vienna conceive that it will 
be more convenient to treat directly 
through him about the amount of the 

1 Sup. Pap. p. 1, 2, & 3. -!■ Ibid. p. 4. 



56 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

subsidies*. In his dispatch of Septem* 
ber 5, the same envoy states, that he has 
learnt from Count Cobenzel, that he may 
soon expect a communication relative to 
the British plans respecting Naples f . 
From the declaration of the Russian 
cabinet, August 7, it also appears, that 
the terms upon which England and 
Austria were to treat had been discussed 
at Vienna, on the 7th of July, by the 
ministers of the emperor and the Russian 
envoy, while the British envoy, though 
upon the spot, was not even aware that 
any such intercourse was carrying on Jo 
But the most singular of all the proofs 
which these documents afford of this 
point, is contained in Sir A. Paget's ex- 
cellent dispatch of October 24, in which 
he enumerates with distinguished ability, 
the causes of the failure in Swabia. " In 
sett) the plan of the campaign," says 
he, " it must have been calculated that 
previous to the opening of it the Russians 

* Sup. Pap. p. H. f Id. pc 7. X Treat, p. 31 & 32, 



STATE OF THE NATION* 5 7 

would have joined. This, in truth, how- 
ever false and extraordinary, was the cal- 
culation which was made, Upon what 
it was founded I cannot exactly say*." 
Now it happens that this calculation never 
was made ; on the contrary, both in the 
Austrian plan of operations and the Rus- 
sian answer to itf, the impossibility of 
the Russians arriving before the cam- 
paign should begin, and the necessity of 
the Austrians sustaining the first attack 
alone, is explicitly stated. The same ad- 
mission is made in the calculations of the 
military conference, held July 1 0, to dis- 
cuss the plan of the campaign J. There- 
fore, it is clear ,. that as late as the 24 th 
of October, our minister at Vienna was 
utterly ignorant of the military confer- 
ences carried on in that capital, upon 
the measures of the coalition, as far back 
as the 16th of July, and of the diploma- 
tic correspondence upon the same subject, 

* Sup. Pap. p. 1 2, t Id. p. 30. J Id. p. 40. 



53 an iNQurRY i>rro the 

Which had passed between the two im- 
perial courts at a still earlier period. 

This is a very serious charge either 
against the British cabinet, or their en- 
voy, or both. When the affairs of the 
league were discussed at Vienna, the pro- 
per person to attend the conference on our 
part was our envoy, and not the ambas- 
sador of Russia. Austria seems, indeed, 
always disposed to prefer treating with 
Russia ; but our envoy ought at least to 
have been fully informed of the intercourse 
that subsisted, especially after Austria 
consented to hold a direct communication 
with him. If he was unworthy of such 
confidence, he was unworthy of his post, 
and the blame of the cabinet, which kept 
him on so important a station during so 
critical a juncture, is aggravated tenfold. 
If he had from any cause become disa- 
greeable to the court where he was sent to 
reside, he was not the person to represent 
the mover of the new league in the coun- 
cils of the chief confederate ; and the 
English cabinet instead of retaining him, 



STATE OF THE NATION. £() 

&t such a post, to the extreme detriment 
of the common cause, should have re- 
placed him by a person against whom 
similar objections did not exist. But 
we are far from suspecting that this 
was the case : It remains then, for the ca- 
binet who superintended this strange ne- 
gotiation, to explain the reason of their 
unwillingness to confide in their own 
agent, and the aversion of the Austrian ca- 
binet to communicate with him. 

When we survey the whole machinery 
then, by which the grand coalition was to 
be moved and regulated, we discover 
nothing but weakness and confusion — a 
total want of strength in the materials; of 
skill in the arrangement of the parts ; of 
harmony in their movements. England, 
the main-spring of the union, is not suf- 
fered to communicate directly with Aus- 
tria the great moving power ; while the 
intercourse with such a petty member of 
the system as Sweden, is constant and 
intimate. Russia, calculated by nature to 
pperate as a grand auxiliary to Austria, 



Co an iNaurav into Ttn; 

is first made the centre of the movement, 
and then the balance and director. The 
instruments of communication employed 
by England, are either distrusted by her^ 
self or by her allies, with whom they are 
nevertheless stationed to the exclusion of 
fitter instruments, and the increased de-» 
rangement of the machine. But above all, 
though England furnishes the sinews of 
the war, and originates the whole opera- 
tion, she is not allowed a single voice in 
directing or controuling it ; she is excluded 
from all influence over the operation after 
it is once resolved upon ; studiously re- 
pressed at all times, except when the 
wheels cannot move without her assistance, 
and even then only permitted to interfere 
with her services, and compelled to ab- 
stain from advice. 

Now it may probably be stated that the 
powers of the continent would not coa- 
lesce with us on any other terms ; that 
from dislike of our active interference ir* 
continental affairs, they refused to involve 
themselves in a more close connection with 



STATE OF THE NATION. 6l 

l 

us than the necessitous state of their fi- 
nances required ; that from dread of of- 
fending France before the scheme was ma- 
tured, they would not acknowledge the 
extent of their intercourse with us ; that 
from these motives they refused to give us 
any share of influence in arranging the 
measures of the league, and even declined 
admitting us to an intimate knowledge of 
their concerted scheme. — We believe 
there may be much truth in this statement, 
and that it will contain a just account of 
the matter, if to these motives of repug- 
nance, we add a great distrust of our politi- 
cal wisdom in continental affairs ; and per- 
haps some doubts of our good faith, arising 
from our conduct in former wars. But the 
existence of these prepossessions against us, 
is the very reason why this juncture should 
not have been chosen for a new coalition ; 
and whatever may have been the motives, 
the repugnance of Austria and Russia to 
ally themselves with us, was a sufficient 
argument against pressing the formation of 
a league. Austria would not give us bet- 



$2 AN INQUIRY INTO THB 

ter terms, you say — That is no reason for 
making a confederacy upon bad terms, but 
a perfectly good reason for waiting till 
better can be obtained. There was no ab- 
solute necessity for making war on France 
in the summer of 1 805. It is to be hoped 
we were not in such fear of invasion, as to 
buy the short respite of a diversion at any 
price : There was no pressing occasion, so 
far at least as the country was concerned, 
for having a continental campaign finished 
before the session of parliament began : It 
is to be hoped that our representatives 
would have granted supplies without the 
stimulus of a war in the circle of Austria ; 
and a confidence in the wisdom of govern- 
ment might have kept them in good hu- 
mour, without the fearful amusement of 
battles between French and German 
armies. After we had unwarily begun a 
new coalition, we might have paused when 
we found the obstacles to its success so 
insurmountable. There was no fatality to 
make us persist in arming the continent, 
when we perceived that the powers of 
Germany would neither unite together nor 



STATE OF THE NATION. 03 

Confide in us. We should have sacrificed 
nothing but our temerity, and lost nothing 
but our too sanguine hopes, had we put 
off the execution of our rash design, when 
we discovered that Austria would not treat 
directly with us ; that she durst not avow 
our friendship, until Russia came up to pro- 
tect her from the consequences of such an 
admission ; that the cabinets of Vienna 
and Berlin, could not be brought to forget 
Silesia and the Indemnities. It was an 
ample ground for refusing to complete the 
league, that the allies would give us no 
voice in forming the plans of the cam- 
paign, or even in arranging the system of 
the war ; that they for the first time re- 
cognised the enemy's favourite policy of 
excluding us from the continent, and 
would not hear a whisper from us until the 
moment when our money was wanted. 

But every part of our conduct is marked 
with the same deplorable impatience which 
prompted the first step. Haying in our 
rashness resolved to make a league, not- 
w ithstanding the unfitness of the times, 



04 AN INGtUIRY INTO TJ*E 

the same temerity made us persist in ottf 
scheme, in spite of the backwardness and 
distrust of our allies. We hurried on 
matters to a new coalition, at a moment 
when the enemy alone could lose by a delay ; 
and pressed forward the coalition to a new 
war, when our allies, spiritless and ineffi- 
cient in themselves, would neither suffer 
us to participate in the formation, nor in 
the knowledge of the common schemes, 
" Make war" — was our cry — " successful- 
ly if you can, but make war. — League 
against France — wisely and cordially if pos- 
sible, with such a union among yourselves 
and such solid help from us, as may give 
some small chance of safety, if not of ad- 
vantage — but at all events league against 
France. " Thus a coalition and a campaign 
were the only objects in the contemplation 
of our government, and they fatally attain- 
ed their wish ; they got up the concert of 
St. Petersburgh, and the invasion of Bavaria. 
There was a convention and a war, how- 
ever, which they did not bargain for ; the 
enemy was as rapid in completing the pic- 



STATE OF THE NATION. QS 

ture as they had been in preparing the 
canvas ; the finishing, too, for so hasty a 
performance, was wonderfully harmoni- 
ous with the original design — he gave them 
in a few weeks the conquest of Austria. 
and the treaty of Presburg. 

0. We now proceed to follow the na 
tural development of the errors which 
presided over the formation of the league, 
and mingled themselves in its composition. 
To the total exclusion of England from 
her just and natural influence in the ar- 
rangement of the war, the disasters which 
followed may in a very great degree be 
ascribed. We shall enumerate a few of 
the faults committed by the allies, which 
our interposition might effectually have 
prevented, and of which we must share the 
blame if we could have interfered and 
did not. 

(l .) To some it may perhaps appear ex- 
travagant to maintain, that England should 
have interposed her voice in the nomina- 
tion of the Austrian generals. Yet it is 
certain that upon former occasions she 

F 



60 AN IN&UIRY INTO THK 

used this privilege, and that she has fre- 
quently named the commander of an en- 
terprize to which, besides her subsidies, she 
contributed in a very limited proportion. 
How attentively Russia was listened to on 
this point, we have clear evidence in the 
" Protocol of conferences." The Russian 
court expressly refuses to place her troops 
under the command of any one but an 
archduke *. There was no risk of England 
making such a stipulation : on the con- 
trary, had she been allowed to concert 
upon this important matter, it would have 
been her duty to enforce the sacrifice of so 
absurd a condition. Were France to have 
such a connection with any of her allies as 
we attempted to form with Austria and 
Russia ; were her interests closely involved 
with the success of the common opera- 
tions ; were she engaged to give for the 
troops employed, at the rate of twelve 



* Sup. Pap. p. 41. Not meaning the Archduke 
Charles — but in the case of his being indisposed, 
providing that none but an Archduke shall succeed 
him. 



TATE OP THE NATION. 07 

pounds ten shillings per man yearly, that 
more than treble the amount of their pay — 
can we doubt that she would insist upon 
a voice, in the great question of chusing 
to whose talents and fortunes, the fate of 
the enterprise should be committed ? The 
choice of general Mack was in every respect 
singularly injudicious ; from the authority 
of Sir A. Paget, we learn that he was ex 
tremely disagreeable to the archduke. He 
prabably owed his appointment to court 
intrigue ; but the archduke's strong pre- 
judice against him, whether founded upon 
experience of his character, or upon mere 
personal dislike, if that illustrious prince 
can be suspected of such a motive, was an 
insurmountable objection to his employ 
ment. He had formerly been eminently 
unsuccessful in Italy. Those who served 
with him in Flanders thought meanly of 
his talents. That he was a man of mili- 
tary detail, an excellent quarter- master-ge- 
neral they admitted : that he understood his 
art in theory too, and could combine a good 
military plan, was not denied. But the 
F 2 



$8 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

best judges in our own army, believed him 
to be devoid of that versatility of genius, 
which enables a commander to vary his 
preconcerted schemes with the s u den 
change of circumstances; they even knew 
him to be deficient in that presence of mind, 
which gives a leader the command of his 
personal recourses, under an unexpected 
turn of affairs ; in other words, he was 
understood to have precisely those defects 
which most completely disqualified him 
for opposing the captains of France. This 
opinion of general Mack was stated by of- 
ficers of high rank and great respecta- 
bility in the British army, long before the 
surrender of Uim. If our cabinet knew 
it and neglected it, their culpability was 
great : but still more have they to answer 
for, if they were ignorant of what might 
so easily have been ascertained. 

(2.) A grand error was committed by 
the Austrians in passing the Inn, and 
carrying the war at once into Bavaria, 
before the Russians were near to support 
them. This has been fully exposed in 



STATE OF THE NAfflON. Cq 

Sir A. Paget's dispatch of October 24*; 
and had he been admitted, like the Russian 
envoy to the conferences at Vienna, we 
are entitled to presume, that the influence 
of England would have been exerted to 
recommend a wiser plan. But it is not 
merely in this point of view that England 
should have interfered to modify the plan 
of the campaign. The violation of the 
Bavarian neutrality, with the circum- 
stances of injustice affirmed to have at- 
tended it, would have called imperiously 
for the interposition of an ally, who, from 
her disinterested views, was the proper um- 
pire between those neighbouring powers, 
and whose pure principles of continental 
policy were committed by the oppressive 
measures of her confederates. 

The suppression of evidence prevents 
us from ascertaining the precise extent of 
the injustice done to Bavaria. The ac- 
count given by the elector, is in a material 
degree at variance with that of the Aus- 
trian government. The frrmer states his 
desire to remain neutral, and asserts that 

* Sup. Pap. p, 11. 



7© AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

Austria rendered this impossible, by sudn 
denly demanding an incorporation of the 
Bavarian with the imperial troops ; refus- 
ing to hear of any alternative but the im- 
mediate dismission of the whole Bavarian 
army ; and instantly following up these 
violent demands with seizing the electoral 
dominions *. 

The emperor, on the other hand, af- 
firms, that his Serene Highness had re- 
solved to join France ; that prompt measures 
were requisite to prevent this step — and 
that the Elector behaved with great dupli- 
city while he was maturing his plant . ?ut 
it is distinctly admitted by the emperor, that 
without previously preparing the Elector, 
or attempting by negotiation to engage him 
in the league, a requisition was suddenly 
made of his assistance, and of the junction 
of his army with the allies. It is proved 
by a dispatch of Sir A. Paget J, that the 

* Historical representation of the Elector Palatine, 
Sept. 29, 1805. • 

f Answer of Austria, Oct. 16. 

% Sup. Pap. p. 1. The dispatch is dated Sept. 5, 
before it could possibly be known at Vienna what 
answer was to be given to the proposals of the Prince. 



STATE OF THE NATION. ? X 

Emperor sent Prince Swazemberg, Sep- 
tember 3, to intimate the march of his 
army through Bavaria. The Emperor ac- 
knowledges* that this prince was the 
bearer of his first proposal to the court of 
Munich, where he arrived on the Oth — 
that the Elector's answer was not given 
till the 8 th, before which time all the 
arrangements for seizing Bavaria had 
finally been made. 

Now it is manifest that, if the plans of 
the electoral court were doubtful, or if 
they leant towards neutrality, as the 
Elector states, this conduct of Austria was 
at once impolitic and unjust. But if the 
politics of that court were so decidedly 
French, as the Emperor asserts, then the 
sudden attack of Bavaria was the very 
worst expedient which could be devised 
for gaining her over to the alliance, and 
counteracting the influence acquired by 
France in the court of Munich, from the 
affair of the indemnities. In rearing up 

* Austria Answer of 0<ft. 16, 



72 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

that influence, Prussia had been chiefly 
instrumental — England had suffered it — 
Austria had but feebly opposed it. Its 
effects were likely to be felt for at least 
fifteen months after its establishment, and 
the confederates rashly hurry into a new- 
war, where that influence must be highly 
detrimental, without making any prelimi- 
nary attempts to counteract it, and before 
time has been given for its wearing away. 
At any rate the errors and improprieties 
of the manner in which Bavaria was at- 
tacked, were obvious, and England kept 
aloof at the moment when her councils 
or influence might have rectified them. 

(3.) The arrangements of the campaign 
between the Austrian and Russian envoys, 
as detailed in the Protocol of conferences*, 
are evidently founded upon the most unac- 
countable mistakes with respect to the 
operations of the French troops. The 
combination proceeds on the supposition, 
that a Russian army marches nine German 



Sup 



Pap. p. 36, et se^.— See particularly p. 46, 



STATE OF THE NATION. 73 

miles in four days at an average or some- 
what more than ten English miles a day; 
and upon the supposition also that a French 
army will march at the very sail e 
rate. It was imagined, then, by those 
generals, who had so often been opposed to 
the French, and so constantly been beaten 
by their rapid movements, that they could 
march no more than ten English miles a 
day ! — It was conceived that a French 
army, unincumbered by baggage and 
heavy artillery, would march through their 
own territory — through Flanders — the 
country in the world best adapted to the 
movement of troops, as slowly as the 
cumberous armies of Russia could drag 
their way through strange and difficult 
countries — through the forests of Poland, 
and the mountains of Silesia ! The event 
proved how grievously those planners of 
the campaign had erred. From Bou- 
logne to the right bank of the Rhine, 
the French army spent only three weeks 
instead of five, the computed time; in 
a fortnight more the fate of the cam- 



74 A$i INQUIRY INTO THE 

paign ia Svrabia was decided. It had 
been agreed that the Russians and Aus- 
trians should join on the Inn, and there 
wait for the French, who, it was calcu- 
lated, would take sixty-four days to march 
thither from Boulogne, besides six days 
to put themselves in motion, and ten which 
were allowed for the priority of informa- 
tion. How long the French took to give 
their orders for beginning the march, we 
know not precisely — six days they certain- 
ly did not consume in this way. But one 
thing is too surely proved, that they ar- 
rived at the Inn, after completely destroy- 
ing theAustrian armies, a fortnight sooner 
than the estimate supposed they could 
arrive in order to begin the campaign. 
Nor is this reasoning from the event un- 
fair in the present question; that event is 
by no means unparalleled in the history 
of the French tactics. Had the Russian 
and Austrian counsellors any right to make 
such calculations of the French move- 
ments ? Could England have failed to 
oppose blunders on the face of the matter 



STATE OF THB NATION. 75 

so enormous, if she had been permitted to 
partake in the consultations, upon the 
common cause, at Vienna ? 

(4.) But although such errors as we have 
been contemplating had not entered into 
the details of the campaign, there was a fun- 
demental omission in the concerted plan, 
which must have proved fatal to the suc- 
cess of any attempt against France. No 
measures were taken beforehand for the 
occupation of Switzerland, or the encou- 
ragement of the Austrian interest in that 
country ; and one of the first acts of the 
court of Vienna, when the war com- 
menced, was an acknowledgment of its 
neutrality *. It is manifest, that, if the war 
was not offensive against France, it had 
no object : and few points seem now to be 
more clearly ascertained, than the impossi- 
bility of making any successful attempt to 
penetrate into that country on the north 
of the Alps. The vulnerable part of the 
French territory, is that which can only 

* Sup. Papers, p. 9 and 10. 



70 AN INQUIRY INTO THIS 

be commanded by the possession of Swit- 
zerland, Franche Compte — an open coun- 
try, naturally weak, entirely unprovided 
with strong places or works of art, leading 
by a short march into the very heart of the 
empire, surrounded by several of the 
provinces best affected towards the cause of 
royalty and the league. If France washed at 
am time to commence offensive operations 
against Austria, the occupation of Switzer- 
land might be necessary for their success; not 
onlyfrom the command which that country 
has of the communication between Ger- 
many, as well as France and Italy, and 
from its commanding posture towards the 
Austrian possessions , but also because, if 
not occupied by France, it must either be 
seized by Austria, to the incalculable danger 
of Franche Compte, or remain neutral, to 
the great and hazardous diminution of the 
French line of attack. But if France 
changes her usual mode of invading Aus- 
tria, and pushes on with her main army, 
not in Italy but Swabia, while the posses- 
sion of Lombardy and the Genoese, and 



STATE OF THE NATION. ?7 

the command of Lower Italy allows her 
to support that operation by an army on 
the Adriatic ; it is certainly of less conse- 
quence that the neutrality of Switzerland 
should narrow her line of attack ; and she 
gains more by the certainty of avoiding 
any danger from that quarter, than she 
loses by the sacrifice of one additional 
point of invasion. On the other hand, if 
France is to act only on the defensive, the 
neutrality of Switzerland is absolutely ne- 
cessary for her safety. If that country is 
rendered impassable, all fears for the only- 
valuable part of France are removed. If it 
is left open to Austria, while her armies are 
making advances from Lombardy, through 
Piedmont and the Genoese, and by threat- 
ening an attack upon the southern depart- 
ments of France, are drawing the French 
troops towards the Mediterranean, and 
forcing them to fall back upon France, not 
by the side of Switzerland, but by the Col 
di Tende and the Var ; and while the armies 
on the Rhine arc supporting the southern 
operations by defending Germany, or even 



78 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

threatening Alsace, the occupation of Swit- 
zerland by the allies, must give the enemy 
a line of weak country to defend, from 
Hunningen to Lyons, in an arch of which 
the allies have possession of the cord. 
The grand fault of the directory in 17QQ, 
was their first neglecting to secure, and 
then themselves violating the neutrality 
of Switzerland : they occupied it, and 
when their inadequate means of attack 
compelled them to resume the defensive, 
France was exposed in consequence of 
Switzerland not being neutral, to such 
imminent danger of a formidable inva- 
sion, that nothing saved her but the vio- 
lent remedy of calling out the second 
and third conscriptions. 

The neutrality of Switzerland, then, is 
of all points the most important to France, 
whether she wishes to carry on a defen- 
sive war, or to attack in a single point on 
the North of the Alps, bo sensible of 
this were the French government, and so 
well aware of the error which had almost 
proved fatal in 1 7QQ, that their first anxiety 



STATE OF THE NATION. *Q 

on a near prospect of war, was to estab- 
lish the Swiss neutrality. To this the ca- 
binet of Vienna unhappily consented ; 
forgetful of the evils which must result 
from such a step in all offensive opera- 
tions against France, and of the impossi- 
bility of securing that neutrality against 
the French one moment longer than they 
might find it beneficial to their own 
cause. Although, therefore, the begin- 
ning of the campaign had not proved fatal 
in consequence of other errors ; although 
France had then been foiled, and the 
Austrians had been required to follow 
up their first successes in Germany or 
Italy, by carrying the war into France ; 
the neutrality of Switzerland would have 
destroyed every chance of pursuing the 
offensive with success, by reducing the 
French frontier to the strong country be- 
tween the Lake of Geneva and the mouth 
of the Var, the impregnable bastion of 
Holland, and the iron wall of the Ne- 
therlands and Rhine. When we find 
such a grand omission as this in the com- 



80 AX INQUIRY INTO TUB 

binations of the allies, we are intitled to 
maintain that the addition* of one other 
counsellor would have supplied it ; and 
that counsellor ought to have been Eng- 
land, the soul and support of the con- 
federacy. 

But the conduct of England relative to 
Swiss affairs, was indeed unfortunate in 
other respects. She seems to have joined 
with the allies in misconceiving at all 
times the importance of the Alpine terri- 
tory. Her treatment of the cantons 
when France invaded them in 1802, and 
the misfortunes which befel her allies in 
those countries, through the unskilful- 
ness of the English agents, during the 
whole of the last war, will not soon be 
forgotten by the Swiss. But a more re- 
cent impolicy on our part, has thrown 
away all the advantages which the coali- 
tion might still have expected from the 
tried valour of that people, and their un- 
conquerable hatred of France. We 
granted pensions to many of the Swiss 
officers who had entered our service dur- 



STATE OF THE NATION. 81 

ing the last war, and always on the ex- 
press condition that they should not reside 
in Switzerland *. These brave men, 
whose influence with their countrymen 
was powerful ; whose fidelity to our cause 
had never been suspected ; who only 
panted after the moment when their rage 
against France might once more shew it- 
self at the head of their peasantry, were 
thus deprived of the only means by which 
they could maintain their personal autho- 
rity, and support the good cause in their 
own country. Had they been allowed to 
receive at home a pension, earned by the 
utter ruin of their fortunes in our service, 
and not forced to earn it over again by 
submitting to banishment'; and had a si- 
milar bounty been extended to the other 
reduced officers, who were left at the 
peace without means of subsistence, un- 
less they entered the French or Helvetian 
service ; the means would have been pre- 

* This fact will not be denied by any agent of the 
English government. 



82 AN INQUIRY INTO TH» 

pared — in generosity and prudence pre- 
pared — of rousing the whole Alps from 
Constance to the Rhone, in hostility to 
France, as soon as the war should break 
out ; and the allies would then have had 
some prospect of invading that powerful 
empire, on the side where alone it can be 
attacked. It must, however, be admitted, 
that such a conduct on the part of Eng- 
land would have been anomalous, and 
sufficiently inconsistent with the rest of 
her foreign policy. To have looked for- 
ward beyond the next year ; to have taken 
measures in silence for the slow prepara- 
tions of distant events ; to have gradually 
disposed the minds of a people in our fa- 
vour by kind treatment, for which no 
immediate return was expected, or won 
them by any other means than a mani- 
festo from a commander at the head of a 
paultry force ; to have laid plans of war 
beforehand which should not for some 
time burst into view, with glare and 
noise ; out of our millions to have given a 
few pounds for the support of our firmest 



STATE OF THE NATION. 



si 



friends, ruined in our cause; to have 
spent what we did give, in a manner 
grateful to them, or really beneficial to 
our interests ; in our countless subsidies, 
to have had a single guinea bestowed, 
which should not be repaid by the defeat 
of the receiver immediately, and his ut- 
ter ruin, at six months credit — all this 
would have indicated a strange, unac- 
countable deviation from the system 
which has been unremittingly at work, 
since the treaty of Pilnitz, by day and 
by night, during war and during truce, 
in aggrandizing the proud, and crushing 
the humble; and which has at length, by 
the most persevering constancy of opera- 
tion, happily compleated the ruin of our 
allies, and triumphing, it must be confess- 
ed, over various and mighty obstacles, 
established our enemy in universal em 
pire. 

These four capital errors in the ar- 
rangement of the late war, are, wesliink, 
either to be ascribed to England not having 
been consulted, or else to her having par- 
g 2 



84 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

taken in the infatuation of the allies. But 
it will be said that those allies would give 
her no voice in such matters as the choice 
of a general, the march of troops, and 
the plan of a campaign; and that they 
would have persisted in adhering to their 
own errors, even after England should 
have pointed them out. This is not im- 
probable ; but it only shews for the hun- 
dredth time, that things were not ripe for 
a new war. If Austria persisted in pre- 
ferring a general, from court favour, to 
the great prince who had twice saved the 
monarchy ; if she insisted on calculating 
her plans upon the supposition that 
French armies can only move ten miles 
a-day through Flanders ; if she shut her 
eyes to the value of Bavaria, and. refused 
to learn the paramount importance of 
Switzerland in any war against France- 
then it was manifest that nothing could 
be hoped for, and that Austria had not 
been s ^bdued to a sense of her interest, 
nor felt her real situation. It was the 
province of England to prevent her from 



STATE OF THE NATION. 85 

beginning a league for which she was so 
ill prepared. It was madness in England 
to hurry on the continent to a war, which, 
if unsuccessful, must be its last struggle 
for independence, in circumstances that 
made it madness to hope for success. 

7. It remains to inquire what direct 
assistance Great Britain afforded to the 
coalition which she had formed — how far 
her co-operation with the measures of 
hostility, was either well-planned or well- 
timed. 

An expedition was prepared for the 
north of Germany, at a time when the 
cause of the allies might have been mate- 
rially aided by a diversion either in Holland, 
or the north of France, and the country of 
Hanover was chosen as the scene of our 
operations. It is needless to remark, how 
very trifling the benefit of such a scheme 
was to the advantage of making a pow- 
erful diversion at the beginning of the 
campaign. Admitting that Hanover should 
be occupied aftera short defence — the most 
critical moment for distracting the French 



8(3 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

force was thrown away, and our allies 
had a right to complain that our co-opera- 
tion was limited to an object purely 
British, while they were risking their ex- 
istence for the independence of the con- 
tinent. 

When the army of invasion left Bou- 
logne almost defenceless, surely we might 
have made an attempt upon its works, by 
landing a force ; and had some chance of 
destroying the flotilla which has given so 
much uneasiness to this country, but 
which is chiefly to be dreaded as it will 
always form a popular ground of objection 
to a peace w r ith France. The enemy had 
withdrawn his army suddenly, and the 
first step which he was likely to take was 
to supply its place by marching from the 
interior new troops, better fitted for gar- 
rison duty than for the service of the field. 
The opportunity, therefore, of attacking 
Boulogne was transient, and must be 
seized at once. Our government, engaged 
in projects of new arms, and fireworks, 
and arrows, and the other resources of the 



STATE OF THE NATION-. 87 

chymical method of war, allowed an op- 
portunity to pass by which assuredly will 
not soon return. 

But, when an expedition was resolved 
on to Germany, means were taken to 
defeat its utility and narrow its chance 
of success as far as possible. The de- 
parture of the army from Boulogne took 
place in the beginning of September, and 
our troops did not arrive in Hanover be- 
fore the middle of November. This delay 
is most unaccountable. The moment that 
the invasion was put off, our forces should 
have been ready to set sail : the prepara- 
tions should have been made before that 
time, because we knew perfectly well, that, 
as soon as the war broke out, the Boulogne 
army must leave the coast. But, besides 
forcing the continent to begin the attack 
unprepared, it appears that the war, of 
which we were the planners and insti- 
gators, found us after all our negotiations 
stiil less prepared than our allies. Accord- 
ingly the armament lost the fine season, 
and sailed, as British expeditions generally 
do, in a month when storms must be 



88 AN INQUIRY INTO THS 

expected. Some of our best troops were 
lost ; the rest arrived in time to make a 
shew of retaking Hanover, after every 
chance of doing any thing more than de- 
fending that electorate was gone*. The 
allies saw that nothing could be gained to 
the common cause by such an operation ; 
and Austria has since ascribed part of the 
general disasters f to our delay in making 
any diversion. 

But still worse contrived was our co- 
operation in Italy. Had the English and 
Russian army in the Mediterranean landed 
in Lombardy, or the Venetian territory, so 
as either to join the Archduke (a benefit in- 
calculable to troops commanded by in- 
ferior generals J) or to hang upon Mas- 



* See General Don's Proclamation, Nov. 20,IS05. 

-j- Count Sathremberg's note, Sup. Pap. p. 52. 

% It cannot be reckoned any disrespect to the meri- 
torious officer at the head of the allied army, to 
presume that great advantage would have arisen from 
his not opposing the ablest general of France, without 
the assistance of Prince Charles. General Craig's 
services in the East are certainly very eminent ; but 
the Mabrattas, with all the improvements which they 
have reaped from our East Indian policy, are still a 
■very different enemy from the French, and General 



STATE OF THE NATION. 89 

sena's rear ; the best effects might haye 
followed. The inferiority of the Austrians 
in point of force was clearly the cause of 
their not making head against the enemy 
in that quarter : still greater was the dis- 
parity of numbers after the defeats in Ger- 
many caused the Archduke to detach a 
large body of his army to reinforce General 
Mack*. That was the moment w T hen the 
assistance of twenty thousand English and 
Russians was likely to be of eminent ser- 
vice : but, instead of adopting this plan, 
we landed an army in Naples, than which 
no measure could be more injudicious. 

We affected to defend the King of Naples, 
yet we forced him to give our troops ad- 
mittance immediately after he had solemn- 
ly engaged himself not to admit any 
English or Russian forces into his territo- 
ries, or any ships of war into his portsf . 
In return for this strict neutrality which 

Craig- would unquestionably have found the Italian 
campaign a new scene. " I.onge alius Italia 
quam Indite, per quam tcmulcnto agmine commissa- 
bundus incessil, visits illi habitus essef, saltus Apu- 
lia et monies Lucanos cernenti." — Tit. Liv. ix. n, 

* Sir A. Paget's dispatch, Sup. Pap. p. 21. 

■J- Treaty of Portici, Oct. 8, 1805. 



gO AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

he promised to observe, France withdrew 
her troops from his dominions. As soon 
as they w r ere gone, England compelled him 
to break his engagements, and to receive 
her army. But admitting that the measures 
were not compulsory on our part, we 
ought to have respected his neutrality, if 
he himself did not ; and, knowing his 
engagements with France, we ought to 
have taken no advantage of any disposifi 
which he might betray to break tb 
Indeed we gained nothing by this rash a 
unjust conduct. The French army w , 
gone at any rate, and Naples freed for 
the present. We did not venture to lac 
an army until every thing had been done 
which could be gained by a victorious 
campaign. The French troops were sure 
to return as soon as the affairs in the north 
should be settled, and then we must fly 
as speedily as possible. A landing in the 
Adriatic, and a junction with the Arch- 
duke, would have had the effect of freeing 
Naples from the French, had they been 
willing to remain there, just as cei » 
tainly as landing in the bay of Naples, 



STATE OF THE NATION. 



01 



By pursuing the former plan, effectual 
service would have been performed in the 
north, besides the liberation of the south. 
The latter plan, which unhappily we 
adopted, without doing any good to the 
Archduke, only protected Naples so long 
as it was the interest of France to with- 
draw her troops, and kept a large army 
unemployed, so long as it was the interest 
of the allies to have every soldier in their 
service brought into the field against the 
enemy. The occupation of Naples, then, 
after the French had left it, could never 
assist the campaign in the north . If the 
allies were successful in that quarter; 
Naples was freed at any rate. If they 
were unsuccessful, our army could not 
long defend it. We managed with our 
usual skill to unite all disadvantages in one 
plan : we hurried on one ally to the ruin 
which has since befallen him, for the pur- 
pose of rendering our army useless at a 
time when another ally might have been 
saved by its co-operation. So uniform, 
so harmonious in every quarter have been 



Q2 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

the schemes of England throughout the 
late coalition ! — And can we wonder that 
our affairs have been ruined amidst the 
waste of our resourses, and the squander 
of our opportunities, when we have been 
consistent only in impolicy, lavish of every 
thing but vigour, and strenuous in pursu- 
ing all varieties of plan, all sorts of system, 
except those which border upon pru- 
dence and wisdom? 

It remains before closing the melan- 
choly history of our misconduct, that some 
notice should be taken of the strange pro- 
ceeding adopted by his majesty's late mi- 
nisters, in publishing dispatches relating to 
some of the most delicate subjects imagin- 
able. 

The treaties laid before parliament are 
not given entire : several articles are sup- 
pressed ; but one is inserted for the avowed 
purpose of binding the contracting parties 
to act in a certain event contrary to their 
public declarations *.. Why a stipulation , 
which convicts the parties of deliberately 

* Additional Art. July 24— Treat, p. 24, 



STATE OF THE NATION. g3 

laying the grounds of a positive falsehood, 
should not have been kept concealed, as 
well as other separate articles*, it would 
be difficult to determine. How far Russia 
and Austria will approve of the disclosure, 
it is easy to conjecture. There is the 
same indiscretion in publishing a secret 
article, binding England to subsidize Aus- 
tria and Sweden, if they came forward 
within ten months — when the treaty itself 
threatens to withhold all subsidy, unless 
those powers take the field within four 
months f\ It is obvious, that, for the fu- 
ture, all such threats from Russia and 
England will be of no avail ; their precise 
meaning is now ascertained. It is proba- 
ble, too, that the Austrian cabinet will not 
be much pleased with the publication of 
Sir A. Paget's dispatch of 29th August, in 
which he states, that Count Cobentzel had 
insinuated to him, that the language of the 

* Articles 3, 1, 9, and 10, are suppressed, possibly- 
more. 

f Compare first Separate Art. (pubiic) with second 
ditto (secret) Treat, p. 11, 20. 



AN INQUIRY INTO THE 



Emperor would be heightened or lowered 
in proportion as he should be subsidized 
by England *. 

We may also form some conjecture 
of the Archduke Charles's feelings, when 
he finds himself held - up to the world, by 
the official papers of the English cabinet, 
as the slave of ill-temper and jealousy ; 
fearful of reinforcing the army of his 
rival ; taking umbrage at such reinforce- 
ments being given, when the fate of the 
monarchy depended on it : and this ri- 
val too — the object of all this jealousy 
and umbrage in the mind of Prince 
Charles of Austria — General Mack! — 
When Sir A. Paget gave such informa- 
tion i to his court, he only repeated lightly 
what he had been told falsely ; but surely he 
never expected that his communication 
would be laid before Parliament as a public 
document. Count Rasumofski, too, when 
he transmitted his free strictures on the 
cabinet of Vienna to his court, did not 
probably conceive that our government, 

* Sup. Fap. p. 4. f Ibid. p. 11 and 12, 



STATE OF THE NATION. g5 

getting notice of them through their mi- 
nister at St. Petersburgh, would publish 
them to all the world. It is possible, that 
he may feel it rather unpleasant to com- 
municate with a ministry who are now 
aware of his contempt for their character*. 
The same ambassador is convicted of hav- 
ing deceived our minister at Vienna, as to 
his knowledge of the Russian army's des- 
tination. Sir A. Paget's dispatch of Sep- 
tember 5, states that Count Rasumofski 
knew nothing about itf , but the Protocol 
of Conferences proves that in July he knew 
the whole matter J. The publication of 
the Protocol, too, clearly proves that the 
allies had reason to reckon upon the co- 
operation of the Neapolitans, as soon as 
their army should land from Corfu || ; and 
this information, thus communicared to the 
French government, would have ensured 
the total ruin of the Sicilian court, if the 
more active efforts of our friendship had 



* Sup. pup. p. 16. f fold, p. 7. 

% Ibid. p. 43. || Ibid. p. 43 & 44. 



gO AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

not already effected that object in a more 
direct way. 

It was not enough, then, that our fatal 
activity accomplised at last the subjuga- 
tion of the continent ; that our allies were 
by our exertions brought to utter discom- 
fiture ; we must hold them up to contempt 
after the struggle is over, by divulging se- 
crets which the most limited discretion 
would have respected. Not content with 
sacrificing the foreign interest of England, 
by the compendious events of one short 
campaign, we must cut it up by the roots, 
and prevent its ever growing again, by 
taking such steps as may naturally beget 
distrust and alienation ; by ruining in the 
eyes of Europe, our character for discretion 
and good faith, which had survived the 
wreck of so many continental leagues. 
And to what purpose have those disclosures 
been made ? Whose cause have they 
served? Which of the measures that 
produced the downfal of Austria have 
they elucidated ? Which of the British 
statesmen who planned those measures 



STATE OF THE NATION. 97 

have they exculpated ? To thoughtless- 
ness alone can this conduct be imputed, 
or to the fatuity of despair ; to the un- 
heeding temerity, the impatience of rest, 
which devised and directed the third co- 
alition ; and the despair which those 
always feel most under disappointment, 
whose hopes are the most extravagant, and 
whose resources are the most paltry. 

From contemplating the progress of our 
late fatal misconduct, it is difficult to avoid 
casting behind us a look at the better 
times of English history ; when the affairs 
of this country were administered by the 
vigour of Cromwell, or her fortunes and 
the liberties of Europe entrusted to the 
sagacity of William ; when the name of 
England was dreaded on every sea, her 
alliance courted as the badge of honour, 
and the pledge of safety in the remotest 
parts of the continent, and her protecting 
wisdom revered by all the nations, as then- 
common shelter from oppression. How 
mightily have things been since changed I 
How little is that England now to be rc- 



S>8 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

cognized ! How plainly may the revolution* 
in her destiny be traced to the alteration of 
her conduct ! It is indeed highly instruc- 
tive to pause for a moment, and contrast 
the policy which gave birth to the con- 
quest of Ge many, with that which, after 
preparing the grand alliance, was deve- 
loped in the victories of Marlborough, and 
ended in the subjugation of France. From 
such a comparison we may learn why the 
event was so different. 

The overgrown power of Louis XIV, 
was ably but unsuccessfully resisted 
by the allies, during the war which 
ended so favourably to France in the peace 
of Nimeguen. After that treaty, his inso* 
Itence knew no bounds, and scarcely a 
month passed without some aggression, 
which would have amply justified a 
renewal of the war. Eut William, then 
the soul of the alliance, exerted all his 
influence in repressing any premature op- 
position ; wisely judging that thejustice of a 
war — the extento f the provocation — is only 
half the question ; and must always be sub- 
ordinate to the prospect of succeeding by 



STATE OF THE NATION. 99 

an appeal to arms. In a few years, S, 
rashly began hostilities, which William 
having in vain tried to prevent, endea- 
voured by all prudent means to assist. Me 
applied to every court in order to com- 
bine a new alliance : but finding that the 
time was not come, he continued to pre- 
pare measures, which he knew must lead 
to a happy result at a future period. As 
he foresaw, the usurpations of the 
French king, and his religious persecuti- 
ons, in a few years excited a universal dis- 
position to oppose him, and waiting until 
this spirit had reached its highest pitch, he 
availed himself of it, to form the league of 
Augsburg, which united the catholic as 
well as protestant interests of the empire, 
in one common cause against France. In 
1081, he might have gained one of the 
rival parties, but he knew how inadequate 
such support would prove to the exigences 
of the occasion. He waited until the 
course of events had prepared both the 
contending interests, the Austrian and 
Prussian i actions of those days, and he 
h 2 



100 AN ENQUIRY INTO THE 

succeeded in uniting them all under his 
standard. The whole Empire was now 
combined against France ; Spain and Hol- 
land acceded to the league ; Savoy soon 
after joined it ; Sweden and Denmark 
warmly favoured the cause; and the court 
of Rome itself, was by the able negotiations 
of William, induced to support a contest 
most essential to the Protestant Church. 
This great confederacy was animated with 
one spirit of resistance to France, and sub- 
mission to trie counsels of their leader. 
All Europe was cordially united in the 
league, with the exception of England : 
and yet, on this single account, William 
delayed putting the allies in motion, not- 
withstanding the continued insults and 
increasing aggressions of France : he waited 
until he had undertaken that enterprise 
which secured the liberties of this country, 
and which enabled him to complete the 
alliance for restoring those of Europe. It 
was not till after he had effected the Revo~ 
lutiouj and could add England to tjhe 
eague, that he allowed the confederates 



STATE OF THE NATION. 101 

to take the field ; and then, he continued 
to be the mover of the whole operations, 
not by manifestoes or subsidies, but by 
active assistance, and by superintending in 
person at repeated conferences of the com- 
bined powers, the whole arrangement of 
their plans for the war. By the success 
of this system the tide was at length turned 
against France ; and though the peace of 
Ryswick still left her a formidable neigh- 
bour, it succeeded in repressing her en- 
croachments and securing the independ- 
ence of other states, which, since the peace 
of Nimeguen, she had been constantly 
attacking. <( There was not one of the 
allies, (says Bishop Burncll),who complain- 
ed that he had been forgot by him, or 
wronged in the treaty : Nor had the desire 
of having his title universally acknowledg- 
ed, raised any impatience in him, or made 
him run into this peace with any indecent 
haste."* 

His moderation and good scn^cin making 
the best peace he could, notwithstanding 

' History of liis own Times, ii. 1 17. 



102 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

bis rooted antipathy to France was equally 
eminent. '* The terms of it," says Bur- 
net, " were still too much to the advan- 
" tage of France ; but the length and 
" charge of the war had so exhausted the 
" allies, that the king saw the necessity of 
" accepting the best conditions that could be 
" got*." He well knew that the next war 
raust complete the victories which his policy 
and prudence had begun to atchieve. His 
measures were accordingly planned with 
a view to new resistance ; and after his re- 
sources, and those of his allies had been 
recruited by an interval of quiet, they 
revived the league, under the well known 
name of that Grand Alliance, which led 
through a series of brilliant exploits to the 
utter humiliation of the common enemy. 

To complete the contrast between the 
character of this great Prince's policy, and 
that which produced the late continental 
war, it would be necessary to detail the 
whole particulars of his public life. It 
may be sufficient to finish the parallel at 

* History of his own Times, ii. 117. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 103 

present attempted, if we add, that he was 
eminently distinguished by a certain slow- 
ness to passion in his closet, as well as by 
uncommon ardour in action ; that his judg- 
ment was prompt and alert, in proportion 
as his temper was cold. His schemes con- 
ceived in sobriety of mind, were calculated 
to attain some great and solid end, and not 
to strike the vulgar by their gaudiness. 
Their execution was delayed until the mo- 
ment when success was most likely — not 
adjusted to the time when popular applause 
might be grateful, or convenient for other 
purposes. In planning them he was close 
and reserved ; but when he had matured 
them, and when his time came, there was 
no wavering, no procrastination, no vapour- 
ing of hopes ; finally, after the threat was 
made, not one moment' delay of which 
the enemy could avail himself; the noise 
never went before the stroke. 

It is remarkable how universal the contrast 
to which we are alluding, is observable even 
in minute particulars. " He was," says 
.the Historian, " an c^act observer of men 



104 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

and tilings, but he did not descend even 
to the humours of his people, to make 
himself and his notions more acceptable to 
them. He knew all foreign affairs well, 
and understood the state of every court in 
Europe very particularly — he instructed his 
own ministers himself— his only two fa* 
vou rites, Portland and Albemarle, were men 
in all respects, of opposite characters, agree* 
ing only in secrecy and fidelity. ""* It was 
by such a system, and so eminent a capa- 
city for affairs, that this illustrious person 
laid the foundation in Europe, of that in- 
dependence from French dominion, which 
his successors reared up. The fabric was 
indeed strong, and has withstood many 
shocks : but, like all the works of man, it is 
made of perishable materials ; and new 
systems having gained ground under statesr 
men of opposite characters, jt may now 
justly be questioned, whether there yet 
exists a wreck of what king William be- 
queathed. 

* Burnetii. 176 and 177. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 10.> 

We have now completed the examina- 
tion of the late continental policy of Eng- 
land, and have heen enabled, from a re- 
view of the facts presented by the official 
documents, to estimate the merits of those 
who conceived and prosecuted that fatal 
system. Many of the errors which we 
have noticed, are only extravagant forms 
of mistakes not unknown in the past history 
of the country; and the fruits of a policy 
radically defective as to external relations, 
which has long been growing up to matu- 
rity. The details of such misconduct are 
not uninstructive. They expose, by exhibit- 
ing an extreme case, the evils of the gene- 
ral principles; demonstrate the necessity of 
administring a remedy; and lead us to- 
wards the quarter from whence it may be 
obtained. This inquiry, too, has occasion- 
ally opened to us such views of the situation 
of the Continent, as may suggest the absur- 
dity of expecting any improvement in its 
fortunes for a long course of years. The 
arguments which have been urged to shew 
jtlis folly of pressing forward towards 



106 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

anew league In 1805, operate with mani- 
fold force after the fatal changes which 
have ushered in the present year, and have 
flowed from the errors of the last. We are 
thus prepared for the remaining part of the 
discussion — the present state of continental 
affairs, and the new, and necessarily mo- 
derate and pacific system which it pre- 
scribes to this country. 

Having, therefore, fully explained to 
what causes England and Europe owe the 
misfortunes which have lately happened, 
we now proceed to take a view of the ex- 
tent of those misfortunes. 

IL Consequences of our late 
Foreign Policy. 

1. The actual changes of dominion 
which the third Coalition has already pro- 
duced, are in the highest degree alarm- 
ing — whether we consider them as losses 
to Austria or gains to France. 

At the last peace, the Venetian territory 
had even been imagined by some to be a 



STATE OF THE NATION. 10? 

fair compensation for the loss of the Ne- 
therlands. In several points of view, 
importance was certainly of the very first 
rank. Besides a large extent of the most 
fruitful country, a population of nearly two 
millions, and a revenue of a million ster- 
ling ; it gave Austria a line of sea coast, 
studded with excellent harbours, in the 
immediate neighbourhood of those rich 
provinces, which had long been checked 
in their progress, by their scanty means of 
foreign commerce. The acquisition of 
Venice easily rendered the power which 
also possessed the extensive dominions on 
the north of the Adriatic, mistress of that 
sea. The country to the East of the Gulf, 
was valuable in case any views might here- 
after be formed respecting Turkey; — or 
might become necessary from the policy 
of other states in relation to that defence- 
Jcss neighbour. The footing which the 
Venetian territory gave Austria in Lom- 
bard}', added to her dominions in the 
Alpine Country, served to retain somewhat 
ptjeast 01 her former svray in the affairs 



108 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

of Italy; gave her a certain security against 
any further changes being attempted by 
France in that quarter; and secured, when 
an opportunity might offer, the means of 
regaining the ascendant she had once pos- 
sessed in those fine countries. All these va- 
luable possessions are now lost ; and all the 
prospects of which they were the founda- 
tion — the hopes of external influence, and 
the more solid expectation of domestic im- 
provement, are vanished for ever. France, 
or her dependency, the Italian Republic, 
lias completed the conquest of Lombardy. 
From the Gulf of Genoa to the Gulph of 
Istria, all is French. 

To estimate how much France has gain- 
ed by the acquisition of the Venetian pro- 
vinces, it is only necessary that we should 
reflect on the importance of those terri- 
tories to the Italian Republic, from their 
position, and the facilities which they af- 
ford of increasing the naval power of the 
enemy. The commerce of Venice, now 
very considerable, and only checked since 
the revolution by the impolitic preference 



STATE OF THE NATION. 109 

given to Trieste, will increase rapidly, 
when at least equal exertions are made to 
encourage it. At present it does not occupy 
less than 400 vessels belonging to the port 
of Venice alone. In its better days the 
number of these was tenfold. The naval 
arsenal of that city is famous, and the neigh- 
bouring harbours perfectly well adapted to 
the purposes of trade. The coast of Dalma- 
tia, with the islands, possesses perhaps more 
fine ports, with strong fortifications, than 
any in the world. Nona, Zara, Sebenico, 
Trau, Spalatro, Castel Nuovo, Matero, 
Lesina, Corcyra — are but a few of the har- 
bours impregnable to attack, and command- 
ing every commercial advantage, which 
have now fallen into the hands of the Cis- 
alpine and its masters. It is unnecessary 
to state how prodigious an accession of 
trade and force this must, in a short time, 
secure to France; and how paramount it 
must render her superiority in the Medi- 
terranean. Whether we now attempt to 
defend Sicily, or avert the downfall of 
Turkey and the seizure of Egypt, we 



110 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

shall feci the consequences of the treaty 
of Presburg in every operation of the 
war. 

The loss of the Tyrol, and its annexation 
to the new kingdom of Bavaria, is, though 
not from the superior territorial value of 
that province, yet certainly from its rela- 
tive situation, of still greater detriment to 
Austria than her sacrifices in Italy. The 
natural strength of the country, the loy- 
alty and valour of its inhabitants, and the 
skill which their mode of life gave them in 
the warfare adapted to mountainous coun- 
tries, made the Tyrol altogether invaluable 
as a barrier against the invasion of the he<- 
reditary states; had the house of Austria 
but learnt the right use of those resources. 
Unhappily, there prevailed a constant jea- 
lousy of the Tyrolese, and an inclination 
to check them in those pursuits which 
were their most favourite occupation, and 
which formed the habits, of all others most 
necessary for the successful defence of their 
country. Even in a war which threatened 
the throne of the monarchy, the same 



STATE OF THE NATION. Ill 

evil policy continued to curb the exer- 
tions of this high spirited people; and, 
after weakening, during peace, by ab- 
surd restraints, the force which they could 
have opposed to the enemy, the court of 
Vienna, now, at the moment of invasion, 
persisted in refusing to avail itself of their 
services. In several places, the peasantry 
were deprived of arms, and checked by 
the army, least they should defend their 
mountains irregularly, while the old tac- 
ticians were retreating from the strongest 
holds, according to rule. Frequently, in 
spite of all resistance from their own mas- 
ter, these brave and skilful mountaineers 
made out the point of being allowed to 
light ; they generally made a successful 
stand, sometimes gained signal advan- 
tages over the French troops, while all 
their exertions were systematically thwarted 
by the Austrian commanders. But it is 
manifest, that while the province remained 
under the dominion of Austria, she might 
at any time have turned it to full account, 
by reforming so obviously pernicious a 



112 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

system of management. During a short 
interval of peace, she might organise its 
natural force so as to render it quite im- 
pregnable ; and then, whatever successes 
the enemy might, on any future occasion, 
gain in Lombardy and the Frioul, or on the 
Danube, his progress was effectually check- 
ed by the natural garrison which he left 
behind him; which must be taken, not 
turned ; which preserved unbroken the 
communication with Italy and with Swit- 
zerland ; which must always, if properly 
managed, have been the main theatre of 
any war, where Austria acted on the de- 
fensive. Such were the incalculable ad- 
vantages, in a defensive point of view, 
which Austria lost by the cession of the 
Tyrol. 

If we keep in mind the remarks formerly 
made upon the importance of Switzerland, 
we shall be enabled to perceive still further 
advantages for defence, which Austria has 
lost in the Tyrol, and to estimate the ex- 
tent of this loss in an offensive point of view. 
The complete establishment of France 



STATE OF THE NATION. 113 

in Lombardy and the Genoese, would of 
itself have augmented the dependence of 
Switzerland upon her power. But though 
the passes on the West and South would 
have been open to her, while the Tyrol and 
the Voralbcrg remained in the hands, of 
Austria, the Swiss might always reckon up- 
on her powerful support; their country 
might be defended by its native forces 
against the inroads of the enemy from the 
other side**, until assistance was poured in 
from the East; even if overpowered, their 
natural allies might still hope to effect their 
liberation, by attacking from that quarter 
the French who should have established 
themselves in the Alpine territory, as was 
clone successfully by the Rhinthal and 
Engadine in 1799: and at all events, the 
subjugation of Switzerland would not have 
proved altogether fatal to Austria, when she 
had the strong outwork of the Tyrol on 

* There are only four passes into Switzerland, 
from the French side, and seven from the Italian. 
The Swiss conld easily defend these for a month m 
six weeks, 

I 



j 1 i AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

that side, both to oppose the new position 
of the enemy, and to interrupt the commu- 
nication between his Italian dominions and 
the new acquisitions in the North, which 
the occupation of the Alps might give him. 
But still more important, for offensive pur- 
poses, was the communication which the 
Tyrol afforded between Austria and Swit- 
zerland. The Swiss were beyond any other 
people hostile to France. Of this hatred 
they had given undoubted proofs in the 
last war; their skill in defending their own 
passes was truly wonderful; and no instance 
is on record of successes equal to theirs, won 
by individual dexterity and courage over 
numbers and discipline. AV r hile this cha- 
racter continued to adorn that virtuous and 
unconquerable peasantry, there was always 
a prospect of their making such a resistance 
to France, in the event of a wisely arranged 
scheme of invasion, as might enable Austria 
to come up, and thus attack the enemy 
upon his most vulnerable side. Even if 
she unfortunately preferred the plan of in- 
vading France by the Rhine or the Var, 



STATE OF THE NATION; H^ 

and for that purpose wished to secure the 
neutrality of Switzerland; the possession of 
the Tyrol enabled her to do so; because it 
gave France some inducement to acquiesce 
m that arrangement. All the advantages, 
then, which were most important to Au- 
stria, whether she intended to attack France, 
or to defend herself by means of Switzer- 
land, depended entirely on her possessing 
the Tyrol. — With the Tyrol she has now 
lost them for ever. Switzerland is com- 
pletely surrounded by France and the 
1 rench dependencies; cut off from the only 
power which could enable her to stand out 
for a moment against her enemy; delivered 
*p without the possibility of resisting; pre- 
vented from ever being employed in the 
invasion of France; but ready at any time 
to be used as the means of finally reducing 
Austria. In tins employment of Switzer- 
land, the Tyrol will not only be no hin- 
drance; it will be made to assist. The pea- 
santry of that country will be organised 
according to their aptitudes, physical and 
moral; their privileges will be extended 
i 9 



116 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

for the purpose of gaining their assistance 
against their former oppressors, and of ren- 
dering their exertions more powerful; and 
Austria will at length discover the value of 
the Tyrol, by the services which it may 
render to her invaders. 

The loss of the Venetian and Tyrolese 
territory, with the confirmation of the 
French power over Switzerland, has now 
completed the dominion of France over 
the whole of Italy. Every avenue to that 
country is hnally closed against Austria 
and commanded by her enemy with 
undivided authority. From Dalmatia and 
the con lines of Turkey, round to Stras- 
burg, France has drawn a line of strong 
possessions, by which she completely hems 
in Italy; cuts her off from every commu- 
nication with the rest of the world ; and 
opens to her the closest intercourse with 
herself. Her sway being so absolute, here, 
it is natural that she should lose no time in 
exercising all the rights of sovereignty. 
Accordingly, she models at pleasure the 
kingdom of Etruria; augments the Cisal- 



STATE OF THE NATION. 117 

pine ; disposes at will of the court of Rome; 
and. dethrones, by a common regimental 
order, the royal family of Naples; for which 
last proceeding England, be it remembered, 
took care to furnish also the pretext, after 
having given the power of accomplishing it. 
Thus has the grand strife between France 
and Austria at length been settled, by the sur- 
render of Italy, more absolute and uncondi- 
tional, and in a far greater extent, than the 
courtiers of Charles, of Francis, or of Lewi-, 
ever dared; flatter their masters to expect. 
France has now become sole mistress of," that 
splendid country, from the Alps to the 
streights of Messina — its position, which do- 
mineers over the Mediterranean; its mighty 
resources; the fruitfulness of the garden of 
Europe; the bays, and rivers, and harbour: 
which open to its produce the uttermost 
ends of the earth; the forests which varie- 
gate its surface, and only break the conti- 
nuity of culture to augment its powers, by 
preparing for this favoured lane! the domi- 
nion of the sea; the genius and lire &( its 
numerous people; the monument- 6i art: 



118 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

the remains of antiquity; the ground on 
which the glories of their Roman ancestors 
were atchieved; — all are now in the hands 
of the nation in the world hest able to im- 
prove them — to combine them — to make 
them aid one another; and, after calling 
them forth, to the incalculable augmenta* 
tion of her former resources, ready to turn 
them against those, if any such shall remain, 
who still dare to be her enemies. 

The other changes of dominion effected 
by the treaty of Presburg — the emperor's ces- 
sion of his possessions in Suabia*, and his sub" 
mission to the further spoliation of the Ger- 
man empire-)- ; — though important in them- 
selves, and sufficient, in any former period, 
to alarm all Europe for their consequences; 
sink into insignificance after the entire sur- 
render of Italy, which we have been con- 

* These are chiefly the Burgaw, the Brisgaw, 
and Coutance. The whole loss of Austria has been 
estimated at 1297 square geographical miles 5 
2,116,000 subjects, and 1,600,000/. sterling of 
yearly revenue ; of which three fourths have been 
given to the Cisalpine. 

* The seizure of Augsburg and Borndorff. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 119 

templating. All those changes have one 
simple view — the diminution of the Austrian 
monarchy; its separation from France by a 
number of petty kingdoms dependent on 
the French power; the transference of the 
Emperor's influence in Germany to his 
enemies; and his confinement to the poli- 
tics of the East of Europe; where, also, he 
is closely watched by France and her crea- 
tures. Nor does it make any difference 
upon the relative situation of the powers, 
that the sacrifices of Austria have been 
made to aggrandize the dependants of 
France, and not France herself. That 
overgrown empire could not expect to 
keep together more nations and countries 
than it already counted within its limits*. 
The only feat which the French power has 
not attempted, is the conciliation of those 
peoples whom it has conquered; the only 

* — " Quibus non lex, non mos, non lingua com- 
munis ; alius habitus, alia vest is, alia anna, alii ritus, 
alia sacra, alii propc Dei esscnt : it a quodam uno vin- 
culo copulaverit cos, ut nulla nee inte ipsos, ncc adxer- 
susducem seditio cxtiterit" — Tit liv. xxviii. 12. 



120 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

difficulties which it has not mastered, are 
those that natural boundaries present. France, 
therefore, finds it more easy to complete 
the incorporation of Europe by some inter- 
mediate process, which may assimilate its 
heterogeneous parts, and prepare them for 
a lasting, as well as an intimate union. In 
the mean time, her sway over the princi- 
palities and powers, whom she calls into 
existence, is absolute and certain ; her in- 
fluence is hourly gaining ground. Should 
the course of eve'nts maintain the nominal 
separation of those dependent kingdoms, 
they may, at some future period, revolt 
from her federal empire ; but, for years to 
come, they are as subservient to her pur- 
poses, as if they had no separate names. 
Had she not acted upon such principles; 
had she taken more to herself at Presburg; 
she would have resembled the allies whose 
impolicy has laid Europe at her feet: she 
would have seemed to gain more, but she 
would not have been the formidable neigh- 
bour which a deeper policy has made her. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 121 



•2. But the calamities of Austria are not 
to be measured by the cessions that have 
been wrung from her. The unhappy 
events of the Coalition War have had a 
more extensive and deep rooted influence, 
than can appear in the articles of any 
treaty which may have been made to ter- 
minate actual hostilities. There are certain 
effects of conquest, certain symptoms of 
subjugation, which escape the art of the 
diplomatist, and cannot be expressed in 
public instruments. In a little month, the 
finest army in the imperial service was an- 
nihilated without striking a blow. From 
the Rhine to the heart of the hereditary 
states, the French marched on with one 
uniform success, and had not even to fight 
their way. The progress of their forces 
through the best defended countries of the 
Emperor, resembled a regular movement 
through a subject and peaceable state. Every 
thing gave way before them, as if both ar- 
mies were governed by the same word of 
command; and the Austrian cabinet can 



3 22 AN INQUIRY INtO THE 

only account for the defeat of its troops by 
stating, that two grievous errors were com* 
nutted; one, in expecting the enemy would 
respect the Prussian neutrality, when it 
stood in the way of a decisive victory; the 
other, in being deceived by his bare asser- 
tion, and allowing him to enter the metro- 
polis*. The fruit of these rapid and easy 
conquests was the possession of Vienna. 
Nor did the progress of the French arms 
stop there. Prussia, unmoved, saw France 
surrounding her on every side, by the com- 
plete reduction of Germany; she allowed 
the conquerors to march on in all directions, 
to drive the Emperor from his capital, and 
pursue him out of the Empire. At last, on 
the verge of his hereditary dominions, a 
general engagement takes place, the first 
and the last of this eventful campaign, in 
which the battle has indeed been to the 
skilful, not the strong; which, from the 

* See Count Stahrembcrg's Note, where he states 
these two mistakes of General Mack and Prince 
Aversberg, as fundamental causes of the defeats.-— 
Sup. pap. p. 52. 



STATS OF THE NATION. Vl% 

beginning to the end, has been one con- 
stant illustration or* the weakness of mere 
physical force, and the omnipotence of 
talents. Is it possible that such things 
should speedily be forgotten? Where is 
the nation so stout hearted as not to feel 
disasters like these? The very sights of un- 
exampled humiliation to which the people 
have been witness; i1k> strange event- which 
within a few weeks have, brought the Austrian 
monarchy so low; must leave an indelible im- 
pression on their minds; and prepare them 
for new defeats, while they efface the me- 
mory of past victories. " Nee quisqiiam 
adeo rerum humanarum immemor, quern non 
comrnoveret ilia fades, Romanian principem et 
generis humani paatlo ante dominum, relict A 
fortune? suce. sede, per populnm, per urbem, 
aire de Imperio — nihil tale viderant — nihil 
audicrant*." If to the state in which their 
defeats have left the spirit of the Austrian?, 
we oppose the natural effects of their new 
victories upon the minds of the French, 

* Tacit. Hist. lib. iii. cup. 68. 



124* AN INQUIRY INTO TIJE 

we shall be able to estimate how far the 
recollection of this memorable war leaves 
the balance in favour of the conquerors, 
beyond the mere changes of territory 
which it may have occasioned. There is, 
indeed, no closing our eyes to the extent 
of the misfortunes entailed upon Europe 
by the projectors of the late coalition. We 
must not deceive ourselves. The house 
of Austria is completely humbled ; she 
must receive the law, not from Vienna, 
but from Paris ; she has sacrificed much ; 
but more she must be prepared to surren- 
der if required, rather than run the last 
of risks, that of a new war. Whatever the 
sacrifice demanded may be, she must 
make it — whether treasure, or alliances, or 
dignities or territory, or what is worst of 
all, principles. If the enemy require her 
to join him in attacking Prussia, or turning 
against Russia, or sharing the plunder of 
Germany, or dividing and pillaging the 
Turk ; she cannot now balance. Agitur 
de imperio. France has Italy and the Tyrol ; 
the people of Austria are crushed ; the 



STATE OF THE NATION. J 'J 5 

French are exalted and exulting. What 
though the treaty of Presburgh has bound 
them together by no secret articles, and 
that its public stipulations still leave t<j 
Austria the semblance of a great monarchy? 
Italy and the Tyrol arc French, and the 
campaign of 1805, lives in the recollection 
of both French and Germans — Do we not 
know that the only extensive or durable 
conquests have been made gradually; that 
m treating with a humbled enemy, vou 
raise him by exacting too harsh conditions ; 
that the wisest policy is to take something, 
and by the present, to pave the way for 
future sains. One onlv chance of retaining 
even the name of independence, now re- 
mains to our unfortunate ally; she must 
listen no more to such counsellors as hurried 
her into the late alliance in spite of her 
better reason. By skill , and strength she 
may possibly preserve some part of what is 
left, and improve it in peace. If she once 
more forsakes moderate counsels, she is 
undone. 

Nor is it Austria alone that lias suffered 



126 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

by this unhappy coalition. The new vic- 
tories of France; the actual aggrandisement 
of her empire; the subjection of her rival; 
and the dread of her invincible arms ; have 
now rivcttcd the chains of the continent. 
No one ever supposed that the state of 
things as settled at the peace of Luneville, 
was to last longer than the necessities which 
made the different powers submit to the 
conditions then imposed. As soon as their 
strength should be recruited, and their sen- 
timents united against the French yoke, 
we had a right to expect that attempts 
would be made to throw it oil'. Time, only — » 
a prudent delay, and a judicious choice of 
the proper moment, was required to render 
such a resistance effectual. But all this 
prospect is now vanished ; the chance is 
thrown away, and the only hope is gone 
which Holland, and Switzerland, and Italy 
had of once more knowing independence. 
Henceforth the object of these unhappy 
states must be not to oppose France, but to 
moderate, if possible, the violence of her 
oppressions. They have England to thank 



STATE OF THE NATION. 127 

for this reverse of prospects, and it is pro- 
bably the last favour they will receive at 
her hands. 

3. If from these effects of the late war 
upon the state of the continent, we turn to 
a view of its effects upon our own indi- 
vidual interests, we shall find, that we 
have suffered, as is most just, a great share 
of the common loss. Besides the injury 
which England ultimately receives from 
the disasters of the rest of Europe, she 
is more immediately affected by the ag- 
grandizement of her enemy, from the 
increased danger of invasion to which 
it exposes her. The fate of the third 
coalition has in several ways augmented 
this danger; multiplying both the chances 
of the attempt being made, and increas- 
ing the probability of its success. 

Nothing is more common than to hear 
thoughtless persons talk lightly of such 
dangers. They trust that the loyalty and 
courage of the country would carry it 
through greater perils than France has in 
store for us. The French have never yei 



128 AN INQUIRY INTO TH£ 

been engaged with a nation of Freemen, 
They would find us made of different ma- 
terials from the Germans. They might 
over-run the country and take London ; 
but London is not England, and they 
would soon be extirpated. Such well 
meaning persons seem even to be afraid 
least no attempt should be made ; least they 
should not have an opportunity of conquer- 
ing upon British ground. " Let the ene- 
my come, say they, we desire nothing more, 
and not a man of his force shall escape." 
— But it is much to be feared that this zeal, 
so laudable in itself, " is without know- 
ledge." With every disposition to exalt 
the valour of Britons, and to augur well of 
their efforts in defence ,of the greatest bless- 
ing which any people enjoy; we may be 
permitted to dread the event of a contest 
between courage and skill. Nor was the 
difference between the two ever so strongly 
marked as since the experience of the late 
campaign. It is no disrespect to our troops, 
and their commanders, to question whether 
their native talents are sufficient to supply 



STATE OF THE NATION. 12& 

their want of experience, and to wish that, 
until measures are taken to improve them 
in their art, there may be no trial of gene- 
ralship between them and the conductors 
of the late German campaign. That the 
country could be ultimately conquered, 
we cannot indeed for a moment allow our- 
selves to believe ; but there are other evils 
attending an invasion, besides the greatest 
of all evils ; there are injuries short of utter 
ruin which a nation may receive from it. 
We know nothing practically of war in 
this happy land : we have heard of its 
effects, and read of battles at a great dis- 
tance ; but we know it not from experi- 
ence, and it is well we do not. Never was 
a country worse calculated for being the 
scene of military operations, for having the 
hazardous issue of war tried within its 
bounds. With its wealth, its crowded 
population, its multitude of artizans and 
traders, its paper circulation, its public 
debts, its commercial credit ; with the vari- 
ous factitious qualities of a nice and com- 
plicated system of most artificial society ; 

K 



ISO AN INQUIRY INTO TH£ 

and above all, without any experience 
whatever of a campaign on its own ground — 
how frightful to contemplate the mischiefs 
which so unusual a convulsion must occa- 
sion, admitting it should end in the total 
defeat of the invader ! It is clear, that no 
wise man will desire to see such an experi- 
ment tried, and that however it may end, 
the attempt would of itself be an enormous 
evil . 

Now the risk of this pernicious attempt 
beiug made, is greatly augmented by the 
late defeats of our allies. Before the new 
coalition, the enemy, at whatever time he 
might attempt to execute his favourite pro- 
ject, had always to apprehend great dan- 
ger, from his continental neighbours seizing 
the opportunity of his forces being occupied 
in England, and attacking him at a prodi- 
gious advantage. Every year that the at- 
tempt was delayed increased the magnitude 
of this risk; and had he deferred it a few 
-years longer, the certainty of the continent 
•being recruited and ready to attack him, 
should he give them so fair an occasion. 



STATE OF THE NATION 131 

would probably have made him finally 
abandon the scheme. But we have taken 
care to relieve him from all such embar- 
rassmenf. He has now nothing to appre- 
hend from continental wars. We have 
purchased a miserable respite from our 
alarms, (lor in spite of our boasting we were 
the dupes of our fears) at the expence of 
whatever solid benefit we might have found 
in a coalition able to assist us at the moment 
of real danger. Another check upon the 
French government was, the fear of the 
odium which would have attended a failure 
in the threatened project. So great a 
source of hope was this consideration with 
some, that they believed it would for ever 
prevent the attempt. But this too is entirely 
at an end. The Swabian and Moravian 
campaigns have raised the French Chief so 
high in the eyes of his subjects — have given 
him such an unexpected accession of popu- 
larity, and so signally increased the fame 
of his arms, that he may now with perfect 
safety try whatsoever his ambition or his 
caprices shall dictate. He may bury ano- 
k 2 



132 AN INQUIRY INTO Till- 

ther army in St. Domingo, or squander A 
hundred thousand lives in Ireland, or even 
risk their entire loss at sea for the chance of 
some part of the armament landing ; all 
will he forgotten by a people so elated 
with recent triumph, or if remembered will 
be chearfully forgiven to the conqueror 
of Austerlitz. Formerly, he dared not 
think of failing in the projected invasion ; 
he could only contemplate its success. 
Now he may be content with taking his 
chance of conquering, and ensuring the 
certainty of injuring us. That he should 
ruakethisattempt then, in every way so hurt- 
ful to our interests, is become infinitely more 
likely, since the wretched policy of Eng- 
land, by effecting the subjugation of her 
continental allies, and compleating the 
achievements of her enemy, removed the 
two great impediments which stood in his 
way. 

It is equally manifest that the danger of 
this attempt proving successful, or at least 
the probable amount of the injury which 
we may receive from it, has been greatly 



STATE OF THE NATION. 133 

augmented by the unhappy fate of the 
Continent. Not only has the discomfiture 
of the coalition enabled France to embark 
a much larger proportion of herdisposcablo 
force in the enterprise ; the recent suc- 
cesses of her arms must produce a very 
sensible effect on every man in her service. 
The confidence in their superiority which 
always animated French soldiers, is now 
greatly augmented ; and they have to op- 
pose men who know little of war, but what 
they have heard of in the history of the 
French conquests. The service of the 
late campaign too, was peculiarly well 
adapted to discipline new troops, and to 
increase the proportion of good soldiers in 
the whole army. 

But while the result of our impolitic 
measures has thus strengthened in every 
respect the hands of the enemy, it is 
strange that we have ourselves entirely 
neglected the short interval of quiet which 
the continental war gave us. At its com- 
mencement, upwards of two years had 
©lapsed since the British government were 
filled with the constant expectation of a. 



134 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

descent upon our coasts. Our military 
system was extremely imperfect, and the 
fear of all men was least the invasion should 
be attempted, before any material improve- 
ments could take place. We were indeed, 
" counting hours and minutes," till the 
enemy should land ; and at this critical 
juncture, a respite is suddenly obtained by 
means of the campaign in Germany. The 
invasion is now necessarily delayed for 
half a year at least. Would not any one 
have conceived that such an interval was 
valuable beyond all price ; that it gave us 
the very time so much wanted for the 
completion of our defensive preparations ; 
that it might be the turn of the balance in 
our favour, when the attempt should at last 
be made. Yet strange to tell, this oppor- 
tunity was utterly thrown away; our cabinet, 
as soon as the army left Boulogne, seem to 
have thought the whole project of invasion 
at an end ; and never contemplating the pos? 
sibility of the allies being once more beaten, 
they chose rather to remain spectators of 
the continental war, than to prepare for our 



STATE OF THE NATION. 135 

own battles, should it prove unfortunate. 
Their military system had been tried above 
a year, and might be said to have tailed 
more egregiously than any plan that ever 
was devised. It had not during the whole 
of that period produced 1500 men in the 
whole island, and not five hundred of these 
for general service. The volunteer army, 
as it has been called, had relaxed in its most 
valuable quality of ardour and alacrity; and 
had been losing the only advantage which 
such a force can possess over regular troops, 
without making any sensible progress in 
discipline. The recruiting for the army 
was at a stand, and nothing whatever had 
been done to improve its constitution. Yet 
did the government allow the whole inter- 
val between the departure of the Boulogne 
army, and the dissolution of the late cabinet, 
to pass over without taking a single step 
for the general reform of our defensive 
measures, or even for the new modelling 
pf that plan, which a fair trial had shewn to 
be nugatory in its original shape. They 
did not even assemble the parliament, with- 



136 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

out whose interference no such im-e 
provements could be made. They avoid- 
ed every thing which could have turn- 
ed their impolicy in making the coali- 
tion, to the smallest account ; and persisted 
in rejecting the one solitary benefit which 
their new war might have produced, in 
compensation of so many calamities. Thus, 
after the best possible opportunity of aug- 
menting the strength of the country,, they 
have left it to their successors, feeble and 
confused, at the very crisis when the ne- 
cessary consequences of their other mea- 
sures are hurrying on its fate. "With such 
an army, with our volunteers and our de- 
fence bill, with our regular forces weaken- 
ed by the conflicting tendencies of the 
militia and reserve, with our volunteer 
system counteracting all the other branches, 
we are now left to contend alone against 
the undivided force of our enemy, and his 
allies. " Is autem valet exercitu, tercet mul- 
tos spe et promissis, omnia omnium concupivit, 
Huic tradita urbs est, nuda presidiis, refertq 



STATE OF THE NATION. 137 

COpiis, Quid est quod ab eo non metuas, qui 
ilia templa et tecta, non patriam sed prcedam 
putet ? Comrnissum quidem a nobis eerie est, 
she a nostro duce, ut, e portii sine gubcrna- 
culo egressi, tempest at i nos tradere/nus.'"* 



Such arc, in a general view, the lamenta- 
ble effects of that foreign policy which we 
have minutely traced through its different 
errors, in the former part of this inquiry. 
We might have enumerated other evils, 
which have flowed from it both to Europe, 
and to our own individual interests. We 
might, for example, have stated the loss of 
character and influence which has attended 
so plain an exposure of our incapacity for 
continental aflairs ; the contempt into 
which our assistance has fallen with every 
ally, reduced as it now has been to the 
mere payment of modly ; the pains we 
have taken to make them undenate even 
those supplies which they were willing to 
receive, by pressing our gold upon all the 

* Cic. Epist. Lib. vii. 



13S AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

world, and running from door to door, to 
beg it might be accepted ; and above all, 
the odium which we have incurred with 
the less enlightened part of the continent, 
with the people in every foreign state, in 
whose eyes we have appeared only as in- 
stigators of war, and as corrupters of their 
rulers for their destruction. From the 
effects of these impressions our name will 
not soon recover, and we may rest assured 
that the Continent is at last heartily sick 
of our interference, and prepared to join 
with the enemy in his plan of excluding 
us from any voice in its affairs. But it 
was the less necessary to enter upon such 
topics, that they are naturally suggested by 
the previous discussions, and that they tend 
in no way to modify the picture formerly 
drawn of our affairs: for it is our misfortune 
that we look around in vain for any cir- 
cumstances which %nay soften its features, 
while it is impossible to imagine any 
addition which can aggravate them, ,. 



STATE OF THE NATION. I3fl| 



•III. St-ate of Foreign Affairs, in- 
dependent of the late Coalition 
and its Consequences. 

Although the effects of our last exertions 
on the Continent have almost entirely new 
modelled it, yet there are several particulars 
in its present state, which have not hecu 
directly influenced by the fate of the war, 
partly because they lay beyond the sphere 
of its operation, but chiefly because our 
former impolicy and mismanagement had 
done as much detriment as was possible, 
to our interests in those quarters. An in- 
quiry into the state of our foreign affairs 
Would be imperfect without some notice of 
these points. 

I. The unfortunate circumstance of 
having Spain against us, and given up en- 
tirely to the alliance, or rather the service 
of our enemies, during the present war, is 
a consequence of the impolicy of the Bri- 
tish cabinet, previous to the commence- 
ment of the late coalition. After our rup- 



140 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

ture with France, and down to the forma- 
tion of the late ministry, in May 1804, it 
clearly appears, that the dispositions of Spain 
towards this country, and against our 
enemy, were as favourable as could have 
been desired*. Our popularity was never 
so great, either with the Court of Madrid, 
with the confidential ministers of the 
crown, or with the nation at large. France, 
always disliked by the Spaniards, had be- 
come still more odious from her insolent 
and rapacious demands; and from the in- 
temperate conduct of her represent?. hves. 
The wishes of the Spanish cabinet accords 
ed with those of the people, in lean- 
ing plai. rds an of tensive alliance 
with England against France. But the 
state of our continental relations, and our 
inability to give Spain any effectual support 
in the dangers to which such a conduct 
must expose her, rendered it necessary for 
her to delay all measures leading to a rup- 
ture ; and she submitted to a convention of 

* Additional Spanish Papers, presented 2d. Fe- 
bruary, 1805,— No. II. to XX, 



STATE OF THE NATION. 141 

neutrality, by which she became bound to 
pay a considerable subsidy to the French 
government. To this the English cabinet 
consented as a temporary measure, " in- 
tended to give time till the disposition of 
the great powers of Europe should be more 
decidedly known. "* That the subsidy 
was extorted from Spain, by the imminent 
fear of seeing a French army in Madrid ; 
that the dispositions of Spain in our fa- 
vour, and her enmity to France were in- 
creased by this compulsory submission, is 
clearly demonstrated by the dispatches of 
the British Envoy -f-. Of these dispositions 
we ought doubtless to have availed our- 
selves. We were engaged in planning the 
new coalition, nothing could be more 
important than to include Spain in such a 
league. Her position with respect to 
France, must always render her hostility 
extremely hurtful to that power. Her 
frontier on the Pyrennees is strong, and well 

* Additional Spanish Papers, presented 2d. Fe- 
bruary, 1805— No. VII. 

f Ibid. No. VIII. 



142 AN INQUIRY INTO iii.C 

defended by fortified places. The French 
frontier is only protected by Perpignan, 
and France has no way of removing 
the danger of an attack from Spain, but 
by attacking her in the first instance, and 
forcing her to conclude a separate peace. 
This would have been rendered imprac- 
ticable by the preparations of the allies on 
the East side of the French territories , and 
a most important accession would thus 
have been gained to the measures of the 
offensive league. By the hostility of Spain* 
too, France would have lost the benefit 
of her subsidies, and the still greater ad- 
vantage of that controul over her coiin- 
cils, which enabled her at any time to 
involve every branch of the Spanish 
monarchy in a war with her enemies. 
The allies would have secured the in- 
dependence of Spain, while they pro- 
fited by her assistance; and prevented 
the subjection of the whole of her re- 
sources to France, while they converted a 
just and moderate proportion of them to 
their own use. By going to war with 
Spain, they necessarily threw her into the 



STATE OF THE NATION. 143 

arms of France ; armed her whole force 
against themselves ; sacrificed the benefits 
of a commercial intercourse, the most lu- 
crative and even necessary to their prospe- 
rity ; extended the sea-coast of the enemy 
from Bourdeaux round to Toulon ; in- 
creased his predominating influence in the 
Mediterranean; and laid Portugal entirely 
at his mercy. 

Yet this was the very line of con- 
duct which the allies ; or rather which 
England, in the infancy of the alli- 
ance, chose to pursue. She delayed ob- 
jecting to the Spanish subsidy until she 
should sound the dispositions of the other 
Powers. Those she found to be favoura- 
ble, or at least she conceived that they 
warranted her in expecting a new coali- 
tion against France. Instead of delaying 
her objections to the subsidy a few weeks 
longer, and then offering Spain a place in 
the league, when she might declare her- 
self with impunity, England demanded 
that she should produce the subsidiary 
convention, which every one knew she was 
bound to conceal, at the peril of an imme- 



144 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

diate war with France ; and she made this 
bootless demand at a time when matters 
were not ripe for assisting her in such a 
war*. The pretext of armaments at Fer- 
rol was mere trifling; they lasted exactly 
nine days, and were intended for quelling an 
insurrection in Biscay. But this pretence, 
with the refusal o[ Spain to produce the 
convention, were made the grounds of 
that unprecedented violation of justice, 
the capture of the frigates without any 
declaration of war; accompanied with 
circumstances of individual calamity, which 
have not failed to injure the English cause 
irreparably among the Spanish people. — 
Thus did our government sacrifice to the 
paltry object of a few cargoes of silver, 
its character; its prospects of assistance 
from Spain, at the moment when that 
assistance would have been most valuable; 
its hopes of weaning her entirely from 
French connexions; its expectations of 
the security derived from lessening our 

* The point here at issue, was a mere matter of 
form ; the tenor of the convention was publicly 
known- 



STATE OF THE NATION. \ij 

enemy's sea coast, and the advantages con- 
nected with the Spanish commerce; above 
all, its chance of continuing the high fa- 
vour enjoyed by England in Spain, and 
the influence in her councils to which it 
must have led. One of two plans were 
clearly pointed out by the state of our 
relations with Spain ; either we should 
have connived at her compulsory submis- 
sion to France until we could protect her in 
resisting the French dominion, and added 
her to the new league; or, if unfortu- 
nately we preferred hostilities, we should 
Jiavc taken care to make the war as ad- 
vantageous as possible, by liberating the 
Spanish colonies from the galling mono- 
poly of the Mother Country, and opening 
a most profitable inlet for our commercial 
speculations. Neither of those schemes 
was adopted. With our accustomed in- 
genuity, we contrived to find a line of 
policy which should avoid the benefit?, 
and combine the disadvantages of all the 
others. We managed to lose the alliance 
of Spain at present, and her friendship Jbr 

L 



146 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

ever ; and at the same time gave up ali 
chance of turning her hostility to our 
advantage. Her trade so beneficial to all 
the branches of our domestic industry, 
so essential to some of them, we aban- 
doned for a few barrels of dollars. To 
prevent her from paying a subsidy to 
France, we incorporated her whole re- 
sources with those of our enemy ; and 
rather than allow a neutrality, which 
might give -a trifling aid to him, we 
rushed into a kind of hostility which 
could procure no assistance for ourselves. 
The total alienation of Spain from our 
interests ; the ruin of our ancient popu- 
larity in that country ; the absolute sub- 
jection of her power to that of France ; 
has been the price paid for our acquisi- 
tions of silver bullion ; and next to the 
evils produced by the new coalition, this 
is the most serious misfortune which her 
fatal impolicy has brought upon the conti- 
nental affairs of England. 

2. If we cast our eyes on the other states, 
who are confederates, or rather depen- 



STATE OF THE NATION. 147 

dants of France, we shall find that the 
hopes of their deserting her, or attempt- 
ing to throw off the yoke, with the assist- 
ance of England and her allies, are slen- 
der indeed. Partly from circumstances 
never within our controul, and partly, no 
doubt, from our former impolicy, those 
countries are as firmly united in fate with 
our enemy, as if they formed integral 
parts of 1 1 is extensive dominions. 

Holland has always been regarded as 
the natural ally of this country. Her 
proximity to France, and consequent ex- 
posure to the power of that formidable 
neighbour ; her commercial relations, the 
nature of her civil and religious establish- 
ments, and the character of her people, 
have been esteemed, in the better times 
of European affairs, a sufficient pledge of 
her inclination to connect her interests 
with the cause of Great Britain. Accord- 
ingly, except during the impolitic alli- 
ance of Charles II. with France, and the 
no less unwise enmity of the Dutch towards 
us in the American war, Holland has uni- 
formly been our firm ally in all our dis- 
L 2 



148 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

putcs with France, and our cause has 
never tailed to gain by the connexion. 
But since the Dutch Revolution, this 
alliance has been entirely dissolved. 
The arms of France having over-run 
the Netherlands, soon established the 
French power in Holland. The govern- 
ment, the armies and fleets, the trade 
and the revenues of that rich and populous 
country, have been delivered over to our 
enemy, not by an offensive and defensive 
alliance, but by an entire conquest and 
subsequent acknowledgment of the yoke. 
From this important increase of the French 
power, have arisen many serious accessions 
to the dangers to which it exposes us. A 
great extent of sea-coast; a numerous body 
of men accustomed to maritime affairs, 
and eminently skilled in the navigation 
of the North Sea ; a commercial navy, 
next to our own, the greatest in the world 
— these are but a few of the advantages 
which France has derived from Holland, 
and may turn against us in her projected 
attack upon our European dominions. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 149 

But many well-informed persons have 
imagined that the Dutch arc discontented 
with their yoke; that they earnestly desire 
an opportunity of regaining their indepen- 
dence; and that these dispositions would 
both insure the success of any attempts to 
assist them, in freeing themselves from 
French influence, and deprive France of 
any material benefit from their services in 
her attempts upon England. It cannot 
be doubted that such hopes as these are 
altogether vain — that they arc founded 
upon a mistake of the Dutch character, 
and upon gross exaggerations of the French 
policy towards Holland. A country, in 
the circumstances of Holland, depending 
entirely upon commerce for its wealth, 
and for its support ; crowded beyond all 
others with a population *of industrious 
and skilful inhabitants; covered with 
warehouses, manufactories, canals, docks, 
wharfs, and all the other acquisitions of 
ingenuity and labour; its very land saved 
from the sea by monuments of their per- 
severance, throuiili a ions course of acres : 



150 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

its vast accumulation of riches depending 
entirely upon the preservation of order, 
and the safety of commercial credit among 
its citizens — such a country must always 
dread a change as the greatest of evils; 
must prefer the certainty of being indif- 
ferently well, to the chance of being bet- 
ter, coupled with the risk of being worse; 
and of all revolutions must fear those 
the most which may involve it in the cala- 
mities and the uncertainties of domestic 
wan are. An invasion, or a civil war in 
England, would indeed be dreadful, 
whatever event it might have ; but Hol- 
land is in all respects less fitted for sustain- 
ing such a shock ; and the Dutch are not 
so dull to their interests or their dangers 
as some persons formerly alluded to in 
this country ; for no man in the United 
Provinces will be found hardy enough to 
contemplate an invasion as matter of exult- 
ation, or even of indifference, however 
sure he may be of its leading to the 
emancipation of his country, and however 
zealous to see her once more independent. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 151 

Much will be borne of real loss, and much 
more of degradation and insult, by every 
Dutch patriot, before he will rashly con- 
sent to hazard the existence of Holland 
in the most promising schemes for her 
liberation. Whatever may be the pros- 
pect of succeeding in such attempts, he 
will judge, and wisely judge, that the 
maintenance of things in their present 
state, is preferable to the certainty of 
their being improved, when that certainty 
must be purchased by the complicated 
evils of a war in the heart of the Re- 
public. It is the nature of commerce to 
dread revolution and war as the last of 
dangers; and the Dutch depend too much 
upon their trade, to put honour or glory 
in competition with it. These considera- 
tions may, in part, account for the cold 
reception which our attempts to free Hol- 
land from the French yoke have hitherto 
met with ; and may explain the reason of 
our being unpopular in a country formerly 
so much attached to us, merely because 
we have endeavoured to save it from op- 



152 AJT INQUIRY INTO THE 

pression. In truth, however little the 
Dutch may like their French masters, and 
however much they may regret the changes 
of dominion which have altered their alli- 
ance?, there is one thing which they must 
always dislike still more strongly than the 
yoke of France itself, and that is the 
struggle which is necessary to shake it off. 
We, who have forced them to undertake 
this struggle, by carrying the war, unin^ 
vitcd, into their territories, and who are 
always suspected of still retaining the same 
intentions, are not treated as real friends 
to their interests ; and though they would 
not hesitate for one moment in preferring 
our dominion to an alliance on equal terms 
with France, wcrethe original choice in their 
power, yet now that the French have sub- 
dued them, they have as little hesitation 
in preferring their present masters to those 
whe would annoy them with attempting 
their emancipation. 

But, in truth, the accounts of the Dutch 
oppressions are greatly exaggerated. Many 
capitalists have been ruined and forced to 



STATE OF THE NATION. 153 

emigrate. Many persons have had their 
wealth diminished, and the whole riches of 
the state are greatly impaired ; hut the pro- 
fits n bich are still drawn upon the remain- 
ing stock arc necessarily higher, and this of 
itself tends to alleviate the burthens of the 
capitalists who are left behind. The French 
have wisely confined their plunder of the 
stat*' to public exactions ; they have not, as 
in Italy, (where the Directory never intend- 
ed to establish a permanent dominion), al- 
lowed the individuals of their armies to pil- 
lage the country at large. Contributions 
have been levied, but not by the conqueror 
from the people. The government have 
been required to furnish so much money, 
or support so many troops, and have 
been left to devise the means of raising 
these supplies, and to enforce their mea- 
sures in their own way. It need hardly 
be remarked, how much lighter it is for a 
people to pay a very large tribute in this 
regular manner, than to be robbed in a 
disorderly way, of the smallest sum, by 
the licence of individuals. If any proof 



154 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

were required, we might notice the violence 
of the hatred borne towards the French all 
over Italy, contrasted with the moderate 
dislike in which they are held by the Hol- 
landers ; though no one can believe that 
the Italians lost nearly so much by the in- 
vasion of their country, or that the Dutch 
have less regard for their property. 

It deserves further to be remarked, that 
the wars with England, in which the revo- 
lution has engaged the Dutch, however in- 
jurious to their commerce, have greatly en- 
riched their colonies by the prodigiousin- 
flux of British capital, which has uniformly 
attended their falling into our hands ; and 
among the branches of the community 
most likely to feel the weight of their sub- 
jection to France, the most important is 
Amsterdam, which, from ancient antipathy 
to the Stadtholder's party, would at all 
times have embraced any alternative for 
the certainty of ruining his power. If 
to all these considerations, we add the utter 
despair with which the Dutch are filled, 
of ever seeing their country re-established 



STATE OF THE NATION. 155 

in its independence, whatever attempts 
they may make for it, so long as Belgium 
is in the hands of France, and their 
conviction that the time is yet far off 
when any change of affairs may reduce 
the French power ; we shall be satisfied 
that they are indeed lamentably deceived, 
who cherish the hope of assistance from 
the Dutch, in driving the French out of 
Holland, or even of maintaining the popu- 
larity and influence of the English name, 
among a people who reflect on our exer- 
tions in their affairs, as on so many in- 
juries to their prosperity. We must, 
therefore, make up our minds to the un- 
comfortable prospect of Holland remain- 
ing intirely and inactively subject to our 
enemy and averse to us, until changes 
shall have been wrought in the lace of 
affairs, which it would be idle to guess at, 
and pernicious to reckon upon. 

The fate of Switzerland was by no 
means so unpromising as that of Holland, 
before the last campaign. How completely 
the changes produced by that dreadful 



156 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

contest have given up the Swiss to the dd- 
minion of France, has been already de- 
monstrated. The most short-sighted of all 
policy in England, or her allies, would 
now be to think of agitating that unhappy 
country with any further hopes of regain- 
ing its liberties, by new struggles against 
France. Were the Swiss thoroughly united 
together as one man, and resolved to re* 
sist the power of the masters who now sur- 
round them on every side, nothing could 
be expected from their efforts, but new 
scenes of bloodshed, and an intolenftle 
augmentation of their burthens. While 
France possesses Savoy and Piedmont, and 
while Swabia and the Tyrol belong to her 
dependants who exist during her plea- 
sure, as by her pleasure they were created; 
all the exertions which the Swiss can 
make, is inadequate to prevent them from 
being overwhelmed, long before any allies 
could break through the strong French 
provinces that surround them, and come 
to their assistance. The Cisalpine, and 
the petty states in Germany, are, if pos- 



STATE OF THE NATION - . 157 

sible, still more dependent on France. 
Their disposition to revolt unhappily sig- 
nifies nothing. For a long course of years 
they must submit in silence, however well 
inclined to rebel ; and the worst service 
that the well-wishers of European inde- 
pendence could render them, would be to 
stir up any premature attempt at effecting 
their deliverance. "We may rest assured 
then, that the petty states by whom France 
has surrounded herself, as well as the more 
powerful dominions which she has suc- 
ceeded in subduing, are firmly united to 
her fortunes, fome by their weakness, 
others by their disinclination to exert their 
strength in a way which they deem hurtful 
to their interests ; that from Holland to 
Switzerland, and from Switzerland to Tur- 
key, she has covered a frontier almost every 
where strong by nature, with dependent 
nations, whom there is no chance of our 
seeing revolt, and who will always bear the 
first shock of a war waged against her, if 
they do not actively assist in her of- 
fensive operations. What remain a lor the 
7 



158 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

rest of Europe to undertake, in its own be- 
half, may not be very easily discovered : 
but nothing can be more plain than the 
course of policy which should, at the pre- 
sent juncture, be avoided — the vain at- 
tempt to force those subject nations into 
new and ruinous efforts at regaining their 
independence. 

3. If from a view of the dependencies 
of France, we turn to the contemplation 
of that prodigious empire itself, we shall 
find as little to cheer our prospects of the 
future fates of the European common- 
wealth. The resources which she draws 
from Spain, Italy, Germany, and Holland, 
are trivial when compared with the mass 
of real and rapidly increasing power by 
which she has added those states to her do- 
minions. A population of above thirty- 
two millions; a revenue of twenty-five 
millions sterling, in spite of the ruin of herf 
commerce, with a diminution of only three 
millions and a half for the interest of debt, 
notwithstanding the wars she has been en- 
gaged in; a regular army of five hundred 



STATE OF THE NATION. 15§ 

and fifty thousand men, known in almost 
every eorner of Europe by the rapidity of 
their conquests, and commanded by the 
first generals in the world ; a force not 
less formidable, of men whose skill in ne- 
gotiation has completed the victories of 
her troops ; a spirit, the most turbulent 
and restless, the most impatient of peace, 
and fearless of war, animating all ranks of 
her people, and produced, in a great de- 
gree, by the long continued hostility of 
all her neighbours — these form together 
a foundation of military superiority, suffici- 
ent to alarm more powerful states than any 
that yet remain in her neighbourhood. 
But a change has within these few years 
taken place, in the constitution of the 
French nation, still more formidable in its 
natural consequences to the tranquillity 
and prosperity of Europe, than any of those 
well known particulars which we have just 
now enumerated. We allude to the system 
of military conscription, by which their 
forces are now recruited, which has slowly 
grown up with the revolutionary govern- 



1(70 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

ment, which has of late been carried 
into complete effect all over the coun- 
try, and now forms a part of the esta- 
blishment, likely to mingle itself in a 
short time with all the views and habits 
of the people, and scarcely to occasion 
more inconvenience or discontent, than 
the milder expedients of the militia law 
do in this island. This conscription af- 
fects all ranks of the community ; every 
man in France, with a very few excep- 
tions in favour of certain public functiona- 
ries, is a soldier from the age of twenty 
to twenty-five, not merely by inrolment 
as in Austria and Prussia, but in actual 
service ; whatever be his rank or his for- 
tune, or his pursuits in life, he must give 
up every other view as soon as he reaches 
his twentieth year, and devote his life (01 
five years to the profession of arms alone. 
As there are no exemptions, unless in 
cases of former service, a substitute cannot 
be procured under an enormous sum, fre- 
quently so high as 7001. sterling, never 
lower thatn 4001. and if more than a very 



STATE OF THE NATIOX. iGl 

small number required substitutes, it would 
be altogether impossible to procure them : 
so that in fact there are scarce any excep- 
tions to the rule of strict personal ser- 
vice. The rigour of the police established 
all over France renders it quite impossible 
for any one within the specified years to 
escape^ In every quarter the gendarmerie 
have authority to arrest all the young men 
whom they can find, and detain them 
until they can prove themselves to be 
exempt from the conscription. The peo- 
ple are now learning to submit quietly to 
their fate, and with the happy levity of 
their national character, try to make the 
military life agreeable. The pay is ex- 
tremely small ; but the rich and poor all 
live together, and the former contribute to 
improve the common fare. Every one en- 
deavours in the first place to make him- 
self master of the military art, in order 
to qualify him for being promoted ; officers 
are chosen from the ranks without any 
regard to birth or fortune ; the emula- 
tion and interest of the common soldiers 

M 



162 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

are kept up by their chance of promotion, 
and by the voice which they are allowed, 
to a certain degree, in the choice of their 
officers. The Imperial guard, which has 
many privileges, and is composed of per- 
sons possessing a certain fortune, consti- 
tutes a species of aristocracy of extensive 
influence in this system. The military 
schools, the only branch of public instruc- 
tion which is much attended to, secure the 
constant supply of the higher branches of 
the science ; and the excellent organiza- 
tion of the Etat-Major General, to which 
the victories of the French arms are per- 
haps more owing than to any other im- 
provement in their military afTairs, keeps 
alive during peace the practice of their 
scientific acquirements, while it prepares 
the most valuable collection of practical 
information, so essential to the success of 
warlike, operations. Add to this that the 
great offices of the state are all in the 
hands of military men ; that honours as well 
as power and wealth are almost confined to 
this favoured order ; and that all places of 
trust, from the command of armies to the 



State of the nation 1- , 163 

management of negociations, are their pa- 
trimony. 

Thus, \vc find, that it is no exaggcra- 
geration, no metaphorical language to de- 
nominate France a great military empire ; 
to say that the government now calls forth 
the whole resources of the state, and that 
every Frenchman is literally a soldier. 
Nothing like this has ever appeared since 
the early days of the Roman people. The 
feudal militia had not the same regularity, 
the same science and discipline. The in- 
surrection of Hungary, the rising en masse 
of Switzerland and America, were all con- 
fined to particular emergencies. The nati- 
onal guards and first conscriptions of France 
herself, which approach nearer to the new 
order of things, were still far inferior to it in 
systematic arrangement and extent of ope- 
ration ; yet by their aid, imperfect as they 
were in the comparison, she gained all 
that she had conquered previous to the 
last campaign. But her present system is 
in truth, a terrible spectacle. The most nu- 
merous and ingenious people in the world 
have abandoned the arts of peace, not for 
M 2 



164 AN INQUIRT INTO THE 

their defence, but after having conquered 
all the nations around them. They have 
betaken themselves to the military life as 
their main pursuit, almost their exclusive 
occupation, not from impatience of a 
Jong continued quiet, but at the end of 
various revolutions and a series of the most 
destructive wars. With a government 
purely military, a stock of science pecu- 
liarly adapted to the same pursuits, and a 
species of wealth not likely to be imme- 
diately ruined by such a change, they have 
established a regular system of discipline, 
which draws every arm into the service of 
the country, and renders the whole sur- 
face of the most compact, extensive, and 
best situated country in Europe, one vast 
camp, swarming with the finest soldiers — 

" Ubi fas versum atque nefas : tot bella per orbem : 
" Tam multce scelerum facies : non ullus aratro 
" Dignus honos. Squalent abductis arva colonis, 
" Et curvse rigidum fakes conflantur in ensem. 
" Hinc movet Euphrates, illinc German ia, bellum: 
" Vic ina: ruptis inter se legibus urbes 
" Anna fcrunt : x saevit toto Mars impius orbe. 

Virg. Georg. 



STATE OF. THE NATION l€)5 

4. So formidable being the aspect of 
France, both from her federal relations 
and from her own internal resources, let 
us turn our attention towards tbe situation 
of the powers yet unsubdued by her arms ; 
to Austria, Russia, and Prussia, who, 
though by no means beyond her controul, 
are, however, still in appearance indepen- 
dent. That the resources of Austria are 
naturally most splendid, cannot be denied. 
It* her external commerce were more ex- 
tensive, or even the general policy towards 
her provinces more enlightened, she might 
still view the strength of France without 
dismay. The extent and natural fertility 
of the countries already subject to her, 
renders any acquisition of new territory on 
the side of Turkey a vain and unprofitable 
injustice. While she possesses Bohemia, 
Gallicia, and above all Hungary ; while 
those noble kingdoms remain almost in a 
state of nature, and so neglected, made 
her before her late disasters one of the first 
powers in Europe — what folly could be 
so great as to seek for new countries, and 



166 AN INQUIRY .INTO THE 

persist in neglecting her ancient posses- 
sions? To explain the various measures by 
which she has already, not merely neg- 
lected, but stunted the growth of her he- 
reditary provinces, would form a volume, 
by no means uninstructive to the political 
economist, who wishes to contemplate 
the errors of statesmen ; or the practical 
politician, who would be warned by the 
example of his predecessors. AVe shall 
confine ourselves to the statement of a few 
particulars, which may serve to shew in 
how lamentable a situation the resources 
of the Monarchy are, and how vain all 
new exertions against France must prove, 
until time shall have been given for their 
gradual improvement by the adoption 
of a wiser system. 

In some parts of the Monarchy the pea- 
sants are a great deal too much oppressed 
by their landlords; in others they pay too 
small a rent, and the land is in conse- 
quence neglected. Thus in Austria and 
part of Styria, the feudal services were 
commuted for a certain fixed sum yearly 3 



STATE 6F THE NATION. 167 

above thirty years ago: It was reckoned too 
small a compensation then, and now it is 
almost a nominal rent. In Hungary, on 
the other hand, the abolition of villenage 
has been legally effected by the famous 
Urbarium of Maria Teresa ; but the lords 
retain in practice, especially in the re- 
moter parts, a most exorbitant power over 
their vassals. — All over the monarchy, ex- 
cept in Hungary, the system of military 
enrolment presses very severely upon the 
people ; every person, not noble, or ex- 
empted by his office, is liable to serve; if 
a person leaves the country and returns at 
any distance of time, he is stopped in his 
passage through it, and sent to the army 
because he had missed his turn of service 
during his absence. When Joseph II. 
wished to encourage settlers in Poland 
from other parts of Europe, he thought he 
gave them a great exemption by promising 
the lathers of families and their eldest 
sons a freedom from military service. — The 
crown not only carries on, upon its own 
account, a great variety of extensive, (it 



1 

168 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

is needless to add) ruinous speculations in 
trade and manufactures ; it has also some 
of the most oppressive monopolies, of use- 
ful or necessary articles. In the towns a 
licence must be bought to sell almost 
every article of commerce ; and for enter- 
ing a new line of business a high price 
must be paid. — Except in Styria and Gal- 
licia, salt is every where a Royal mono- 
poly ; and except in Hungary, tobacco is 
strictly subjected to the same oppressive 
restriction. The effect of these mono- 
polies on the prosperity of the state, 
and their trifling utility to the reve- 
nue, may be estimated from the price 
to which they raise the articles in 
question, and the amount of net income 
which they yield the crown. The fossil 
salt, which forms nine tenths of the con- 
sumption in Hungary, and is yielded in 
such abundance, that in the neighbour- 
hood of the mines, it costs but twopence 
a hundred weight to the crown, costs in the 
m arket nearly forty times as much, or 
about six shillings and sixpence. The 



STATE OF THE NATION. \6<) 

yearly consumption of this article in Hun- 
gary exceeds a million of hundred weight; 
yet this oppressive monopoly yields the 
crown no more than 200,000/. a year. 
The eft cts of the monopoly of tobacco are 
i iy similar; but we may judge more 
accurately of them by remarking, that in 
Hungary, where it does not exist, the best 
tobacco is sol ' en times cheaper than the 
vile tobac- '.ria and Bohemia, are 

in those provinces* ; and that when the 
whole profit of the monopoly was farmed, 

" Tobacco, on the Hungarian frontier, is not seized ; 
but the person attempting to bring it into Austria is fined 
above two hundred times the price of it; and the search 
for tobacco is accordingly as strict as for diamonds at the 
mines of the East Indies. Foreign tobacco may be im- 
ported for use on paying 60 per cent, duty, but not for 
sale. All the manufacture and sale, without exception, is 
carried on upon Royal account. The degree in which 
Hungary is oppressed by these strange regulations, may be 
estimated from this, that she only exports annually 70,0001. 
worth of tobacco, all of which goes to the Emperor's ac- 
count. The Austrians use much more of that herb than 
tlit French, and yet (he total importation of tobacco into 
Fraru- . I. '■■ are the revolution, to exceed ten times that 
run, 



i 



AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

it yielded only 150,000/. — Hungary, in- 
deed, the finest of all the provinces, and 
sufficient, if well managed, to render 
Austria the richest country in Europe, is 
studiously oppressed, because its free con- 
stitution prevents the crown from laying 
on arbitrary imposts, and monopolizing all 
its produce. In revenge, its tobacco is 
prevented from being exported (except on 
royal account) under the severest penal- 
ties. Its excellent wines arc oppressed 
with duties, amounting almost to prohi- 
bitions, in order to encourage the undrink- 
able produce of the Austrian vineyards; 
but those duties are exacted even in coun- 
tries where no Austrian wine ever reached, 
as in Croatia. Even the grains which can- 
not bear the expence of carriage to Fiume, if 
brought round through the other provinces, 
are loaded with the heaviest duties, and the 
merchant annoyed with regulations still 
more vexatious. To conclude this melan- 
choly picture of impolitic conduct; the 
same jealousy of the people which deliver- 
ed up the Tyrol to the enemy last war, 



STATE OF THE NATION' 171 

prevails vvitli respect to the peasantry of 
Carinthia and Styria, in spite of past ex- 
perience, in spite even of the success which 
attended ajust confidence in the people of 
the frontier towards Turkey, who, since 
the earlier times, have been freed from 
vassalage, and embodied as a feudal militia. 
— If, to these examples of the impolicy 
which has weakened Austria, we add her 
perseverance in an inadequate military 
system, always ill devised, but least of all 
calculated to oppose the light troops and 
young officers of France; and the unfortu- 
nate confusion which prevails in her fi- 
nances, partly from bad management of 
the revenue, partly from an excessive issue 
of paper, and the want of any bank beyond 
the controul of government, and partly 
from the signal marks of bad faith which 
have at different times, so late even as 
1805*, been given to the public creditor ; 

* The discount of the paper, which formed the only 
currency, was, during peace, from 28 to 32 per cent, and 
during war much greater. The credit of the Government 
suffered extremely from the unfair treatment of .the subscri- 
bers to the Francklort Loan, in January 1805. 



172 AX INQUIRY INTO THE 

we shall be prepared to judge, whether any 
hope can yet be placed in the speedy efforts 
of Austria against France— whether the wit 
of man can figure a season more calculated 
for repose, or worse adapted to the smallest 
movement of a warlike nature. 

Having proved beyond dispute that 
Austria, from the natural weakness of her 
resources, independently of her late mis- 
fortunes, is for the present quite incapaci- 
tated from going to war with France ; it 
is not necessary to stop long in order to 
consider the resources of her neighbours. 
Without her assistance, it is manifeft that 
no project for the restraint of French en- 
croachments can be one moment enter- 
tained ; and were Russia as powerful as is 
vulgarly supposed, and Prussia as solid 
in her general strength as she appears 
to be strong from her excellent army; 
still it would be the extreme of infatua- 
tion to think of leaguing them in the 
common cause, alone, Yet it may not be 
useless to remark, that the resources of 
both these powers are commonly over- 



STATE OF THE XATIOX. i/O 

rated. Russia possesses, indeed, an immense 
empire, if \vc only view its extent, and 
the absolute numbers of her inhabitants; 
but that something in the situation of 
affairs prevents her from calling forth a 
large proportion of these, is sufficiently 
proved by the comparatively small armies 
which she has ever been able to send 
abroad. With the most noble and dis- 
interested inclinations to support the com- 
mon cause, his Imperial Majesty has not 
sent, by any means, such armies into the 
field as the Emperor of Germany, whom 
we are accustomed to think a much less 
powerful ally. There has been, too, a seri- 
ous defect of talents,and chiefly of prudence, 
the best of talents in a statesman, anion he 
Russian counsellors. Prussia, it may also 
be remarked, has a scattered territory, 
feeble commercial resources, and in some 
parts a discontented population. Her 
Polish provinces, like those of Austria, are 
sources of constant anxiety. Russia alone, 
of the three partitioning powers, lias a 
secure hold of her share ; and, without 



17-i' AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

running any risk herself, may at any time 
create a revolt in either of the other por- 
tions. If this gives her some influence 
over her two neighbours, it also tends to 
alienate them from her friendship* by 
keeping their jealousy always awake. Nor 
can there be a doubt, that Prussia in par- 
ticular, is generally less inclined towards 
Russia than towards France herself. But, 
in truth, the mutual dissensions of these 
three great powers, upon various grounds, 
are of too long standing to leave us any 
hopes, that a cordial union of them all can 
be formed for the defence of Europe, be- 
fore time is given to adopt a conciliatory 
system, and to sink past differences in 
oblivion. At present their disunion forms 
the best security of the enemy. Were 
France, contrary to all present appear- 
ance, to shew symptoms of decline ; were 
her strength to fail suddenly, and her ap- 
proaching dissolution to afford hopes to 
her enemies that the crisis of European 
subjection was arrived; still she might trust 
for safety in those discords which the hand 



STATE OF THE NATION. 1?5 

of time had not yet healed ; and looking 
at the three powers whose relations and 
resources we have just now been contem- 
plating, the favourite of fortune might 
justly exclaim with the Roman patriot in 
the decline of his country, " Mane at 
" quctso duretqne gentibus, si non amor 
" nostril at arte odium sui; quando ur- 
" gentibus imperii fat is, niliil jam prcestare 
" fortuna majus potest quam Jwstium dis- 
" cordiam*" 

5. Having taken a general survey of the 
present state of our enemy, of his allies, 
and of those powers which are upon the 
whole friendly to us ; it may be proper, 
before concluding this branch of the sub- 
ject, to consider the relations of England 
with the few powers which have preserved a 
strict neutrality in the present unfortunate 
contest, more particularly with the United 
States of America — the chief, indeed the 
only considerable nation of this descrip- 
tion. 

* Tacit. De Mor. Gerjpn. 



176 AX INQUIRY INTO THE 

It is the uniform consequence of a long 
continued war between the principal states 
of Europe, that the nations which take no 
part in the dispute, are employed to carry 
on much of the commerce of the bellige- 
rent countries, with the permission of all 
parties, and that they also engage in 
branches of trade which those belligerents 
wish, if possible, to prohibit. When 
France and England, for example, are at 
war, the .custom of privateering, or in ge- 
neral of permitting the vessels of the state 
to capture merchantmen, renders it dan- 
gerousfor the English and French traders to 
sail as often as during peace; and much of 
the business which they used to carry on 
must be transferred to the neutral merchants, 
the Danes or Americans. The mere in- 
terruption of direct intercourse between 
the belligerents, imposes the necessity of 
admitting neutrals to the trade which they 
used to carry on together, and to the 
trade which each used to carry on between 
the other, and third parties. The admis- 
sion of" neutrals to the former branch of 

commerce, 



STATE OF THE NATION, 177 

commerce, has seldom been objected to, 
except during the heat of national animo- 
sity, and even then the objection was di- 
rected, not against the neutral, but against 
the other belligerent. The admission of 
neutrals to the latter branch of commerce, 
the carrying trade of the one belligerent be- 
tween the other and third parties, has been 
restricted by certain rules, tending to pre- 
vent the neutral from directly assisting the 
belligerent in his hostile operations. These 
rules have prohibited the neutral from 
dealing with the belligerent, in articles im- 
mediately subservient to military opera- 
tions, or as they have thence been denomi- 
nated contraband of war, . In order to en- 
force this law, a right of searching 
neutral traders at sea has been claimed by 
belligerent powers, and on some remark* 
able occasions, submitted to by the go- 
vernment of the neutral nation. None of 
these points are at present an object of 
discussion. Neither the right of search 
nor the prohibition of contraband, nor the 
power of blockade, have for some time 

N 



178 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

past been called in question. But a branch 
of ordinary commerce has, during the 
course of the present war, passed into the 
hands of neutrals, so important from its 
extent and so unequally beneficial to the 
belligerents, from its being confined chiefly 
to the weaker party, that a disposition 
has appeared in the councils of the stronger 
party to dispute the neutral right. 

In no maritime war before the present 
has it happened, that the superiority of one 
party was so decisive as to deprive the other 
of every chance of keeping the sea. Eng- 
land may generally have had the better, 
her fleets may have gained signal advan- 
tages, and her cruizers or privateers have 
annoyed the enemy's trade. But still 
France was not so crippled as to lose all 
chance of protecting her commerce. She 
was not so completely beset as to view a 
voyage and a capture with the same appre- 
hensions. Accordingly her merchants ran 
the risk, which was not enormous; and 
continued to freight vessels for ..foreign 
ports, or to bring home their colonial pro- 



f 

STATE OF THE NATION". 179 

duce, with the chance, hut not the cer- 
tainty of their being taken. Some part of 
this commerce fell into the hands of neu- 
tral traders ; some part was carried on frau- 
dulently under the cover of the neutral flag: 
but the risk was not sufficient to make the 
merchant give up the profit of direct traffic 
on his own account, with vessels and crews, 
and flag of his own country. But the un- 
exampled increase of the English marine, 
and the almost total ruin of the French 
navy during the last and present wars, have 
augmented the risk of capture to the 
French trader so greatly, that he can no 
longer undergo it, and must be content to 
give up much of his traffic to neutrals, and 
endeavour to screen the rest by fraudulent 
devices. The unprecedented length of the 
last war, too, and the renewal of hostilities 
after so short an interval of peace, has in- 
creased still further the inducement, or 
rather the necessity of employing neutral 
nations, in the commerce formerly carried 
on by the belligerent alone. For a few 
years of war the privation of certain articles 
n 2 ' 



ISO AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

of necessity or luxury may be endured ; 
but this becomes at length intolerable, and 
overcomes every restraint which either go- 
vernmentorthe opposing interests of traders 
can create. Those traders themselves, too, 
when a war has lasted long, gradually shift 
their capital into new channels, and with- 
draw more and more from the hazardous 
speculations, in which, during a short pe- 
riod of hostility, they might be contented 
or compelled to continue. The lines of 
employment which they thus leave, be- 
come, in consequence, open to neutrals, 
who now carry on the various branches of 
foreign trade, from which they were for- 
merly excluded. Thus it has happened 
from the combined effects of our astonishing 
naval superiority, and the unprecedented 
length of the war, that almost all the fo* 
reign commerce of France, and a largs 
proportion even of the coasting trade, have 
fallen into the hands of neutral nations, 
and particularly of the Americans, who 
have the greatest facilities of maritime car- 
riage, and the most rising commercial sys- 



STATE OF THE NATION. 

tern. Among other branches of the French 
commerce now engrossed by American 
traders, with the permission of both go- 
vernments, is that of the colonies. As 
this trade, during peace, was subject to 
the strict rules of the Navigation Law, 
common to all the maritime powers of 
Europe, a peculiar objection has been taken 
to its being suddenly laid open by the 
enemy to neutrals during war, for the evi- 
dent purpose of screening it from our just 
hostility. And this interference of the 
Americans, in order to assist such a scheme, 
has been supposed inconsistent with the 
relations of neutrality which their nation 
professes to maintain. 

It is in vain, the supporters of the belli- 
gerent rights contend, that England con- 
quers the French marine, nay, reduces it 
almost to annihilation. Her ships oj" war 
may be captured, but the commerce of 
France is safe. She may declare war when 
she pleases ; and without a ship that can 
make head to our weakest cruizer, she 
has a sure method of at once protecting 
n 3 



182 - AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

her whole trade, more certainly than if 
she had the entire command of the seas. 
She has but to suspend her Navigation Law, 
to admit the Americans into her colonial 
and coasting trade, and to fit out no vessel 
for sea under French colours. The English 
cruizers may domineer over the seas, and 
yet they are unable to touch a ton of her 
trade. She has millions floating on the 
vessels of neutral nations, which no enemy 
can reach. She reaps the whole benefits 
of commerce and of colonies without the 
risks of capture or detention. She may fit 
out nothing but privateers or cruizers to at- 
tack our trade, and distress our colonies, 
while her own are beyond the efforts of our 
armed vessels. She unites the whole bene- 
fits of war with all the security of peace. 
The rule, it is contended, which should 
guide us in this question, as the fairest 
measure of justice to all parties, is, that 
neutrals can only take part during war, in 
such branches of commerce as the domestic 
regulations of the belligerent allowed them 
to partake in during peace. This doctrine 
.3 



STATE OF THE NATTON. 183 

was recognised, we are told, in the war of 
1756", and has never since been disputed, 
though England has frequently departed 
from its rigour by voluntary concessions. 
Its policy is as obvious as its justice, say 
the enemies of the neutral claims. Were 
the present principle of unlimited neutral 
trade to be recognized, England might 
give over every pretension to naval power, 
abandon the hope of curbing French com- 
merce, and despair at once of gaining any 
thing by a continuance even of the justcst 
war. Should the support of our maritime 
rights lead to a rupture with the neutrals, 
which, however, is said to be most im- 
probable, we can lose little by such an ad- 
dition to the number of our enemies, in 
comparison of the va.st detriment which 
we now sustain, from those neutrals tying 
up our hands against all the enemies we 
have to contend with. Better, say they, 
have America as well as France hos- 
tile, and exposed to our fair attacks, than 
France openly hostile, and America covert- 
ly protecting her from-every effort of our 
N 4 



184 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

enmity. This will give us a chance of 
speedily terminating the war, or at least 
secure the opportunity of rendering it both 
safe and lucrative. 

Such is the main body of the argu- 
ment, in favour of the justice as well 
as the policy of our reviving the rule 
of the war 1756. The chief point at issue 
is the application of that rule to the colo- 
nial trade of the enemy ; and, without at 
all entering into the question of right, we 
shall proceed to offer a few simple consi- 
derations, which may tend to shew that 
the view of the case, in point of policy, 
taken by the supporters of the above doc- 
trine, is by no means a correct one, and 
that the importance of the whole matter 
at issue in the dispute has been enormously 
exaggerated. The following observations 
proceed upon the further admission, that 
the facts stated by the advocates of belli- 
gerent rights are accurately given, and 
also that wherever a neutral flag is as- 
sumed as a cover to the ship and cargo 
of a belligerent power, so evident a fraud 
is excepted from the argument. The points 



STATE OF THE NATION. 185 

to be maintained arc, that, whatever right 
England may have to prevent the interfe- 
rence of America in the French colonial 
trade during war, no material advantage 
could be gained from the enforcement of 
such a prohibition ; that the real difference 
between the former and the present method 
of carrying French colonial produce, and 
supplying the French colonies, is extreme- 
ly trifling in its ultimate consequences; 
and that other reasons of a very positive 
nature enjoin a departure from such 
claims in the present situation of affairs. 

To prevent a supply of colonial pro- 
duce from reaching France, if not direct- 
ly, at least by a roundabout importation, 
exceeds the power of the British navy t 
numerous and victorious as it is. Unless 
we can surround every port of the French 
coast with ships, and the land frontiers 
also with troops ; and unless we are still 
further resolved to prohibit neutral na- 
tions from trading with France in their 
own merchandize, or in merchandize of 
our colonies, the French people must 
4 



18(5 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

continue to be supplied with sugar and 
coffee, whether we are at war with them 
or not. If we prevent those articles from 
being carried directly to France from her 
colonies, a small increase of the price will 
enable neutrals to import them into their 
own countries, and then re-export them to 
France. If we maintain that the mere 
importation and re-exportation, though 
accompanied with re-landing of cargoes 
and payment of duties, is still a collusive 
transaction, and must be prohibited, as a 
continuation of the original voyage ; then 
a further increase of price enables the 
same produce to reach France in different 
vessels, while the vessels that imported 
it take other freights. We in fact only 
oblige the neutrals to have two sets of 
vessels, one employed between the French 
colonies and America, the other between 
America and France. The total gain of 
England upon these prohibitory opera- 
tions, is the causing Frenchmen to drink 
their coffee some sous a pound dearer, 
which is a most pitiful advantage to us ; s 



STATE OF THE NATION, 



187 



and creating inconvenience to America, 
which is no advantage at all. 

But suppose we go a step further, and 
prevent the Americans from exporting the 
French colony produce at all, upon the 
plea that this trade was not open to them 
during peace ; let us consider what con- 
sequences will follow. One of three things 
must happen if such a prohibition is 
rigorously enforced ; either the French 
will be compelled to carry their produce 
in their own ships — or the English will be 
allowed to purchase it, and then sell it 
to neutrals in Europe, who will carry it 
to France — or the produce will be con- 
demned to remain in the colonies. If the 
French venture at first to freight their 
own vessels with the produce, the British 
cruizers will infallibly take them, or at 
least the risk of capture, which made the 
French throw open this traffic to neutrals, 
will continue to be so enormous, that 
neither the planter nor the merchantcan af- 
ford it. This expedient will therefore speedi- 
ly be abandoned. If the English traders arc 



188 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

allowed to purchase and carry the pro- 
duce, it may be remarked, that such a 
proceeding, such an intercourse with the 
enemy, would be contrary to all the ge- 
neral rules of war, and would be a com- 
promise of our character for the gain of 
the trade. But, after all, what great na- 
tional end would be gained by such a com- 
merce ? The French would pay somewhat 
higher for the produce than if neutrals 
carried it ; and a few English merchants 
would gain a certain commission upon the 
sale of it. The capital required to carry 
on this new and suddenly created branch 
of trade, would leave other branches in 
which it had formerly been employed ; 
and those branches would be filled by the 
capital of neutral nations. At a peace, a 
new change would be necessary, the ca- 
pital must partly shift back again, and must 
in part be thrown out of employment al- 
together. Such changes are rather upon 
the whole hurtful than beneficial in a 
general view. Lastly, if the produce of 
the French colonies is prevented from 



STATE OF THE NATION. 189 

being exported, it must rot there, and 
the colonies must be ruined ; the supplies 
of provisions must fail ; the work of the 
plantations be suspended ; the Negroes 
revolt, and the whole be involved in ruin. 
Besides the cruelly of such a plan, besides 
its total repugnance to the practice of 
civilized warfare, which never attacks pri- 
vate property except at sea ; the evils of 
this system would be shared by ourselves, 
not only from the loss of customers, which 
we should feel when so much wealth and 
industry was destroyed in the country of 
our nearest neighbours, but also from the 
incalculable dangers of having scenes of 
rebellion and confusion in the immediate 
vicinity of our finest colonies. The plan 
therefore of preventing all exportation of 
French colonial produce, though the only 
consistent one in those who attack neutral 
rights, and the point to which ail their sup- 
port of the rule of the war 1756 neces- 
sarily leads them, is clearly objectionable 
on the most established principles, both of 
policy and justice. 



190 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

There is, moreover, a very essential dis- 
tinction to be made, between the ordinary 
branches of trade and that commerce which 
is employed in transporting the produce of 
the colonies to the mother country ; which 
is rather the remittance of their rents to 
the great body of non-resident proprietors, 
than the exchange of colonial for European 
commodities. If Guadaloupe or Cuba were 
countries unconnected with France and 
Spain, except by the intercourse of traffic; 
if no further relation subsisted between 
them, than that the Weft Indian territories 
produced commodities, which the European 
nations required, and must either purchase 
directly, or procure by a roundabout com- 
merce — then it might be of some import- 
ance, according to the views with which 
maritime war is now carried on, for Eng- 
land to harass this branch of Spanish and 
French trade, and to profit by taking it 
into her own hands. The people of Cuba 
and Guadaloupe would then be paid for 
their produce by English merchants, and 
France and Spain would be obliged to 
buy them circuitously from England. But 



STATE OF THE NATION. 19* 

tli is is by no means the nature of the navi- 
gation between those islands and Europe. 
The proprietors of the colonies reside al- 
most entirely in the mother countries. 
The carriage of West Indian produce, is 
not on account of merchants, who are to 
sell it again after having bought it in the 
colony, but on account of absent land- 
holders, who have no other way of re- 
ceiving their rents but by having the pro- 
duce of their estates brought over to them. 
They live not at their farm, but at the 
market ; and their income is transmitted 
in goods, which they there dispose of. 

Now by intercepting this communica- 
tion, what would England effect ? She can- 
not intend to stop it altogether, to prevent 
the colonial agents from sending any of 
their revenue to the proprietors, or to in- 
tercept it on the way. This would be a 
kind of warfare quite contrary to the spi- 
rit of modern customs ; it would be more 
hurtful to individuals than the entire cap- 
ture of the colonies where their estates lie, 
for in that case the conquerors never in- 
terfere -with private property, and only 



• 1^2 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

carry the rents of the planter round for 
them by a channel somewhat more circuit- 
ous. England, then, by interfering in the 
remittance of those rents, without capturing 
the enemy's colonics, can only mean to 
trade with the planters, to purchase the 
produce, and bring it home, where it will 
be sold again, and reach at last the con- 
sumer in the enemy's country, while the 
agents of the proprietors remit their rents, 
not in kind, but in money or bills. The 
same effect will be produced, if, instead 
of buying the produce, we only cause it to 
be consigned to English merchants, who, 
for a certain commission, sell it, and ac- 
count to the planter or his agents. In 
either case, the colonial proprietor loses 
absolutely nothing. His produce is carried 
by English, instead of French or American 
merchants ; the freight cannot be much 
greater ; the commission will probably be 
less ; he is paid by bills upon London or 
Liverpool, instead of Bourdeaux or Nantes, 
or New York ; and a few mercantile houses 
in England gain a profit upon the consign- 
ment instead of the same number of French 



STATE OF THE NATION". l£)3 

or American houses. Surely it is neither 
for the gains of these individuals, nor for. 
the sake of effecting such a change as this 
upon the wealth of French colonial pro- 
prietors, that we are to insist on the exclu- 
sion of neutrals from the colony trade of 
our enemies. We injure the enemy suf- 
ficiently by forcing those neutrals to carry 
the produce round by their own ports, in- 
stead of allowing it to be transported di~ 
rcctly from the colony to the mother coun- 
try, as during peace* This may raise the 
price of the goods to the consumer in the 
enemy's country; to the planter, who is 
most interested in the traffic, we can do 
no injury whatever, unless we can take 
the colonics where his estate lies, and then 
choose to violate the rights of individual 
proprietors; or until we discover a method 
of compelling people to ship cargoes in 
vessels which are absolutely certain of being 
captured. 

If we can only look calmly at the whole 
bearings of this question, we shall discover 
that the advantages which the enemy de- 



194 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

rives from the assistance of neutrals in car- 
rying on his colonial remittances, and all 
the other branches of his distant commerce, 
are by no means unmixed with serious in- 
juries to his prosperity, and that the neu- 
tral flag can by no means cover him from 
the effects of our maritime superiority. 

In thejirsl place, the superiority of our 
navy, which forces him as soon as a war 
breaks out, to employ neutrals in almost 
every branch of his commerce, has the 
obvious effect of creating a great shock to 
his mercantile affairs. Nothing is more to 
be dreaded in a trading country, than such 
sudden and extensive changes as this. 
Scarcely a merchant in France but must 
feel the consequences of our instantly 
transferring all the navigation of the coun- 
try to the hands of neutrals, and compel- 
ling its foreign imports and exports to be 
entirely carried on circuitously, instead of 
directly. What should we not expect in 
this country, if, by the sudden occurrence 
of any event, our whole foreign, and part 
of our coasting trade were thus new mo- 
delled, and,, if by the occurrence of an- 



STATE OF THE NATION", 1Q5 

other event a few years afterwards, it were 
as suddenly to be drawn back to its former 
state ? We should undoubtedly tremble 
for the whole mass of our commercial esta- 
blishment; and if France were as mercan- 
tile a country as England, she too would 
be nearly ruined by so violent a succession 
of changes; 

In the second place, the total suspension 
of the enemy's navigation is an injury of 
the greatest moment to his general power. 
It is precisely the sort of injury most de- 
sirable to our own interests, and the natu- 
ral consequence of our naval superiority. 
While neutral ships and seamen alone arc 
employed in carrying on the commerce of 
France, her only nursery of maritime 
power is destroyed ; she loses her whole 
chance of gaining a navy ; she can neither 
procure a stock of merchant vessels nor 
breed a race of seamen to man her ships 
of war. We are told indeed, that theexclu - 
sion of her seamen from trade, gives her a 
great command of recruits for her vessels 
of war ; but is this any thing more than a 
mere temporary supply ? When the Eng- 
o2 



1^6 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

lish navy has taken or destroyed the crews 
thus procured, or when, in a few years, 
they have died out, whence are their places 
to be supplied ? The trade of France must 
revive, it must be re-established for some 
years, before her navy can be placed 
on the footing which it had when the 
neutrals began to lend her their assistance, 
by engrossing her foreign commerce. The 
ruin of all her hopes of ever acquiring ma- 
ritime strength is as effectually secured by 
our naval superiority driving her trade into 
neutral hands, as it could be by our pre- 
venting her from trading at all. And let 
it be remembered that this is all the injury 
which it is our interest to make her feel 
from the war. The destruction of an 
enemy's trade is not to be desired, in order 
to annihilate his national wealth. By the 
individual prosperity of his subjects we 
ourselves gain ; by their progress in riches 
we improve our own; and though his pub- 
lic revenue may be augmented by the 
increase of his public wealth, we must ne- 
cessarily augment our own revenue by the 
increase which our wealth receives from 



STATE OF THE NATION. 197 

his. It is the " terra potens armis" that 
we have to dread, not the " ubcrc glcbx" 
It is his progress in arms, not in arts, 
that is formidable ; and there cannot be a 
doubt that an expedient which renders 
him richer and weaker — which augments 
the opulence of his people, and makes 
them harmless to their neighbours — which 
preserves their trade, but stunts the growtii 
of their navy — is of all others the contriv- 
ance best suited to our interests. The 
surrender of the French commerce to the 
neutral nations, is this expedient. It pre- 
serves whatever of that commerce is bene- 
ficial to England, and destroys whatever 
might injure us; it gives us all ihe ad- 
vantages of a rich neighbour, and all the 
security of a weak one. This is the re- 
ward of our unexampled naval superiority ; 
it is the glorious fruit of our numerous 
victories ; it is a benefit which provides of 
itself the means of retaining it ; it is o 
prize which we shall assuredly lose, as 
soon as we surrender by our impolicy 
the commercial greatness that makes u^ 



198 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

powerful at sea. We may prevent it from 
passing into the hands of France, indeed ; 
but some other nation must take it from 
us, if we sacrifice our real prosperity to a 
foolish jealousy of the good as well as the 
bad; a shortsighted desire of annihilat- 
ing the advantageous with the dangerous 
branches of our rival's commerce. 

But, lastly, the operation of our mari- 
time power upon the naval affairs of the 
enemy, besides destroying that part of his 
system winch alone it is our interest to 
injure, confers important benefits upon 
those whom it is our interest to assist. Not 
only does the ruin of the French navy, 
by the neutral interference, produce the 
greatest injury to the government of 
France, with which alone we ought to be 
at war, without ruining the unoffending 
and peaceable inhabitants, whom we' should 
have no spite against; but it transfers a 
large portion of commercial wealth, and a 
capacity of acquiring maritime power, to 
nations naturally allied to us, by blood, by 
the relations of political interest, and by 



STATE OF THE XATIOX. IQQ 

the intercourse of trade. The Americans, 
in particular, with whom our most ex- 
tensive and lucrative traffic is carried on, 
and whose friendship in a political view 
wc ought to court, as the only respectable 
state beyond the influence of our enemy, 
arc gainers by the commerce in question, 
to an astonishing degree, both as a 
mercantile and military people. How 
much their commercial gains are our 
gains, need scarcely be pointed out ; 
neither need we shew how greatly it is 
for the advantage of England, and of the 
world in general, that what the French 
power loses should pass into the hands of 
a state where no undue bias, either to- 
wards schemes of ambition, or measures 
of submission to the common enemy, has 
ever been shewn — a state where so many 
circumstances concur to establish the in- 
fluence of English principles and con- 
nexions ; where the other powers of the 
continent, without having any ground for 
ahum, may always expect to find assist- 
ance, as soon as its means are commenni- 
ratc with its inclinations. 



200 AN JNQUltlY INTO THE 

It is in vain, then, to represent the 
neutral trade as a complete security to our 
enemies, against the effects of our mari- 
time superiority, The injuries which it is 
our interest to inflict upon France, are in 
no wise diminished by the interference of 
America in her commerce. The French 
navy is destroyed by ours, and the chance 
of restoring it may be considered as at an 
end, during the war. The revenue of France, 
in so far as it depends upon colonial pro- 
duce, we mi glit wish to cut off, but we 
cannot ; for so long as the French people 
have a taste for that produce, and money 
to pay for it, they will buy it : it will enter 
France, and pay duties to the government. 
The commercial prosperity of France we 
have no interest to destroy; but if we had, 
we could not, and the transference of the 
trade to neutral carriers, must always pro- 
tect it in one way or another, when a long 
war, and a total ruin of their naval force, 
compels the French to embrace this last 
alternative, as the only chance that is left 
of importing and exporting commodities.. 



STATE OF THE NATION'. C01 

A further ground Of objection to the 
Americans has been urged with consider- 
able popular effect. Their merchantmen, 
it seems, are now manned, in a great de- 
cree, by deserters from the British navy. 
While the emigration of seamen into their 
service prevents England from putting her 
ships of war in commission, the Americans 
are ready to establish a formidable marine 
upon the ruins of ours, for the maintenance 
of their disputed claims. — It happens, how- 
ever, to be the necessary consequence of 
our situation, that such an emigration- 
should take place. The similarity of lan- 
guage and manners, which determines the 
ordinary course of emigration towards Ame- 
rica from this country, has a similar effect 
upon the emigration of our seamen. The 
higher wages too, of the American service. 
and still more, the total freedom from 
pressgangs, which it enjoys, cannot fail to 
attract a great number of men from our 
merchant vessels during a war. But how 
can this possibly be prevented ? No re- 
gulation of the government can alter the 



202 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

manners of America, nor make our mer- 
chants raise their wages, in order to retain 
subjects for the impress service. Nor do 
we seem willing to abolish that mode of 
supplying our navy, which would pro- 
bably, if coupled with a rise of wages, have 
the desired effect. 

It is said, however, that we may 
insist upon a right of searching all Ame- 
rican vessels at sea, and impressing the 
British seamen found in them. Do we 
mean, then, to deny to our sailors alone, 
of all classes of the people, a right to leave 
the country, and seek employment in the 
territories of friendly powers? It is hurt- 
ful to the commerce of the country, that 
artisans should go to America and Russia, 
and we have various laws on our statute 
book, the fruits of a mistaken policy, 
framed with a view of preventing such an 
emigration. But no one can propose, 
at the piesent day, to extend such pro- 
hibitions, and 'still less was it ever in 
contemplation to reclaim the artisans 
n\ -ho had actually gone away and settled 
in foreign countries, A sailor working 



STATE OF THE NATION". i!03 

in an American ship, is only in the 
predicament of a farmer cultivating an 

American plantation ; and the search 
of the ship for the purpose of seizing the 
sailor^ would be an act of as violent ag- 
gression, as the search of the country for 
the seizure of the farmer. The only diffe- 
rence between the cases, is, that we hap- 
pen to have the power in the former, and 
hot in the latter. 

But by going to war with America, 
we may prevent the further emigra- 
tion of our seamen, and acquire a right 
to reclaim those who arc already gone. 
By turning all our vessels into armed 
cruizers too, and engaging in an universal 
piracy, we might still further enrich our- 
selves. We have the first navy and bravest 
people in the world. "We may take the 
sea, as France has seized upon the land ; 
and thus find our prolit in preferring war 
with the whole world, to peace with a 
single nation, which has rights and ad van- 
tages repugnant to our supposed interests 
• — Alter all, however, laying justice out of 
the question, is it our real interest to 



204- AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

quarrel with the only power which remains 
unhurt by French influence, to lose our 
intercourse with the nation best calculated 
for our commercial relations. At this mo- 
ment, France and America seem of them- 
selves disposed to a rupture; and possibly, 
before this time, war is declared by the 
, United States against Spain. Ought we 
not to think well both of the consequences 
of the contest, and of the value of the 
matter in dispute, before we abandon so 
fair an opportunity of adding America to 
the number of our allies, and of cstablish- 
ingour influence there, upon the only du- 
rable foundation of alliances, mutual sa- 
crifices, and mutual benefits ? The trivial 
importance of ail that could be gained by 
excluding the neutral traders from the ene- 
my's commerce, has already been shewn. 
Xo words are required to prove, that the 
blanks occasioned by some sailors leaving 
our service will speedily be filled up ; that 
the number of British seamen at the end of 
a given period will be greater, in conse- 
quence of our breeding for the American 
navy, just as the number of our people is 



STATE OF T1IL NATION*. 

on the whole augmented by the demand 
for men, which our colonies create. 
We may feel some inconvenience in the 
mean time, from the progress of the ene- 
my's commerce, and the desertion of our 
seamen to neutral powers. "But our gene- 
ral policy can never surely be modelled 
according to such temporary considerations. 
The evils or difficulties in question, arc the 
necessary consequences of the long war in 
which we have been engaged. They are 
part of that succession which the new ad- 
ministration have fallen heirs to — a suc- 
cession made up of all the dangers and dif- 
ficulties, which a long course of misma- 
nagement and misfortune has accumulated 
upon the country. 



We have now taken a general survey of 

the relations of England with foreign 

powers, and have viewed in detail the 

hopelessness of her situation, if .she still 

3 



-00 AX 1XQUIRY INTO THE 

persists in building upon the chance of an 
immediate resistance to the influence of 
France. Very few words are required, to 
deduce from the investigation which has 
just been closed, the lessons of political 
conduct pointed out by the experience of 
the past, and by the actual state of affairs. 
That the high, unbending, unaccommo- 
dating tone, which we have been accus- 
tomed to hold all over the world, and 
which the personal behaviour of our foreign 
ministers has generally rendered still more 
unpalatable, is in the extreme foolish at 
all times, and particularly unfit for the 
present aspect of things, needs not be 
proved by a single argument, or illustrated 
by one example. Nor is it less obvious, 
that the feelings and the language of con- 
ciliation, of moderate views, of calm and 
temperate dignity to our enemies, of 
friendly sincerity and frankness to our 
allies, are the feelings and the language 
most subservient at all times to our highest 
interests; most consistent with our true 
honour; and most agreeable to the situation 



STATE OF THE NATION - . 207 

in which the affairs of Europe, as well ag 
of England, arc placed in the present 
crisis. 

The whole concerns of this great and 
invincible people are now committed to 
the care of an administration which unites 
the largest portion of talents, experience, 
rank, and integrity ; the most ample share 
of all the qualities, whether natural or 
acquired, intrinsic or accidental, which 
ever enabled a government to secure influ- 
ence with its subjects, and command respect 
among foreign nations. The ministers have 
taken upon themselves the management of 
public affairs, at a juncture of unprece- 
dented difficulty and peril. For all the 
errors of their predecessors, in peace and 
in war, at home and abroad, they have 
become in some sort responsible. The na- 
tural consequences of those errors must be 
warded oil by their efforts. No compro- 
mise of principles, no paltry, half mea- 
sures, no incongruous mixture of big words 
and little doings, will bear them out in 
redeeming their pledge to save the coun- 



£0S AX TNQUTIIV INTO THE 

try. The world will judge fairly, how- 
ever, or" their conduct, while it scrutinizes 
their measures strictly. Miracles will not 
be expected from them ; and in all the 
departments of our national concerns, the 
magnitude of the losses which have al- 
ready been sustained' — the extent of the 
dangers which at present surround us, 
from no fault of theirs, will be justly taken 
into the estimate of their attempts to bet- 
ter our condition. 

There are, it is true, some reforms in 
our practical policy which the inquiry now 
concluded, has plainly dictated, and which 
will peremptorily be expected from the 
new administration. We may expect that 
the important branch of our intercourse 
with foreign nations will be entrusted to 
men of talents and acquirements, adapted 
to so weighty and difficult a department 
of affairs ; that we shall now see extended 
to those situations of high trust upon 
which depend the alliances, nay, the 
questions of peace and war with our neigh- 
bours, the same enlightened principles of 



STATE OF THE NATION. 209 

preference for real merit and tried inte- 
grity, that has presided over the formation 
of the new ministry in all its other 
blanches. — A careful review of our colo- 
nial affairs forms another fair subject of 
expectation at the present crisis. Nothing 
can be more gratifying than the beginnings 
which have already been made, towards 
the attainment of security for our esta- 
blishments in the West Indies; a security 
which can only be attained, by the utter 
destruction of the grand evil that hourly 
endangers our existence in those rich set- 
tlements, and the gradual relaxation of 
the prohibitory system, that has produced 
of late so many serious inconveniences. — 
The state of affairs in the East is no les3 
delicate and urgent. By an unhappy de- 
parture from the only system of manage- 
ment which can give us a chance of secu- 
rity, amidst the rivals of our power, and the 
natural enemies of our enormous empire 
in those distant countries, we have arrived 
at a point where it is difficult to determine 
whether the pursuit of the path before us, 
p 



210 AN INQUIBY INTO THE 

or the retracing of our steps, be attended 
with the greatest perils. Our measures, 
unfortunately successful at first, have now 
produced their natural effects ; and even 
the external circumstance of military 
triumph has begun to forsake us ; while 
the whole consequences of our impolicy, 
in the ruin of our Indian finances, the ex- 
tension of our untenable conquests, the 
union of our implacable enemies, hitherto 
happily for us divided among themselves, 
have been exhibited by symptoms too 
plain to be mistaken. The details of these 
questions belong to another branch of this 
Inquiry. The subject is only alluded to 
here, as an additional presumption in fa- 
vour of the moderate and pacific system, 
which every other view of our present 
situation concurs to recommend. — Neither 
is this the opportunity for discussing the 
various questions of domestic policy, which 
now press upon the attention of govern- 
ment. Yet, when by the most general 
survey of our situation in this department, 
we discover, such radical defects in our 
4 ' 



STATE OF THE NATION*. 211 

military system as were formerly hinted 
at, we may deduce a new argument in 
favour of the reforms which the country 
has a right to expect; the improvement of 
our military economy confessedly inade- 
quate to the emergency ; and the adop- 
tion of such moderate council?, as may 
give the requisite time for carrying that 
improvement into effect. — The state of our 
finances, the burthens to which the peo- 
ple have long been exposed, the. accumu- 
lation of our debts, lead to the same con- 
clusion. — Moderate councils are still more 
strongly recommended by the situation of 
Ireland; the difficulty of adopting at pre- 
sent the great measure so desirable for the 
prosperity of that valuable dominion ; and 
the propriety of taking all the steps short 
of complete emancipation, which may as- 
similate the catholics with the rest of the 
people. An interval of peace would, in- 
deed, be invaluable for that important 
branch of our empire ; nor can a doubt be 
entertained that it would be improved in 
the way best adapted to restore real con- 
p 2 



212 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

tentment and substantial obedience by the 
confidence and kind treatment which can 
alone establish solid authority — " Tri- 
** umpho multo clarius est, scnatum judicare, 
" potius mansuetudine et innocentid impe- 
u ratoris, provinciam, quam vi militum aut 
" hc?iignitate deorum retentam at que con- 
" servatam esse?'* 

It is, indeed, abundantly clear, that the 
state of our affairs, domestic as well as fo- 
reign, enjoins a strict regard to the conci- 
liatory system in general, and prepares us 
more especially to expect in such a peace a$ 
may be consistent with our real honour, 
the highest advantages both to our own in- 
terests and those of Europe at large. With 
regard to the continent it has already been 
demonstrated, that nothing but mischief 
can possibly accrue from a renewal of the 
late unhappy war. What then is likely to 
result from things remaining in their pre- 
sent unsettled state ? Will the enemy, so 
long as we refuse to give him peace, so 
long as we prevent our allies from treat- 

* Catonis Epist. apud Cic. Ep. lib*xv, 



STATE OF THE NATIOX. 213 

ing, so long as wc do not use our influence 
to bring about a negotiation — will he ab- 
stain from reaping the thousand advan- 
tages of his present situation ? Will he 
submit to all the evils of warfare and forego 
all its gains? Will he unite in his plan all 
the losses of war and all the constraints 
of peace ? This would be too close an imi- 
tation of our own conduct with regard to 
Spain. Unhappily we cannot expect to 
be imitated in our European tactics. Our 
East Indian policy will suit him better. 
He will go on conquering such of our allies 
as continue hostile ; uniting with those 
whom he may intimidate, or allure to share 
in the plunder of the rest; stretching his 
creations of kings over the North of Ger- 
many ; aggrandizing those whom he has 
made in the South ; extending his domi- 
nion in Italy over the islands, and from 
Italy striding onwards to the East. 
" Jam tenet Italiam, tamen ultra pergere tendit 
" Actum, inquit, nihil est"* 

To all this prospect of loss, from a sense- 
less prolongation of a war which has un- 

* Juven, 



214 AN INQUIRY INTO THL 

fortunately reached its natural conclusion, 
the enemies of peace can only oppose 
certain vague, indefinite fears, of the dan- 
gers with which they conceive a peace to 
be pregnant. First they imagine that 
good or even fair terms cannot be ex- 
pected ; then they think the enemy will 
not be sincere ; next, they dread his 
taking the opportunity of recruiting his 
resources, and especially of restoring his 
navy ; lastly, they expect that he will 
take us by surprize, and attack us when 
he is sure to succeed. In all these 
apprehensions, however, there is a great 
deal of misconception, and no small incon- 
sistency. As to the terms, we must first 
see what he offers. It is indeed very evident, 
that we cannot expect such favourable 
conditions for the Continent, as if we had 
not plunged it into the late war, and occa- 
sioned the ruin of Austria, the conquest of 
Naples, and the aggrandisement of France 
and her dependencies. We cannot hope 
such terms as the present Administration 
would have gained, had it been formed 
two years ago. But it is equally clear a 



STATE OF THE NATION. 215 

that if the enemy finds his advantage 
in peace (and if he does not, we need 
neither expect it nor desire it) and if he 
estimates, as he must, the high spirit and 
unconquerable valour of this country, he 
will make no proposals which can disho- 
nour us. He will even tempt us to over- 
come our repugnance towards him, and 
our contempt of his new authority, by 

some favourable concessions -Then, with 

regard to his sincerity, we may safely con- 
clude that the same motive which leads 
him to think of making a peace, will in- 
duce him to keep it — the motive of inte- 
rest — for what can he gain by a transient 
peace, except the paltry cession of a few 
islands, which we shall always be able to 
retake, with the troops and shipping hemay 
send thither, so long as our marine is supe- 
rior to his. — Next, as to his recruiting his 
resources, and particularly his navy, this he 
most undoubtedly will attempt to do. We 
must lay our account with it. We mean 
to recruit our own army, and he must lay 
his account with that. But does it follow, 



216 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

that he will be able to acquire a navy equal 
to ours during the peace ? Where are his 
seamen ? Where are his officers and pilots ? 
Where are his Nelsons? should the peace 
last for ten years, which is unfortunately a 
high estimate, how much would England 
gain in her commerce, her finances, her 
colonial and domestic economy, her mili- 
tary system, her foreign policy ! And 
France, too, would gain somewhat in se- 
veral of these particulars. Her trade would 
increase, and she would acquire colonial 
establishments. Would not this make her 
much less warlike? Would it not be utterly 
incompatible with the military conscrip- 
tion, the most formidable feature in her 
present aspect ? Would it not render her 
less military in peace, and more averse to 
war, the greatest of evils to a mercantile 
and colonial nation ? But could her navy 
in ten, or even twenty years of peace 
possibly grow up so as to match our own r 
Should we not at the end of such a happy 
period, enter upon the war with our com- 
merce augmented, our finances cleared 



STATE OP THE NATION. 217 

' from debt, our wealth more able to supply 
our necessities, our navy more numerous? 
And would not this be the very same thing 
with beginning a new series of brilliant 
victories over the navy of our enemies ? 
Besides, with the restoration of our conti- 
nental relations and the improvement of 
our army, might we not fairly expect 
even success on shore, as well as at sea ? 
Why is not France averse to peace from 
her fears of our commerce increasing, 
and our army being established on a new 
system ? Why then should we, who are as 
courageous as herself, dread the progress 
of her trade and the re-establishment of 
her marine ? But to all such fears one 
answer may be given — they prove too 
much — they prove that peace can never 
be made, if they dissuade us from making 
it now ; they have no application to this 
particular time, they are apprehensions of 
all times, and they go to involve the world 
in one eternal war*. 

* Though no authority is requisite to prove that the po- 
sition, is absurd which leads to such a conclusion, it may be 
Q 



51S AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

Let us hope that the wise men, who are 
now happily placed at the head of the 
state, will judge better, as they see more 
clearly than such desponding and narrow 
views permit the multitude to do; that 
they will justly estimate the sum of af- 
fairs, nor timidly shut their eyes to the 
misfortunes in which they have found the 
country ; that with all their efforts to 
carry on a vigorous war, they will keep in 
mind how peculiarly the great end of all 
warfare is desirable at the present crisis, 
for our allies as well as for ourselves ; that, 
without abandoning one point which the 
honour of England requires them to main- 
tain, they will abjure all those false notions 
of honour, by which nothing but eternal 
hostility with all the world can ever be 
obtained ; and that, whether we are to be 
blessed with peace, or compelled to pre* 

proper to remark that Mr. Burke, in the midst of bis cele- 
brated arguments for war with the French Republic, quotes 
Vattel in order to shew that, if a belligerent power fails 
repeatedly in obtaining the object of the war, it must at 
length " give peace to its people, nor wage eternal hosti- 
lities/' Burke, vii. 209. Yattel, B. ii. chap. xii. 



STATE OF THE NATION". 219 

pare for new battles, they will pursue 
those plans of moderate and salutary re- 
form in the various branches of our na- 
tional policy, without which no glory, no 
safety, not even the inheritance of a name 
will remain for England. 



APPENDIX. 



Treaty cf Concert between his Majesty and the Emperor of all the 
RussiaS, signed at St. Petersburgh, the nth of April 1803. 
(Usual Preamble.) 
Art. 1. AS the state of suffering in which Europe is placed, de- 
XI mands speedy remedy, their Majesties the King of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Emperor of 
all the Russias, have mutually agreed to consult upon the means of 
putting a stop thereto, without waiting for farther encroachments on 
the part of the French government. They have agreed in consequence, 
to employ the most speedy and most efficacious means to form a general 
league of the States of Europe, and to engage them to accede to the 
present concert : and to engage them, in order to accomplish the end 
proposed, ta collect together a force, which, independently of the 
succours furnished by his Britannic Majesty, may amount to five hun- 
dred thousand effective men ; and to employ the same with energy, in 
order to induce or to compel the French government to agree to the 
re-e;tablishment of peace and of the equilibrium of Europe. 

Art. i. The object of this league will be to carry into effect what 
is proposed by the present concert, namely ; 

(uj The evacuation of the country of Hanover and of the north of 
Germany. 

(b) The establishment of the independence of the Republics of 
Holland and Switzerland. 

fcj The re-establishment of the Kinj of Sardinia in Piedmont with 
as large an augmentation of territory as circumstances will permit. 

(d) The future security of the kingdom of Naples, and the com- 
plete evacuation of Italy, the island of Elba included, by the French 
forces. 

(e) The establishment of an order of things in Europe, which may 
effectually guarantee the security and independence of the different 
States, and present a solid barrier against future usurpations. 

Art. 3. His Britannic Majesty, in order to concur efficaciously on 
his side to the happy effects of the present concert, engages to contri- 
bute to the common efforts, by employing his forces both by sea and 
land, as well as his vc-sels adapted for transporting troops, in su.h 
manner as-shallbe determined upon in the general plan of operations ; 
his Majesty will moreover assist the different powers who shall accede 
thereto by subsidies, the amount of which shall correspond to the respec- 
tive forces which slwll be employed ; and in order that the said pecu- 



!l APPENDIX. 

niary succours may be proportioned in the manner most conducive to 
the genera] good, and to assist the powers in proportion to the exer- 
tions they may make to contribute to the common success, it is agreed 
that these subsidies (barring particular arrangements), shall be furnished 
in the proportion of one million two hundred and fifty thousand pounds 
sterling, for each hundred thousand men of regular troops, and so in 
proportion for a greater or smaller number, payable according to the 
conditions herein after specified. 

.Art. 4. The said subsidies shall be payable by instalments, from 
month to month, in proportion to the forces which each power shall 
employ in pursuance of its engagements, to combat the common enemy, 
and according to the official report of the armies employed at the 
opening of the campaign, and of the several reinforcements which may 
join them. An arrangement shall be made in conformity with the 
plan of operations, which shall be forthwith regulated as to the period 
when these subsidies shall begin to be paid, and the mode and place of 
payment shall be settltd, so as to suit the convenience of each of the 
belligerent parties. His Britannic Majesty will likewise be prepared to 
advance within the current year, a sum for putting the troops in motion. 
This sum shall be settled by particular airangements to be entered into 
by each pow»r, who shall take part in this concert ; but his said Ma- 
jesty understands that the whole of the sums to be furnished to any 
power within the current year, as well on account of the said advance 
as for the monthly subsidies, is in no case to exceed the proportion of 
cne million two hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling, for every 
hundred thousand men. 

Art. 5. The high contracting parties agree that the different mem- 
bers of the league shall respectively be permitted to retain accredited 
persons with the commanders in chief of the different armies, to carry 
on the correspondence, and to attend to the military operations. 

Art. 6. Their Majesties agree, that in the event of a league being- 
formed, such as is pointed out in the first article, they will not make 
pence with France but by the common consent of all the powers who 
shall become parties in the said league ; and also that the continental 
powers shall not recal their forces before the peace ; moreover, his 
Britannic Maje ty engages to continue the payment of the subsidies 
during the continuance of the war. 

Art. 7. The present concert which is mutually acknowledged by 
the high contracting parties to be equally valid and binding as the most 
solemn treaty, shall be ratified by his Majesty the King of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and by his Majesty the Empe- 
ror of all the R.ussias, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at 
St. Petersburgh within the space rr ten weeks, or sooner, if possible. 

In testimony whereof, &c. &c. 

(T.S.) Granville Lkveson Gowek. 
(L.S.) Adam Prince Czartomski. 
(L. S.j Nicolas de Novossiizoff, 



No. I. (A.) 

-pirate Article of the Treaty of Concert between his Majesty and 
the Emperor of Russia, signed at St. Petersburgh, nth April — 30th 
March, 1805. 

HIS Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, having made known to 
his Britannic Majesty his arrangements with their Majesties the Em- 
peror of Germany and the King of Sweden, his Britannic Majesty 
engages to fulfil his stipulations of tha present Treaty of Concert to- 
wards each of these Powers, if. in the space of four months, reckoning 
from the day of the signature of the present Instrument, both those 
Powers, or one of them, shall have caused their forces to act against 
France by virtue of the engagements they have taken with his Majesty 
the Emperor of all the Russias. 

This separate Article shall have the same force and validity as if it 
were inserted word for word in the Treaty of Concert signed this day, 
and shall be ratified at the -:ame time. 

In witness whereof, &c. &c. 

(L. S.) Granville Leveson Gov.er, 
(L.S.) Adam Prince Czartoryski: 
(L.S.) Nicolas de Novossilzoft. 



No. I. (B.) 

Fourth separate Article of the Treaty of Concert between his Majesty 
and the Emperor of Russia, signed at St. Petersburgh, nth April — . 
20th March, 1805. 

THE collecting of 500,000 men mentioned in Article I. of the Treaty 
v»f Concert signed this day, not being so easy as it is desirable, their 
Majesties have agreed that it should be carried into execution as soon as 
't should be possible to oppose to France an active force of 400,000 men 
composed in the following manner ; Austria will supply 250,000 men, 
Russia not less than 117,000 men, independently of the levies made by 
her in Albania, in Greece, &c; and the remainder of the 400,000 will 
be made up by the troops of Naples, Hanover, Sardinia, and others. 

This separate Article shall have the same force and validity as if it 
were inserted word for word in the Treaty of Concert signed this day, 
and shall be ratified at the same time. 

In witness whereof, &c. &c. 

(L.S.) Granville Leveson Gower. 
(L.S.) Adam Prince Czartorvski. 
(L.S.) Nicolas de Noyosjilzoff. 



No. I. (C.) 

Fifth separate Article of the Treaty of Concert between his Majesty 
and the Emperor of Russia, signed at St. Petersburgh, nth April— 
30th March, 1805. 

HIS Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias engages also to march as 
soon as possible an army of not less than sixty thousand men to the 
frontiers of Austria, and also another of not less than eighty thousand 
men to the Prussian frontiers, to be ready to co-operate with the said 
courts in the proportion established by the Treaty of Concert signed this 
day, and to support them respectively in case they should be attacked by 
France, who might suppose them to be engaged in some negotiatiou 
tending towards an object contrary to her views; but it is understood, 
that independently of the one hundred and fifteen thousand men, which 
his Imperial Majesty of all the Russias will cause to act against the 
French, he will keep bodies of reserve and observation upon hk 
frontiers. 

It is moreover agreed, that as the forces promised by his Majesty the 
Emperor of all the Russias, shall all, or in part, quit the frontiers of his 
empire, his Britannic Majesty will pay them the subsidies at the rate 
established by the present Treaty of Concert, until the return of the 
said forces to their homes ; and moreover, the equivalent of three 
months of subsidy as a Premiere mite en Campagne. 

TheRusian troops already stationed at the Seven Islands, or which 
may be intended to be transported thither, will not enjoy the advan- 
tage of the subsidies and of the Premiere mise en Campagne, stipulated in 
the present Article, before the day of their leaving the Seven Islands t<* 
commence their operations against the French. 

This separate Article shall have the same force and validity as if it 
were inserted word for word in the Treaty of Concert signed this day, 
and shall be ratified at the same time. 
Ir, witness whereof, &c. &c 

(L. S.) Granville Levescn Gower. 
(I.. S.) Adam Prince Czartoryski. 
(L. S.) Nicolas de Novossilzoff. 



No. I (D.) 

?ixth separate Article of the Treaty of Concert between his Majesty 
and the Emperor of Russia, signed at St. Peter-burgh, nth April — 
30th March, 1805. 

HIS Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias being disposed 
to form an energetic Concert, with the sole view of insuring to Europe 
a lasting and solid peace, founded upon the principles of justice, equity, 
and the law of nations by which they are constantly guided, are aware 
of the necessity of a mutual understanding at this time upon several 
principles, which they will evince in pursuance of a previous Concert, 
is soon as the events of the war may render it necessary. 



These principles arc, in no decree to controul the public opinion in 
Prance, or in any other countries, where the combined armies may 
eirry on their ope ations, with respect to the form of government 
which it may be proper to adopt ; nor to appropriate to themselves, 
till a peace should be con -hided, any of the conquests made by one or 
the other of the belligerent parties ; and to take possession of the towns 
and the tcrri o:ics which may be wrested from the common enemy in 
the name of the country or states to which by acknowledged right they 
belong, and in all other cases, in the name of all the members nf the 
league ; and finally, to assemble, at the termination of the war, a 
general congress, to discuss and fix the provisions of the law of nations, 
on a more determined basis than unfortunately ha< hitherto been 
practicable; and to inure their observance by the establishment of a 
federative system calculated upon the situation of the different States 
«f Europe. 

This separate Article shall have the same force and validity as if it 
were in-erted word for word in the Treaty of Concert signed this day, 
and shall be ratified at the same time. 
In witness whereof, &c. &c. 

(L. S.) Granville Leveson Gower. 
(L. S.) Adam Prince Czartoryski, 
(L. S.) Nicolas de Novossilzoff. 



No. I. (E.) 

Eighth Separate Article. 

IT being possible that the bias which the French government tries to 
give to the counsels of the different States of Europe, may determine 
one or other of those States to throw obstacles in the way of the 
attainment of the salutary effects which aie the object of the present 
Concert, and even to have recourse to hostile measures against one of 
the high contracting parties, in spite of their endeavours to establish an 
equitable and permanent order of things in Europe, his Britannic 
Majesty and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias agree to make 
common cause against every power, which, by the employment of its 
forces, or by too intimate an union with France, may pretend to raise 
essential obstacles to the development of ihose measures which the 
high contracting parties may have to take, in order to attain the object 
proposed by the pre-ent Concert. 

This separate Article shall have the came force and validity, as if it 
were inserted word for word in the Treaty of Concert signed this day, 
and shall be ratified at the same time. 
In witness whereof, &c. &c. 

(L. S.) Granville I. eveson Gower. 

(L.S.I Adam Prince Czartoryski. 

(L.S.) Nicolas si Novossilzoff, 



ATPEXDIX. 



No. I (T-) 

Eleventh Separate Article, 

THE High Contracting Parties, acknowledging the necessity of 
supporting the propositions of peace, which it is their intention to make 
to Bonaparte by energetic demonstrations, have resolved to invite his 
Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty to put his armies in a state of 
readiness for action without delay, by completing their number-, and 
by concentrating them in the neighbourhood of the borders of Trance 
His Britannic Majesty, considering the extraordinary expences which 
this measure will render n< c ss.ry, promi-es and engages to furnish to 
his Imperial and Royal Majesty, immediately alter his accession to the 
present Concert, the sum of one million of pounds terling for Premiere 
wise en Champagne, which the King of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland wiij not reclaim, in case the negotiations for peace 
should be crowned with success, provided that, in a contrary event, 
Austria would take the field immediately. 

This separate Article shall have the same force and validity as if it 
were inserted word for word in the Treaty cf Concert signed this day t 
and shall be ratified at the same time. 
In witness whereof, &c. &c. 

(L. S.) Granville T.eveson Gowf.r. 

(L. S.) Adam Prince Czartoryski. 

(L. S •) Nicolas de Novossilzoff. 



No. I. (G.) 
Separate and Secret Article. 

ALTHOUGH the High Contracting Parties have agreed by the 
first separate Article of the Trtaty of Concert established this day be- 
tween them, that Austria and Sweden shall not partake of the advan- 
tages of the said Concert but in the event of their bringing their forces 
into action against France, four months after its signature, by virtue of 
their engagements with his Majes:y the Emperor of all the Russias ; 
yet his Britannic Majc- ty, considering the advantage to the future 
security of Europe, which results from an union similar to that formed 
by his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias with their Majesties the 
Emperor of Germany and the King of Sweden, for the purpose of 
oppo ing the further encroachments of Bonaparte, promises to fulfil the 
stipulations of the present Concert, in the same decree towards either of 
those powers, if, in the course cf the year 1805, both or one of them 
should bring their forces into action against France, in virtue of their 
engagements with his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias. 

This separaie and secret Article shall have the same force and validity 
as if it were inserted word for word in the Treaty of Concert signed this 
-day, and shall be ratified at the same time. 

In witness whereof, &c. &c. 

(L. S.) Granville Leveson Gower. 
(L. S.) Adam Prince Czartory ski, 
(L. S.) Nicolas de Novossilzoff. 



No. I. (H ) 
Additional Article. 

HIS Majesty the Emperor of all the Rus ias having, in pursuance of 
his sincere desire to insure success to the enterprize concerted against 
Fiance, determined, in ca-e the circumstance should require it. to 
augment the force- which he has promised to bring- info action, to au 
hundred and eighty thousand men, hi Majesty the King of die 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland promises and engages to 
pay, in that case, to his Imperial Majesty of all the Ru hias, for the 
troops which he may thu- add to the 115,000 already agreed upon, a 
Subsidy and a Premitre wise en Champagne, at the same .ate as is agreed 
by the fifth separate Article of the Treaty of Concert established 
between his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland, and hi- Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias the 30th 
March — nth April 1805. 

This additional Article shall have the same force and validity as if it 
were Inserted word for word in the aforementioned Conceit, and shall 
be ratified by the two High Contracting Powers ; and the ratifications 
shall he exchanged in the ><pace of ten weeks, or sooner, if possible. 

In witness whereof, &c. &c. 

(L. S.) Granville Leveson Gower. 
(L.S.) Adam Prince Czartorysk*. 
(L. S.) Nicolas de Novossilzoff. 



No. I. (L) 

Additional Article of the Treaty of Concert, signed at St. Petersburg^ 
the nth April, i8o v 

HIS Maje-ty the Emperor of all the Russias, purposing to concert 
measures with the Court of Vienna, by which considerable Russian 
armies may be approximated to the frontiers of France, by crossing the 
Austrian and Pru-ian territoiies, while it is declared that the object of 
these movements is to obtain securities for the continent, promises and 
engages to his Britannic Majesty, in his own name and in that of his 
allies, that, should even circumstances require, that at the moment 
■when the Rus ian troops began their march, they should declare that 
this movement was in noway connected with an existing Concert with 
hi- Britannic Majesty, but that the powers of the continent reclaim the 
fulfilment by France of her immediate engagements with them, yet as 
soon as the war shall have broken out, they will no longer pursue a 
paiiicular object, but that which has been determined by the C01 cert 
of the 30th March — nth April, with all the clauses incorporated 
with it : 

In return for this as urance, his Britannic Majesty promises and 
engages, in the first place, to fulfil towards the Emperor of i 11 the 
Russias, the stipulations of the above-mentioned Concert, in all their 
parts, as soon as the war shall have broken out between Ru )ia and 



V1U AFP.-NPIX. 

Fran:e, and especially to furnish for the Ru-sian troops the subsidies 
agreed upon, payable from the day on which they shall have quitted the 
frontiers of the empire, and moreover the three months stipulated 
subsidy under the name of Premiere wise en Campj^ne : with this 
condition, nevertheless, that however long may be the term between 
the epoch of the departure of the Russian troops from their frontier s, 
and that of the commencement of hostilities, his Britannic Majesty 
shall not be bound to pay to Russia for that interval more than six 
months subsidy at the most, the Premiere mhe en Camp.igne being 
therein comprised. 

In the second place, to fulfil, with regard to Austria, all the stipula- 
tions of the ahovementioned Conceit, and especially all that relates to 
the subsidies, as soon as the ambassador of his Imperial and Royal 
Majesty shall have signed the act of accession of his court ; and lastly, 
in the third place, to pay in the like manner to the other allies of 
Rus ia, who shall assi-t in this enterprise (except in the case of special 
arrangements), the subsidies which have been allotted for them by the 
abovementioned Concert, and on the conditions therein specified. 

This additional Article shall have the same force and validity, as if it 
were inserted word for word in the abovementioned Concert, and shalj 
be ratified by the Two High Contracting Parties, and the ratifications 
exchanged at St. Pctersburgh, in the space of six weeks, or sooner, if 
possible 



In faith of which, &c. &c. 



(L.S.I Granville Leveson Gower. 
(L. S.) Adam Prince Czartouyski. 



(No. II.) 

Extract from a dispatch of Lord G. L. Gower, to Lord Mulgrave, dated 
St. Pctersburgh, 20th June, 1805. (No. 27.) 

My Lord, 
THE annexation of the Ligurian republic %o the French empire, 
executed at the very moment \ihen a Ru-sian plenipotentiary was 
expected in France, charged with propositions of which the professed 
object had been the general arrangements of the affairs of Europe, is 
considered as so great an insult to both sovereigns, whose sentiments 
that plenipotentiary was empowered to declare, that his imperial ma- 
jesty has judged under these circumstances, he could not consistently, 
with what is due to his own dignity, or to that of his august ally, permit 
M. NevoBsilzoff to p>oceed to fulfil the object of his mission. 
I have the honour to be, &c. &c. 

GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER. 

The right hon. Lord Mulgrave, &c, 



Amnut of a dispatch from Lord G. I.. Cower, to Lord Mulgravc, dated 
Pcter-bur^h, lid July, 1805. (No. 30.) 

My Lord, 

I WAS on the point of dispatching; yesterday the mesenger to 
England, when 1 received an invitation from Prince Czartorvski to a 
conference, in which he read to me some very important dispatches he 
had just received from Count Razoumofsky and General Winzingerode. 
By these it appears that the emperor of Germany is at last awakened to 
a sense of his true dignity, and the real interests of his empire ; and that 
foreseeing the inevitability of war, he is determined not to leave to 
Bonaparte the choice of the moment to commence hostilities. 
The right hon. Lord Mulgrave, &c. &c. 



Extract of a dispatch from Lord G. L. Gower, to Lord Mulgrave, dated 
St. Pctersburgh, 3d September, 1805. (No. 38.) 

My Lord, 

THE last dispatches from the Russian ambas>ador at Vienna speak 
in strong terms of the warlike temper of that cabinet ; certain commu- 
nications had been made from Paris, which indicated a yielding disposi- 
tion on the part of Bonaparte, but to the^e indications Count Cobentzel 
seems to attach no credit, and Count Razoumofsky represents that the 
present character of the Austrian mini, try is a direct contrast to its 
former timidity and indicision,and that a firm conviction seems now to 
prevail at Vienna, that it is through war alone that any security can be 
obtained against the ambition and power of France. There is just 
ground for expecting, that his imperial and royal majesty, being per- 
suaded that war is inevitable, may be induced not to wait the issue of 
the pioposed negotiations with the French government, but that he will 
commence hostilities at the time when the superiority of the allied 
forces promi es the best prospect of succes-,. Towa ds the beginning of 
October, the Au-trian army upon the Venetian frontier will be com- 
pletely to its full cstabli hment, and will without doubt be greatly 
superior in numbers to the French forces in Italy, and the Russian 
armies will be sufficiently advam cd into the hereditary -tares to ensure 
their arrival upon the frontiers of Bavaria, before the French troops 
from the coast and the interior of France can reach the German empire; 
I have, therefore, in several conversations lateiy with Prince Czartorysky 
and Comte Stadion, urged the expediency of losing no time in beginning 
the war. The prince informs me, that he has already instructed Comtc 
Razoumofsky to press this con-ideration upon the attention of the court 
of Vienna, but that he will not fail to repeat the instructions to the 
Rus-ian ambassador. 

I have great satisfaction in observing the encreased energy and vigour 
of this court. The Empi ror, foreseeing the possibility of Bonaparte 
effecting a large augmentation to the French army in consequence of 



the menaced attack by the allied powers, has resolved to be prepared t« 
meet such an effort, by a corresponding' exertion on his part, and he lias 
ordered a levy of four men out of every five hundred, which will produce 
above ijO,cco men. 

A corps of above ten thousand men, under the command of his 
Imperial highne 3 the Grand Duke Constantine, and composed chiefly of 
the garrison of St. Petersburgh, began their march toward the Prussian 
frontier on Thursday the 2:d. The troops destined for Pomerania are 
ready for en I ' will probably sail in about six or eight 

days; they amount to twenty thousand men. No dispatches, however, 
have been received from M. Alopeus, who was charged to negotiate 
with the King oi Sweden t! t necessary arrangements for the landing of 
the Russians at Stralsuad, and the augmentation of the Swedish garrison 
at that port. 

I have the honour to be, &c. £cc. 

GRANVILLE I.EVTSON GOWER. 



No. III. (A.) 

(Translation.) 

Plan of Operations proposed by the Court of Vienna. 

FRANCE, upon the new organization of her army, has on foot, 
112 regiments of the line, - - 40.1,828 men. 

30 regiments of light infantry, - 107,540 

85 cavalry, - 64,226 

16 artillery, *'.""" 21,4.30 

598,024 

This number, with the addition of the different corps in Corsica and 
the islands, of 21 regiments of Dutch soldiers, 11 Swiss regiments, 
18 auxiliary troops from Italy, and the Imperial guard, which consists 
of 15,000 men, makes a total of 651,964, the whole military force now 
on foot in France. These troops are for the greater part already on the 
war establishment. Any grand descent from England, upon the coa t 
of France, with the probability of decided success, is scarcely to be 
expected. Trance may therefore venture to draw almost all her troops 
from her interior, and from her coasts. besides, a well arranged 
national guard, in perfect discipline, would enable her to spare her 
troops of the line, even from where they had been employed in pra- 
serving domestic order and security. It follows, that France might 
c; ploy 500,000 men in Italy, Switzerland, and Germany. 

In opposition to that force, the 250,000 Austrians, and 115,000 
Russians, stipulated in the last treaty, compose a total force, which is, 
in comparison, so much the less to he depended upon, because very 
little effective assistance is to be expected from the Swedes and the 
English. The following are the necessary coaiclusions from th« 
statement. 



T-,t. Considering this estimate, and the advantages which Trance 
enjoys in its geographical situation, whether for defence or for aggres- 
of peace, tiil a more favourable conjuncture shall 
arise, seems to be infinitely desirable. 

ad If, however, war should become inevitable, not only to ensure 
its success, hut to avoid likewise evils more alarming than those of 
the present moment, it would become indispensihly necessary, that 
the sillied courts should use their most vigorous efforts to oppose those 
of the Enemy, and bring into efficiency means at least equal to their-, 
if not superior. 

The military arrangements, the financial, and the general policy of 
the allies, must con ur in putting forth those energies, by which alone 
we can hope to give success to our efforts. 

i t. Military arrangements. This co-operation in these three branches 
could be of very little effect, if the Austrian armie> should not come 
into the field more than ;,co,coo strong. The first of the papers sub- 
joined shews, what would be the deficiencies to be supplied in the Im- 
perial and Royal army, in recruiting, in appointments, and in rcmount- 
avalry, beisdes other augmentations, necessary to raise it from 
its present weak state, upon a peace establishment, to the number above- 
mentioned; and, at the same time, to leave the number of troops re- 
quisite for service in the interior of the Monarchy, and for the observ- 
ance of the movements of Prussia. 

The difficulties which strike upon a first view will appear still more 
considerable upon a due attention to the manner in which the Austrian 
troops arc now distributed. The line formed to prevent the introduc- 
tion of infectious disease, has indeed contributed to obviate, in part, 
that disadvantage, a- it leaves the Venetian dominions of the empire no 
longer in danger of a surprise from the French. But, if it were neces- 
sary to take measures to oppose a great force to that which the enemy 
might bring against us from the interior of his dominions, then would 
dispositions the most prompt and vigorous he requisite, to the season- 
able concentration of the An i bich ar , in great part, at a 
distance from the frontiers in danger.^to put. them upon the footing for 
war, and to bring them to act upon th<: points which are the most ex- 
posed. This first measure would require to be carried inro efiec" with 
the greater activity, because it could not be expected that thv troops of 
his Majesty the Emperor of Russia should, from such a distance, arrive 
on the scene of Action, tiil after the Austrian troops should have sus- 
tained the first attacks of the enemy. His Majesty will not be deterred 
by these great difficulties, if war should bei idable; he will, 
in that case, use his most strenuous endeavours to surmount every diffi- 
culty, and fulfil his engagements. But to give effect to this steady 
resolution, it is necessary; 

2dly. That there should he ade juate financial resources, and that 
the difficulties which present themselves under that head should be re- 
moved ; K the imperial court of St. Petersburgh has already been in- 
formed of the vasi and nece-sary expi nditure r< quired to put the infan- 
try, the cavalry, the carriages and rtillery, the objects of the commifla- 
ries' Department, the magazii i and stores, in hort, every tiling be- 
longing to the army, upon the .ill war establishment. The succour of 
fifteen millions of Florins, which has been asked from England for this 
primary service, is not more than one-half of what is actually wanted. 
The expense of each campaign of the last war was from one hunditd 



XII APPENDIX, 

and ten to one hundred and twenty millions. The subsequent rise af 
the prices of commodities would render the expense of the same objecs, 
now, considerably greater. But, suppose it even not to exceed the 
former, yet the subsidy of thirty millions of Florins, which is asked 
from England, added to the ordinary peace expenditure of the army, 
would leave still an enormous deficit, which the burthencd finances »f 
Austria could hnrdly make good. It follows that, unless England grant 
the subsidy which has been demanded, it mu<t be impossible for the 
Court of Vienna, notwithstanding its determined inclination, even t*» 
make those preparations for war, which are not to be attempted 
without an assurance of being able to follow them up, and maintain 
them. 

These considerations being; stated, it is next to be examined, whnt 
would be the detail of the operations of the armies in Italy, the Tyrol, 
Switzerland, and the frontiers of Germany, if they should make all 
their movements in perfect mutual concert. It is this concert of opera- 
tions which must meet the first plans and marches of the enemy. Its 
prompt or tardy success, its favourable or unfavourable result, will de- 
termine, in fact, the whole fortune of the war, and of course, the fate 
of Europe. 

Considering the geographical position of France; its German fron- 
tier ; Switzerland, which is in subjugation to it ; and the Italian repub- 
lic ; and obsei vin.r, on the other hand, the position of the hereditary 
dominions of Austria; it i- impossible not to discern, that it would be 
imprudent to make any attempt from Germany, against France, in Al- 
sace, or on the Rhine. Such an attempt could be made, only, by passing 
the Rhine at Manheim, or by laying siege to Mentz. 

In the first of these er.terprizes, tne-e would he the vast disadvantage 
of advancing, from the very first step, amidst fortified places of the 
greatest strength ; of being forced to carry on a war of sieges, with an 
enormous consumption of men and money, and without a prospect of 
any happier issue of the campaign, even at the best, than by the re- 
duction of one of those strong places. To undertake the siege of Mentz, 
at least <;o,coo men would be necessary to blockade the place, and to 
cover the operations of the siege. The extent and strength of Mentz 
are such, that we should be detained befoe that place alone for half 
the campaign ; and no operation subsequent to its surrender, could lead 
to any but very uncertain and insecure results; because the places upon 
the Meuse on the one side, and in Alsace on the other, would every 
where arres the progress of our armies. Add to these another conside- 
ration of not less weight, that, since neither of those operations could 
he carried into effect, but by great armies, there would be few troops 
left to cover the Upper Rhine. The enemy might avail himself of 
that local weakness ; might drect his attack there, while we should be 
occupied in the siege cf Landau or Mentz; and might thus advance in 
a line of operation shorter than ours ; might possess himself of our 
communications ; and might get between us and all our supplies. To 
avoid bein^ cut off from these, we should, in that case, be obliged to 
abandon every thing without striking a blow. 

An attempt through Switzerland, against Franche Comfe, would he,, 
indisputably, the most formidable to ihe enemy. His frontiers are there 
open. But, as such a plan of operation could not he carried into. effect 
but through Swabia, by ihe Voralberg, or below the Lake of Constance, 
©n account of the impossibility of having supplies conveyed through the 



Al-TENDIX. XIII 

Tyrol; it would be necessary, before attempting il, to have made con- 
siderab'e progress in Swabia, and 10 have an army of observation op- 
posite Strasb'.rg, to watch the enemy. It would even be necessary to 
have obtained some advantages in Italy, before hazarding an atiack in 
Switzerland. A retreat of the army in Italy toward- Klagenfurt, would 
prevent the army in the Tyrol from joining in the operations •'■' Swit- 
zerland. The enemy would possess them elves of the Puster-Thal, (the 
Pu;tcr-Thal is the Tyrol between Brixen and Lientz, and communi- 
cates with the vale of the Adige), on the great road for our communi- 
cations and conveyances to and from the Tyrol. We should be com- 
pelled to detach troops from the army in Germany for the interior de- 
fence of Austria, and not only to relinquish all offensive operations, 
but even to confine ourselves within the line of the Lech, or, possibly, 
the Inn in Germany, and there to take a defensive position, in order 
not to be at too great a distance from Au-tria, and to be ready to supply 
with due promptitude the assistance which might there be wanted. It 
follows, from all these considerations, that the war .-hould begin with 
vigorous offensive operations in Italy. It is there we should act with the 
superior force of our army. A victory gained there, would afford us 
the :ame advantages for the prosecution of offensive operations against 
France, which France would acquire from our loss of a battle, in order 
to penetrate into the Austrian heieditary dominions. If the difficulties 
of our situation render it even impossible for us to arm and advance to 
ac~t upon the frontier as soon as the enemy, hew much less is it to be 
expefted. that the troops of the Emperor of Russia could arrive in 
time to act at the very commencement of the war ? 

It would be the interest of France to use every means to anticipate 
their arrival, by an early and decLive superiority. Any concentration 
of our troops, or the march of the Russian:;, would not fail to afford 
Bonaparte a specious pretext to dec'aie war. The force of this obser- 
yation is, to prove, that, in case of war with France, the plan of 
operations, first distribution and disposal of the troops, the com- 
mencement and the first progress of the military movements, must 
be arranged, on the supposition that war will be begun by the Aus- 
trians alone. 

It wou'd be requi ite, that the army in Italy should begin its move- 
ments with forcing the passage of the Adige, dislodging the enemy from 
the Mincio, investing Mantua and Te-chiera, detaching a body of troops 
to the Po to observe die South of Italy, and open its way to the Adda, 
in order to cover the blockade or siege of the e places. Only the re- 
duction of tbese two fortresses, or some such great and fortunate events, 
as are not to be reckoned upon, could induce the commandant of this 
army :o push his operation-, farther. 

The army in Germany would commence its operations by parsing the 
Inn, would enter Bavaria, and would there await on the Lech, the 
movements of the other armies, and in particular, the arrival of the 
troops from Russia. The army in the Tyrol would be determined in 
its movements by those of the armies in Italy and Germany 

In the case of operations against Switzerland, a part of the troops in 
the Tyrol would be employed in an attack on the Grisonsand the other 
small cantons ; and the rest would, in the case of the success of the 
army in Italy, advance from its defensive positions, and join that 
army. This is all that, with our greatest efforts, and upon the'snp- 
position of decided success, we can expect to accompli*!!, till the whole 



of the plans and powers of the coalition shall he in full activity. If 
Italy be the grand point of operation at the commencement of hostilities, 
Switzerland must become such, as >oon as we shall hive obtained 
successes in that quarter, and shall have advanced through Swabia. 
Swiczerland offers to a conqueror the advantage of the shortest commu- 
nic?:>in between Italy and Germany; it gives the facility of sending 
sapp&3« and reinforcements with promptitude to the one or the other 
«f these countries ; and it is only through Switzerland that an entrance 
can be effected into France on the side of Franche Comte. It would 
then be necessary to cover ourselves on the side of Alsace, by taking 
Eefort and Hunningen, and leaving, at the same time, a considerable 
body of troops in Swabia, to cover the right wing of the army in 
Switzerland from any of the attempts by the French from Strasburg, 
and to protect our communications, and ensure the conveyance of 
supplies. 

The reasons have been explained, on account of which, in the general 
plan of operations, it is not indicated in what manner the troops of the 
two Imperial courts might co-operate, either in union under the same, 
standards, or by a Concert in their movements. We must look for- 
ward to the case of Austria being attacked by France before the arrival 
cf the Russians in Germany. The combination of the operations of the 
two Courts would then depend upon the resolution of Prussia. And, 
thanks to the wise measures of the Fmperor Alexander ! we are soon 
to learn decisively how far we may or may not reckon upon Prussian 
co-operation, upon the neutrality of that power, or its rejection of our 
propositions. We shall then be enabled to present to the Imperial 
Court of Russia, upon the request which it has communicated, propo- 
sals for its co-operation towards the common and general object. 

We may here previously submit the consideration, that the line of 
operation in Italy is the most remote, and that i( is there the campaign 
must be opened with the greatest vigour ; that the Court of Vienna 
will therefore send a great army into Italy, in order to act with rapidity 
upon that line ; and that therefore the march of the Russian troops, and 
their substitution for those of Austria, amidst the movements of the 
war in Italy, would be impossible. 

As soon as we shall certainly know the result of the great and im- 
portant step which his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias has 
taken at the Court of Berlin, we shall add, without delay, whatever 
remains to be communicated farther upon the subject of the friendly 
propositions here explained, and upon the plan of operations for the 
two Courts, in Germany, and shall forthwith submit it to the Court of 
Russia. 



TREATY OF PRESBURGH.- 

(uSUAL PREAMBLE.) 

Art. I. There shall be from the date of this day peace and friend- 
jhip between his Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria, and 
his Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, their heirs and 
successors, their States and subjects respectively, for ever. 

II. France shall continue to possess to property and sovereignty the 
Butchies, Principalities, Lordfhips, and territories beyond the Alps, 



APPENDIX. IV 

which were before the present Treaty united and incorporated with 
the French Empire, or governed by the Laws and Government of 
France. 

III. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria, for him- 
self, his heirs, and successors, recognise* the dispositions made by his 
Majesty the Emperor of France, King of Italy, relative to the Princi- 
palities of Lucca and Piombino. 

IV. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria renounces, 
as well for himself, as for his heirs and successors, that part of the 
States of the Republic of Venice, ceded to him by the Treaties of 
Camoo Formio and Luneville, {hall be united in perpetuity to the 
kingdom of Italy. 

V. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria acknow- 
ledges his Majesty the Emperor of the French King of Italy ; but it 
is agreed that, in conformity with the declaration made by his Majesty 
the Emperor of the French, at the moment when he took the Crown 
of Italy, that as soon as the parties named in that declaration {hall 
have fulfilled the conditions therein expressed, the Crowns of France 
and Italy shall be separated for ever, and cannot in any case be united 
on the same head. His Maje>ty the Emperor of Germany binds him- 
self to acknowledge, on the separation, the successor his Majesty the 
Emperor of the French fliall appoint to himself as King of Italy. 

VI. The present treaty of peace is declared to comprehend their 
most Serene Highnesses the Electors of Bavaria, Wir-tertibepg, and 
Baden, and the Batavian Republic, allies of his Majesty the Emperor 
of the French, in the present war. 

VII. The Electors of Bavaria and Wirtemberg having taken the 
title of King, without ceasing nevertheless to belong to the Germanic 
confederation, his Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria ac- 
knowledges them in that character. 

VIII. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria, as well 
as himself, his heirs and successors, as for the Princes of his House, 
their heirs and successors respectively, renounces the Principalities, 
Lordfhips, Domains, and Territories herein-after specified : — 

Cedes and abandons to his Majesty the King of Bavaria, the Mar- 
graviate of Bureau and its dependencies, the Principality of Eichstadt, 
the part of the territory of Pas ; au belonging to the Elector of Salz- 
burg, and situated between Bohemia, Austria, the Danube and the 
Inn ; the county of Tyrol, comprehending therein the Principalities of 
Brixen and Botzen, the seven Lordships of the Voralberg, with their 
detached dependencies; the county of Hohenems, the county of 
Konigsegg, Rotrensels, the Lordships of Tetnany and Argen, and the 
town and territory of Lindan. 

To his Majesty the King of Wirtemberg, the five cities of the 
Danube, to wit — Ehingen, Munderkengen, Rudlingen, Mengen, and 
Susgaw, with their dependencies, the city of Constance excepted, 
that part of the Brisgaw which extends in the possessions of Wirtem- 
berg, and situated to the East of a line, drawn from Schlegelberg to 
Molback, and the towns and territories of Willens;en and Brentinicn. — 
To his moit Serene Highness the Elector of Baden, the Brisgaw (with 
the exception of the branch and separate portions above described), 
the Ortenaw and other dependencies, the city of Constance, and the 
■ commanding of Mcinau. 

The Principalities, Lordfliips, Domains, and territories above-men* 



tinned, fiiall be posses-ed respectively by their Majesties, the Kings of 
Bavaria and Wirtcmberg, and by his most Serene Highness the Elector 
of Baden, as well in paramount as in full property and sovereignty, in 
the same manner, with which they were possessed by his Majesty the 
Emperor of Germany and Austria, or the Princes of his House, and 
not otherwise. 

IX. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria acknow* 
ledges the debts contracted by the House of Austria, for the benefit 
of private persons and public establishments of the country, making at 
present an integrant part of the French Empire, and it is agreed that 
his said Majesty shall remain free from all obligation with respetft to 
any debts whatsoever which the House of Austria may have con- 
tracted, on the ground of the possession and of securities on the soil 
of the countries which it renounces by the present treaty. 

X. The county of Salzburgh and of Berchtolsgaden, belonging td 
liis Royal and Hc&oral Highne-s, Prince Ferdinand, shall be incorpo- 
rated with the Empire of Austria, and his Majesty the Emperor of 
Germany and Austria shall possess them in full property and sove- 
reignty, but by the tit ; e of a Duchy only. 

XI. HisMajcsty the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, engages 
himself to obtain, in favour of the Archduke Ferdinand, Eledlor of 
Salzburgh, the cession of his Majefty the Fving of Bavaria, of the 
Principality of Wurtzburgh, such as it has been given to his said 
Maje-ty by the recess of the Deputation of the Germanic Empire, of 
the 25th Feb. 1803. 

The Ele&oral title of his R. H. shall be transferred to this Principa- 
lity, which to his R. H. shall possess in lull property and sovereignty, 
in the same manner and on the same conditions that he possessed the 
Electorate of Saltzlurgh. 

And with respect to debts, it is agreed, that the new possessor shall 
stand charged only with those debts resulting from loans formerly 
agreed to by the States of the country, or the expences incurred for the 
effective administration of the said country. 

XII. The dignity of the grand Master of the Teutonic Order, its 
rights, domains and revenues, which before the present war were de- 
pendencies of Mergentheim, the chief place of the Order; the other 
rights, domains and revenues, which shall be found to belong to the 
grand masterfhip at the present time of the exchange of the ratification 
of the present treaty; as well as the domains and revenues in possession 
of which the said Order shall be, at the same epoch, shall become he- 
reditary in the per on and descendants in the direct male line, accord- 
ing to the order of primogeniture, in which ever of the Princes of 
the Imperial Hou=e as shall be appointed by his Majesty the Emperor 
cf Germany and Austria. His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon pro- 
mises his good offices to obtain, as soon as possible, for his Royal 
Highness the Archduke Ferdinand a full and entire indemnity in Ger- 
many. 

XIII. His Majesty the Elector of Bavaria shall occupy the city of 
Augsberg and its territory, and unite them to his States, in full pro- 
perty and sovereignty. In the same manner the King of Wirtemberg 
may occupy, to his States, and possess in full property and sovereignty 
the county of Borndorff; and his Majesty the Emperor of Germany 
and Austria engages himself to give no opposition. 

XIV. Their Majesties the Kings 0/ Bavaria and Wiftemberg, and 



APPENDIX. .vij 

bis most Serene H'ghne« the Elector of Baden, shall enjoy over this 
territories ceded, as well a over their ancient estates, the plenitude of 
sovereignty, and all the rights resulting from it, which have been 
guaranteed to them by his Majesty the Emperor of the French and King 
of Italy, in the «ame manner as his Majesty the Emperor of Germany 
and Austria, and his Majesty the King of Prussia, over their German 
States. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria, both as 
chief of the empire, and as co-estates, engages himself not to oppose 
any ob>tacle to the execution of the acts \vh ch they may have made, 
or will make in consequence. 

XV. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria, as well 
for himself, his heirs and successors, as for the Princes of his House, 
their heirs and succe sors, renounces all the rights as well of sove- 
reignty i as of paramount right to all pretensions whatsoever, actual or 
eventual, on all the States, without exception, of their Majesties, the 
Kings of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, and of his most Serene Highnes 
the Elector of Baden, and generally on all the states domains, and 
territories comprised in the circles of Bavaria, Franconia.. and Suabia, 
as well as to every title, taken f om the said domains and territories; 
and reciprocally, all pretensions, actual or eventua , of the said States, 
to the charge of the House of Austria, or as Princes are, ami fhall be, 
for ever extinguished ; neverthe!e s the renunciations contained in the 
present article, do not concern the properties which a:e by the nth 
article, or which shall be by virtue of the 12th article ahove, con- 
ceded to their Royal Hi-hnesses the Archdukes, named in the said 
artiles. 

XVI. The titles of the domains and archives, the plans and maps of 
the different countries, towns and fortrcses ceded by the present 
treaty, shall be given up in the space of three months from the date of 
the exchange of the ratifications, to the persons that shall have ac- 
quired the property of them 

XVII. His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon guarantees the integrity 
of the empire of Austria in the state in which it shall be in conse- 
quence of the present treaty of peace, as well as the integrky of the 
possessions of the Princes of the House of Austria, pointed out in the 
Iith and 12th articles. 

XVII I. The high contracting parties acknowlege the independence of 
the Helvetic republic, as establifhed by the a<it of mediation, as well 
ssthe independence of the Batavian repub'ic. 

XIX. The piisoners of war made by France and her allies from 
Austria, and by Austria from France and her allies, and who have nor 
been yet restored, hall be restored within 40 days from the date of 
the exchange of the ratifications of the prehcut treaty. 

XX. All commercial communications and relations are re-established 
in the two countries on the same footing as before the war. 

XXI. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria, and his 
Majesty the Emperor of the French and Kin; of Italy, shall maintain 
between them the same ceremonial as to rank and etiquette as was ob- 
served before the present war. 

XXII. Within five days from the exchange of the ratifications of the 
prccnt treaty, the town of Presburg, and its environs, to the extenc 
of my leagues, shall be evacuated. Ten days after the said c>: b 

the French, and the troops of the allies of France, shall evacuate yl •■ 

ravia, Bohemia, the Viertcl Unter Vienuei', Wald, the Viertel l'u' •.' 

b 



Manhertsbei g, Hungary, and the whole of Styria. In the ten follow-* 
ing days they shall evacuate the Viertel Vienner Wald, and the Viertel 
Obcr Manhertsberg ; and finally, in the space of two months frjm the 
exchange of" the ratifications, the French troop-, and the troops of the 
allies of France, shall evacuate the whole of the Hereditary States of his 
Majesty the Emperor of Germany and of Austria, with the ex eption 
of the place of Braunau, which shall remain for one month at the dis- 
posal of his Majesty the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, 
as a place of dep ct for the sick and forthc artillery. 

No requisition, of whatever nature, shall be made of the inhabitants 
during that month. Eut it is agreed that at the expiration of the said 
month, no corps whatever of Austiian troops can be stationed or intro- 
duced within a circuit of six leagnes around the said place of Brannau. 
It is in like manner agreed, that each of the places which are to be 
successively evacuated by the French troops within the times above- 
tnentioned, shall not be taken possession of by the Austrian troops till 
eight and forty hoars after the evacuation. It is also agreed, that the 
magazines left by the French army, in the places which they hall suc- 
cessively evacuate, shall remain at its disposal; and that the high con- 
tracting parties shall make an arrangement relative to all contributions 
of war whatsoever imposed on the different hereditary states occupied 
by the French, an arrangement in virtue of which, the raiting of the 
said contributions -hall entirely cease from the day of the exchange of 
the ratifications. The French army shall draw its provision- and its 
Sustenance from its own magazines, established on the routes by which 
it is to proceed. 

XXIII. Immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of the 
present treaty, commissaries shall be named on both sides to give up and 
receive in the name- of their respective sovereigns, all pai ts of the Vene- 
tian territory, not occupied by the troops of his Majesty the Emperor 
of the French and Kin- of Italy. The city of Venice, the Lagunes, and 
the possessions of 1 en a Firma, shall be given up in the space of fifteen 
days ; Venetian Istria and Dalmatia, the mouths of the Cattaro, the 
Venetian Isles in the Adriatic, and all the places and forts which they 
contain, in the space of six weeks from the exchange of the ratifications. 
The respective commissaries tvill take care that the separation of the 
artillery belonging to the Repub.ic of Venice from the Austrian artil- 
lery be exactly made, the former being to remain entirely to the king- 
dom of Italy. They will determine by a mutual agreement the kind 
and nature of the objects, which being the property of the Emperor of 
Germany and of Austria, are consequently to remain at his disposal. 
They will agree either on the sale to the kingdom of Italy, of the ob- 
ject above-mentioned, or their exchange for an equivalent quantity of 
artillery, or other objects of the same, or a different nature, which 
shall have been left by the French armies in the hereditary states. 

Every facility and every as istance shal be given to the Austrian 
troops, and to the civi! and military administrations, to return into the 
Austrian states by the most convenient and sure ways, as we ll as to the 
coi veyance of the impe ial artillery, the naval and military ma^aemae, 
and other objects which are not comprehended in the stipulations of 
sale or exchange which may be made. 

XXIV The ratifications of the present treaty shall be exchanges! 
Within the pace of eight days, or sooner, if possible. 

Done and signed at Presburg, the a6th December, i8oj„ 

THE E ND . 



C. Stozver, Printer, Patcrnosfer-raiv. 



